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ABSTRACT
This research explores the unique relationship between covert action and leader
survivability, in particular, how leadership styles and personality traits influence this
relationship. The life of a ruler is ephemeral. For those who are lucky, their exit from
office is through retirement or old age. For most, their tenure is short, often ending
through violent means. The overthrow of rulers by their rivals is a common theme
throughout world history, and the strategy remains a popular choice in contemporary
warfare. However, despite the frequency of regime change, very little is discussed in
international relations about covert regime change and its effects on leader survival. The
research methodology of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) will be
used to empirically test the hypothesis that the extent of a leader’s survivability following
US covert action event, is influenced by his or her respective personality trait and
leadership style. The dependent variable is survival—whether leaders live or die—and
the independent variables are: leader characteristics, public dissent, global instability,
internal conflict, and regime type. Case studies will focus on eight covert action events
that were both successful and unsuccessful, which include: Iran, Guatemala, Indonesia,
Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Republic of Vietnam,
and Chile in order to answer the research question: to what extent, if any, can leader
survival be predicted based on analyses of US-sanctioned covert action events during the
Cold War era?
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CHAPTER I –INTRODUCTION
In The Guns of August, Barbara Tuchman famously wrote, “We were not going to
misjudge or precipitously push our adversaries into a course of action that was not
intended or anticipated”1 She was referring specifically to events leading up to the
outbreak of World War I in August 1914. Some years later during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, American President John F. Kennedy referred to her words to express his
intentions of not letting events control crisis but that he would control the
events…through the use of covert actions.
Enigmatic and shrouded in secrecy, covert actions by states have often been
described as the shadowy means of influencing people and events. As John Breen notes
in his article titled, Disciples: The World War II Missions of the CIA Directors Who
Fought for Wild Bill Donovan, “Morally dubious as it may sometimes be, Presidents rely
on covert action as a vital means by which to implement identifiable foreign policy
objectives in support of US national security” (Breen 2016, 71). During the Cold War
and, in a post-Cold War world where asymmetric threats regularly evolve rapidly, the
‘quiet option’ was often perceived as an appealing alternative to overt war, but do leaders
of covert regime change survive to tell the tale?
Building on extensive archival research at the National Archives and Record
Administration, the National Security Archives and the Library of Congress, this
dissertation uses historical case studies to gather the requisite evidence to address the
research question: to what extent, if any, can leader survival be predicted based on
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Every American President has used some form of covert action to control the course of events. This
dissertation will focus on the effects of covert action on leader survival.
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analyses of US-sanctioned covert action events during the Cold War era? It will test the
hypothesis relating to survivability of leaders in varying types of situations by looking at
leadership styles and backgrounds of individuals in power during covert action events.
This dissertation will focus on leaders who took power as a result of the coup under
consideration, as well as leaders who were removed from power. Additionally, this
dissertation will present and analyze, comparatively, the following eight case studies:
Iran (1952–1953), Guatemala (1953–1954), Indonesia (1955–1958), Dominican Republic
(1959–1961), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1960–1961), Cuba (1961–1962),
Republic of Vietnam (1963), and Chile (1970–1973). Finally, the research methodology
of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) will be employed to empirically
distinguish between cases of US covert action over a specific timeframe (1952–1973).
The hypothesis to be presented and assessed in response to the research question is as
follows:
H1: Leader survival can be predicted based on analyses of US-sanctioned covert action
events during the Cold War era.
H0: Leader survival cannot be predicted based on analyses of US-sanctioned covert
action events during the Cold War era.
Dependent Variable
Survival—This dissertation addresses US-sanctioned covert action events,
leadership characteristics, and leader survival. The primary focus is on whether leaders
lived or died; it is not focused on political survivability.
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Independent Variables
Leader Characteristics—Leader demonstrates a charismatic, introverted,
extroverted personality type, is well-educated, has a military background.
Public Dissent—Protests or mass mobilization of local populace against leader.
Global Instability—Leader has experienced the occurrence of major war or conflict
during that period of time.
Internal Conflict—Country has just experienced or is experiencing coup and/or
revolution.
Regime Type—Was the country a democracy, theocracy, authoritarian regime, or other?
Significance of the Study
Covert actions are not only frequent, they also have broad and long-lasting effects
for all states involved. For target states, the consequences are often catastrophic.
Moreover, covert operations have brought brutal dictators to power and also fueled and
extended bloody civil wars by providing arms and resources to insurgent groups and
warlords who could not have continued fighting without external support. Even
nonviolent covert operations undermine the target state’s self-determination and
sovereignty. For intervening states, the consequences can also be costly. Poorly
executed operations spark long, costly wars where there would otherwise likely have
been a quick and easy victory. Exposed covert operations can provoke an international
backlash, one that weakens American diplomatic and political authority. Domestically,
these missions can undermine a state’s democratic ideals by creating a situation where
political leaders are unaccountable to their citizens. Yet, at the same time, foreignimposed regime changes can also have positive effects. For the intervening state,
3

successful covert operations can bolster their security by replacing a hostile regime with a
friendly one or by preventing a neutral state from joining an opposing alliance. More
importantly, “To the extent that leaders of foreign states matter for foreign policy, we
should care whether one is facing a risk of irregular and unexpected removal” (Ward and
Beger 2017, 142).
One of the most notable examples of foreign-imposed regime changes and the
positive effects they bring forth include United States’ covert operations to curtail Soviet
influence in Eastern Europe by methodically dismantling regimes that Moscow had
created since World War II. To achieve its objective, the United States pursued a myriad
of covert action tactics to include economic warfare—strategic embargo of key
commodities to the Soviet Bloc—as well as psychological warfare in an attempt to
influence attitudes in foreign countries. The United States also developed underground
resistance movements to facilitate, support, arm, and mobilize guerilla forces to
overthrow Soviet-backed regimes.2 O’Rourke notes that “America’s first covert
offensive operations sought to roll back Soviet influence in Eastern Europe by toppling
the regimes that the USSR had established following WWII” (O’Rourke 2013, 104).
Internal divisions within the Soviet Union and its draconian strategy to maintain control
through collectivization and purges, along with divisions within the Communist Party,
prevented it from initiating a cohesive strategic policy. More importantly, it allowed the
United States to exploit their vulnerabilities through economic and psychological
warfare.

2

National Security Directive 5412/2 (December 28, 1955).
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O’Rourke’s doctoral thesis, in which she created an original dataset of all USorchestrated covert regime changes during the Cold War, provided the inspiration for this
study. Her primary argument was that covert regime change played a more significant
role in US Cold War strategy than was commonly believed. This dissertation seeks to
expand on her research by analyzing covert regime change case studies, specifically,
from the perspective of leader survivability. Moreover, it seeks to bring forth the human
element of covert regime change by analyzing personality traits and leadership styles of
leaders who were in power during these events. Whereas Dr. O’Rourke asked the
research questions: why do states attempt regime change, when will states conduct
regime change operations covertly versus overtly, and how successful are these missions
in achieving their foreign policy goals? This researcher asks: To what extent, if any, do
personality traits and leadership styles influence survivability of leaders following US
covert action? It will test the hypothesis relating to survivability of leaders in varying
types of situations by looking at leadership styles and backgrounds of individuals in
power during covert action events.
Variables and Variable Designation
Survival (s) = Leader Characteristics (lc) + Public Dissent (pd) + Global Instability (gi) +
Internal Conflict (ic) + Regime Type (rt) or s= lc+pd+gi+ ic+rt.
Leader Characteristics: Archigos Political Leaders Dataset; Public Dissent: Archigos
Political Leaders Dataset); Global Instability: Polity IV Database; Internal Conflict:
Polity IV Database/Ethnic Power Relations Database; Regime Type: Polity IV Database.
With the preceding discussion providing the necessary historical and theoretical
foundation, this dissertation addresses US covert action events, leadership
5

style/personality traits, and leader survival that includes Chapter I provides the
introduction, research questions, proposed hypotheses, significance of the research
question, and presents a synopsis of the structure of the balance of the dissertation that
serves as a gateway into the following chapters. Chapter II offers a review of relevant
literature on covert action and leadership traits from peer-reviewed publications. Chapter
III provides the methodology portion of the dissertation. Qualitative comparative
analysis will be used to empirically distinguish the extent of a leader’s survival following
US covert action and enable the researcher to focus on the fate of regime leaders.
Chapters IV –XI provide details of eight US-covert action case studies.
Chapter IV Iran (1952–1953)
Primary tactic involved coup d’état under a constitutional monarchy with a
democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Primary objective was a
joint British and American effort to orchestrate a coup d’état against Mossadegh in favor
of General Fazollah Zahedi and Shah Pahlavi. The primary propaganda involved funding
dissident groups and sabotage. Type of covert operation was preventative in nature with
a successful regime change.
Chapter V Guatemala (1953–1954)
Primary tactics involved coup d’etat and dissidents with a target government of
democracy headed by Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and a proposed government with a regime
led by General Castillo Armas. The coup against Arbenz involved Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) recruited, trained, armed, and funded dissident forces to stage mock
invasion of country, propaganda, sabotage, regime destabilization, and limited direct
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American fighting. Type of covert operation was preventative in nature with a successful
regime change.
Chapter VI Indonesia (1955–1958)
Primary tactic involved coup d’état with a target government and authoritarian
regime led by President Sukarno and a proposed government of non-communist, proAmerican regime. Support for coup d’état plot against President Sukarno resulted in an
unsuccessful regime change.
Chapter VII Dominican Republic (1959–1961)
Primary tactics involved coup d’état and assassination with a target government
led by Rafael Trujillo and a proposed government of non-communist, pro-American
regime. Support for coup d’état and assassination of Trujillo resulted in a successful
regime change.
Chapter VIII Democratic Republic of the Congo (1960–1961)
Primary tactics involved coup d’état and assassination with the target democratic
government led by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and a proposed government of a
non-communist pro-American regime. At least two assassination plots were attempted
against democratically-elected Prime Minister Patrice. Type of covert operation was
preventative in nature with a successful regime change.
Chapter IV Cuba (1961–1962)
Primary tactics involved coup d’état and assassination plans with a target
communist government led by Fidel Castro and a proposed government of pro-American
regime led by José Cardona, who was a Cuban exile in the United States. Support for
coup d’état resulted in an unsuccessful regime change.
7

Chapter X Republic of Vietnam (1963)
Primary tactic involved coup d’état with a target government led by Ngo Dinh
Diem and a proposed government of pro-American regime led by General Doung Van
Minh. Support for coup d’état (that inadvertently led to the assassination) of South
Vietnamese ruler, Ngo Dinh Diem resulted in a successful regime change.
Chapter XI Chile (1970–1973)
Primary tactic involved coup d’état with a target government led by
democratically-elected Socialist party led by Salvador Allende and a proposed
government of democratically-elected Christian Democrats led by Eduardo Fre and a
military junta. Secondary support for coup d’état (that inadvertently led to the
assassination) of Renee Schneider resulted in a successful regime change.
Chapter XII concludes by describing the fsQCA process in detail, proposing
potential avenues for future research, and policy recommendations of the findings. This
dissertation will explore cases that illustrate how leadership styles and personality traits
influenced leader survival following US-sanctioned covert action.

8

CHAPTER II – LITERATURE REVIEW
The purpose of this literature review is to explore classic and contemporary works
on covert action during the Cold War, place it within the theoretical framework of
international relations theory, and use a leadership legitimacy model to explain leader
survival. Chapter II begins with a discussion of the basic tenets of covert action,
continues with a detailed review of leadership traits and criteria, offers a compelling
argument for the effects of strong and weak political institutions on leader survival,
analyzes how political and social environments influence leaders and their adaptability to
varying situations transitioning to how covert actions influence leader survival, and ends
with an introduction to the dissertation’s theoretical framework. An introduction to the
theories that create the conceptual framework around this study will round out Chapter II
and each section is intended to flow in a seamless fashion.
The topics of leadership and covert action remain under-explored and, while
researchers have focused on the psychological aspects of leadership, very few have
delved into the effects of covert action on leader survival. This dissertation contributes to
the existing literature by focusing on classic and contemporary peer review publications
on covert action while interweaving a unique blend of case studies on the social
background and careers of leaders in order to determine the effects of covert action on
these individuals. It will test the hypothesis relating to survivability of leaders in varying
types of situations by looking at leadership styles and backgrounds of individuals in
power during US orchestrated covert action events.

9

A Review of Covert Action Research
In the movie Argo, Ben Affleck’s character Jack O’Donnell comments, “This is
the best bad idea we have, Sir.” He was referring to a dramatic plot conceived by United
States government officials to rescue six American hostages from Iran in 1979. While
Hollywood’s version of covert action painted an image of the CIA as a rogue
organization without oversight, the reality was far from fantasy.
Different types of covert action include covert political action that intends to
influence the intentions of a foreign power without disclosing US involvement or
intentions; covert media action used to influence public opinion or perceptions through
the use of newspapers, magazine articles, radio, television, and the internet; and covert
economic action, also called economic warfare, used to affect the economy of a target
country, particularly its ability to wage war or sponsor an insurgency in another country.
Covert action is intended to achieve national security objectives in a foreign country
without disclosing the identity or full intentions of the sponsor; finally, it used to
influence the intentions of a foreign power in the target country producing overt results.
The Church Committee Hearings
The 1975 Senate inquiry into possible and questionable activities conducted by
the CIA and other intelligence agencies painted an image of a “rogue CIA” that “was
conducting covert operations of its own making irrespective of US policy” (Frank Church
from the Church Committee transcripts). The investigation revealed the contrary. All
programs under investigation had been ordered by the President of the United States.
Moreover, future presidents would have to justify the need for covert action and report
this request through a finding. The Cold War provided fertile ground for the use of
10

covert action as the United States attempted to gain and maintain the upper hand against
the threats to its interests and those of its allies posed by the Soviet Union.
The term ‘covert action’ is often misunderstood as something intended to be
secret. In actuality, it is simply “designed to be unacknowledged” (Wood 2014, 8).
Lowenthal (2017) depicts the increase in violence and the decrease of deniability in his
illustration shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Lowenthal’s Covert Action Ladder (Lowenthal 2017)
Daugherty (2004), a 17-year veteran operations officer with the CIA, articulates
the many ways in which American presidents have resorted to the use of covert action as
a tool of foreign policy since World War II. Unlike traditional intelligence programs
such as information collection and counterintelligence operations, covert action programs
are truly presidential in that presidential directives create them, and oversight is managed
by US national security executives. Furthermore, covert action programs are managed by
intelligence agencies because they offer the requisite financial support and secrecy. As
Daugherty notes, covert programs are composed of subordinate operations that may
11

include “propaganda—white, gray, and black; political/economic action—a category of
influence operations limited only by imagination; paramilitary structure, such as the
clandestine ex-filtration of a compromised individual from hostile territory; and
information warfare—the destruction of a computer or the manipulation of its data
through undetected intrusion” (2004, 71–89). His main argument is that covert action is a
legitimate tool of US foreign policy and, as such, its programs are managed through
congressional and legal oversight. Daugherty also notes, “In assessing the results of an
umbrella covert action program, or its individual operational components, the concept of
success must be considered in isolation of other strengths and weaknesses, for it has
different definitions dependent upon the evaluator’s perspective” (Daugherty 2004, 8).
He adds that policymakers would consider a covert action program to be a success if it
achieves the intended policy objectives and the sponsorship role of the government
remains hidden. Specifically, the use of covert action to effect regime change has led to
overreliance on a tool that has limited utility in the first place. The overthrow of the Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran in August 1953, the ouster of President Jacobo Arbenz
in Guatemala in June 1954, and the attempt to reverse the Sukarno government in
Indonesia in 1956–57 are all examples of the valuable lessons learned from covert action
to effect regime change. He adds, “The failure of the Indonesian program in no way
diminished the Eisenhower administration’s zeal for regime reversal; it was a valuable
lesson ignored” (Daugherty 2004, 141-44). Additionally, on the covert action ladder,
propaganda is listed as being low in its relationship to violence and high in its
relationship to plausible deniability. On the other hand, paramilitary force is ranked as
high in its relationship to violence and low in its relationship to plausible deniability. In
12

essence, covert action is an effective tool of US foreign policy. Moreover, it will always
exist and is an effective tool of American foreign policy only if leaders understand its
benefits, limitations, and the risk of long-standing consequences. The post-Cold War
world has consistently provided a new set of challenges and presidents often must rely on
covert action to counter global threats. In the hostile environment of today’s global stage,
hostile nations threaten America’s national security and transnational terrorism or nonstate actors exploit ungoverned space to launch asymmetric attacks for exponential
effects.
As Lowenthal notes, “covert actions are extraordinary steps, something between
the states of peace and war” (2009, 167). Despite the lengthy oversight mechanisms,
elaborate approval and review processes, meticulous Congressional oversight measures,
accountability, and budgetary considerations, the question of morality remains the crux of
what makes covert action so controversial. Johnson defines covert action as “A phrase
used to identify the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives through secret
intervention into the affairs of other nations” (1989, 81). He adds that the appeal of using
covert action is evident in the magnitude of funding made available for operations from
1947 to 1986 and that these fluctuations reveal the “attractiveness to policymakers of
using the quiet option as an instrument of foreign affairs” (Johnson 1989, 82). During the
Gerald R. Ford and James E. Carter presidential administrations, the approval and review
process for covert operations evolved into a complicated web of oversight. Following the
1986–1987 Iran-Contra affairs, Congress implemented tougher procedures governing
intelligence oversight actions.
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Covert actions may also include subversive techniques designed to erode the
foundation of a country’s government, thereby leading to a coup d’état. Examples
include CIA involvement in overthrowing the governments of Iran (1952–1953) and
Guatemala (1952–1954). Kinzer’s All the Shah’s Men: an American Coup and the Roots
of Middle East Terror and Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala,
Revised include detailed information about how covert actions were used to dismantle
governmental structures in Iran and Guatemala. Finally, literature on paramilitary
operations includes Conboy’s Shadow War: the CIA’s Secret War in Laos, Warner’s
Shooting at the Moon: The Story of America’s Clandestine War in Laos, and Leary’s
Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia. Gary
Schroen’s Insider’s Account: CIA Spearheaded Terror in Afghanistan and Coll’s Ghost
Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet
Invasion to September 10, 2001 are examples of assessments of the use of covert action
in American foreign policy. Despite the variety of genres found in covert action
literature, a key theme that runs throughout is that covert action has been used by every
American president as a tool of American foreign policy, specifically for the intent of
facilitating regime change.
The Role of Congressional Oversight
The 1975 Senate inquiry revealed that all programs under investigation had been
ordered by the President of the United States and the popular perception of the CIA as a
rogue entity was simply inaccurate. Since then, the application of covert political and
military actions have been accepted as means of influencing the actions and intentions of
a foreign power and achieve military objectives of the sponsor in the target country.
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Daugherty asserts that, “Covert action has its place in American foreign policy
and Presidential statecraft, empirically proven by the fact that all post-World War II
Presidents have relied on it” (2004, 19). His work titled, Approval and Review of Covert
Programs since Reagan, reinforces the idea that covert action programs are “very much
the President’s programs: only he approves them” (Daugherty 2004, 62). Garner and
Schumacher’s primary thesis is based on the concepts of morals and ethics in covert
action. In their paper, they advocate for a codified ethical guidance accomplished
through ethical training and education.
A review of the relevant literature on covert action illustrates the
compartmentalized views scholars have taken on this topic. While some scholars focus
on the policy aspects of covert action, specifically how covert action is used as a tool of
American foreign policy, others emphasize the oversight process and the limitations that
come with it. Several scholars have also devoted much time to analyzing presidential use
of covert action with a focus on how presidents have either successfully or unsuccessfully
employed covert action during their time in office. Very little has been published about
whether the use of covert action to implement regime change affects the targeted leader
survival, and, in essence, whether they lived or died.
A Review of Leadership Research
While the previous section presented various definitions of covert action and the
legal, moral, and ethical considerations of its use, this section will delve into the
significance of leadership traits in determining the probability of leader survival
following a US covert action event. Specifically, this section of the literature review is
conducted in two phases: first, the researcher searched for the phrase “long-duration
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leadership,” which resulted in 5,082 scholarly sources in the ProQuest and JSTOR
research electronic databases. This search led the researcher to consider other search
terms such as “irregular leadership,” “leadership duration,” “leadership succession,” and
“leader decapitation.” Finally, the researcher considered the terms “personality” and
“leadership relationships” in order to infuse a human element into the study. Previous
scholarly works on covert action tend only to focus on Cold War case studies without
delving into the lives of the leaders who were influenced by such events. In addition to
the electronic search, the author also explored the National Archives database to search
for leader case studies encompassing the Cold War timeline. After an exhaustive search
of scholarly sources and dissertations, it was apparent to the researcher that, while topics
on political leadership and leader duration were popular, integrating these terms into the
context of covert action proved to be more of a challenge.
Regime Change and Leader Survivability
A dictator’s life is ephemeral. Violent coups, torture, execution, assassination by
enemies or even close friends or family are occupational hazards. Escribà-Folch notes,
“As for regular or nonviolent exits, restrictions on civil rights can thwart the ability of
some actors (especially the opposition) to organize, coordinate, and mobilize in the shortterm” (2013, 546). In Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of
War, Goemans offers that, “Dictators stay in power largely thanks to their effective
repressive apparatus. Once they lose power, however, dictators are highly likely to suffer
severe additional punishment, such as death, imprisonment, or exile” (2000, 558). This
dissertation will expand on that study by analyzing specific leaders and their survival
during specific covert action events.
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Leadership Criteria
In this research, the Big Five Traits to Leadership Model is used as the baseline
for distinguishing leadership characteristics and personality traits. Using this model,
combination of causal connections between personality traits and ultimate fate are
explored and set within the context of the covert action case studies. For example,
“Extraversion is more strongly related to leader emergence than leader to leader
effectiveness” (Judge et al. 2002, 773). In his journal article titled, Creativity, Divergent
Thinking, and Openness to Experience, McCrae adds that, “Open individuals may be
better leaders because they are more creative and are divergent thinkers, because they are
risk takers, or because of their tendencies for esoteric thinking and fantasy” (52, 1987).

Figure 2. Traits of Effective or Emergent Leaders (Judge et al 2002, 766)
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Theories of Leadership Change in States
Many scholars to include de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992), de Mesquita
and Siverson (1995), Goemans (2000), and Chiozza and Goemans (2003) have published
works on the impact of interstate war on leader survival. Additionally, publications on
the decapitation of terrorist leaders and its effects on organizational collapse have shown
that “leader capability” and “social network analysis” are two primary reasons why
insurgencies endure (Tiernay 2015, 178). Other factors to consider include whether the
organization is shaped hierarchically or in a more decentralized manner.
A Review of Political Institutions Research
In Political Order in Changing Societies, the late Samuel Huntington suggests
that “the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their form of
government but their degree of government” (1968, 1). He contends that violence in
some societies “was in large part the product of rapid social change and the rapid
mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political
institutions” (1968, 4). In many of the case studies analyzed in this dissertation, leader
survival was directly affected by the individual’s desire to push toward modernity,
thereby resulting in their inevitable demise. In essence, modernity breeds stability but
modernization also breeds instability.
During European colonialism, authoritarian governments were created as a means
to control territories that were not suitable for permanent settlement. During this process
of colonialism, European states such as France, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and
United Kingdom, set up colonial regimes that served the economic, social, and political

18

interests based on the interest of their own domestic interests, while ignoring the
economic and political development of the exploited countries.
Such was the case in Africa, where European colonists were authoritarian and
more concerned with effective administration than political representation (Bratton
2009). Either they ruled directly through coercion or they devised indirect control by
piggybacking Western laws on existing systems of traditional authority (Bratton 2009).
Bratton also states that only in belated reaction to mass African nationalism did the
departing colonial authorities try to install institutions of (British) parliamentary or
(French) presidential democracy (Bratton 2009, 341). European delegates relied on elite
leaders of the colonized country to spread the message of colonialism. In turn, these elite
leaders became economically linked to the West. In this respect, newly independent
African nations briefly partook in the second global wave of democratization that
accompanied the break-up of European empires in the middle twentieth century
(Huntington 1991). The result was no political modernization of any kind. Levitsky and
Way describe the centrality of informal institutions as one characteristic of competitive
authoritarianism, which emerged in Africa’s post-colonialism period (Levitsky and Way
2010).
The Westminster Model of Democracy
In Patterns of Democracy, Arendt Lijphart (1999) calls readers’ attention to two
competing styles of democracy: the Westminster model of democracy (or majoritarian
because it is a model represented by the majority), named after Great Britain’s system,
and the consensus model of democracy, which Lijphart refers to as the “kinder, gentler”
democracy. According to Lijphart, the Westminster model is lacking in some ways
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because it excludes almost half a given population from the governmental process. The
“majoritarian interpretation of the basic definition of democracy is that it means
government by the majority of the people in that majorities should govern and that
minorities should oppose” (Lijphart 1999, 31). He adds, “This view is challenged by the
consensus model of democracy” (Lijphart 1999, 31). Lijphart points out that “in too
many societies such as those with deep ethnic, linguistic, religious, or ideological
divisions, there is little chance of integration between minority and majority interests in
society” (1999, 31). Lijphart warns that “permanent exclusion of the minority could lead
to violence and conflict. Consensus democracy is Lijphart’s solution to the problem—“it
allows democracy to function by giving more power to minority groups” (1999, 31).
The Consensus Model of Democracy
Lijphart is well-known for his support of the consensus approach, which, in his
view, offers more compromise and significant minority rights. He adds that, contrary to
popular belief, Westminster democracy does not outperform consensus democracy.
According to Lijphart, this type of democracy demonstrates “kinder, gentler qualities
because they are more likely to be welfare states, they have a better record of protecting
the environment, few people are incarcerated and there is less use of the death penalty,
and they tend to be more generous with economic assistance to nations in need” (Lijphart
1999, 276). In Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy: A Cross-National
Analysis of Consensus and Majoritarian Systems, the authors note that, “The classic
example for the majoritarian model of democracy is the British Westminster Model,
whereas the Netherlands and Belgium typically are mentioned as prototypes of the
consensual model” (Anderson and Guillory 1997, 68).
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Two-Party vs. Multi-Party Systems
According to Lijphart, “The two-party systems typify the majoritarian model of
democracy and the multi-party systems typify those of the consensus model” (Lijphart
1999, 63). Moreover, the party system can be viewed as an umbrella under which
political parties are organized; the basic definition of party system suggests that political
parties have common elements such as voter support, elections, funding, and such.
Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism
Parliamentary and presidential forms of government are different in that a
parliamentary system is comprised of separate head of state and head of government,
whereas one official fulfills both functions in the presidential form of government
(Lijphart 1999, 117). Presidents are elected in national elections and prime ministers are
selected in local government. Another difference is that presidential terms are fixed,
while parliamentary are flexible. In addition, cabinet members are not members of the
legislature in a presidential system as opposed to the parliamentary system where cabinet
members must be in the legislature. Moreover, the president can only be removed
through impeachment in the presidential system, whereas a parliamentary government
must maintain the confidence of the legislature or face dissolution and a new election.
Political Socialization
In Some Social Requisites of Democracy, Seymour Lipset (1959) seeks to find the
conditions of a “stable” democracy, which he explains is necessary for the survival of the
regime. In Democracy and Development, Przeworski (2000) also studies regime stability
and its role in the success of democracies and dictatorships. Coinciding with regime
stability, Frey and Brooks both argue that certain freedoms, one of which is economic
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freedom, are positively correlated with democracy (Frey and Stutzer 2000, 421). The
level of the effectiveness of a government is usually considered in the many variations of
defining and measuring democracy, but it is not necessarily a condition exclusive to
democracy. Dictatorships can also be effective forms of government.
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the social
background and careers of leaders in order to determine the effects of covert action on
these individuals. It will test the hypothesis relating to survivability of leaders in certain
types of situations by comparing leadership styles and backgrounds of individuals in
power during covert action events. The literature review presented here highlights
historical and contemporary covert action issues as well as how it applies to democratic
and non-democratic regimes. Chapter three will present the methodology, which will
explain the effects of covert regime change on leader survival.
This review of the relevant literature on covert action illustrates the
compartmentalized views scholars have taken on this topic. Some scholars tend to focus
on the policy aspect of covert action, specifically how covert action is used as a tool of
American foreign policy. Other scholars emphasize the oversight process and the
limitations that come with it. Scholars have also devoted much time to presidential use of
covert action, with a focus on how presidents have either successfully or unsuccessfully
used the option during their time in office.
A Review of Theoretical Research: Classical Realism
Historically, regime change operations have occurred in waves with the great
power or powers conducting most such endeavors. During the Cold War, the
international system was bipolar and the two superpowers held the most influence.
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Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr believe that states are
similar to human beings in that each has an innate desire to control others. They argue
that this self-serving desire for power is the cause of wars. In Politics among Nations,
Morgenthau (1948) stresses the value of a multi-polar balance of power system and notes
that realism is fundamentally concerned with power and not morality or material
interests.
Neorealism
In International Relations: One World, Many Theories, Stephen Walt notes that,
“The neorealist theory advanced by Kenneth Waltz ignored human nature and focused on
the effects of the international system” (1998, 2). He adds, “For Waltz, the international
system consisted of a number of great powers, each seeking to survive. Because the
system is anarchic, each state has to survive on its own. Waltz argued that this condition
would lead weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with, more powerful
rivals” (1998, 2).
Neoclassical Realism
The framework for this dissertation is based on the international relations of
neoclassical realism. As Taliaferro states in, State Building for Future Wars:
Neoclassical Realism and the Resource-Extractive State, “Neoclassical realism merges
neorealism’s emphasis on systemic constraints—constrictions caused by the incessant
quest of states for ‘survival’ in the anarchical global realm—with classical realism’s
focus on the dependence of statesmen in acquiring domestic material power resources for
regulating the magnitude and ambition of their foreign and defense policy aims” (2006,
480-481). He adds, “Neoclassical realism argues that over the long run, the relative
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amount of material distributions and the existing context of the international system will
engineer states to maximize their global influence, strength, and security” (2006, 480481). Furthermore, a central tenet of neoclassical realism is that “states use the tools at
their disposal to gain control over their environment” (Rose 1998, 157). According to
neoclassical realists, “decision-makers’ beliefs strongly affect the relationship between
relative power and foreign policy” (Rose 1998, 157). Moreover, h describes the Four
Theories of Foreign Policy as,
1) Innenpolitik describes foreign policy as a direct outgrowth of domestic politics and
factors such as ideology, culture, and economics shape states’ foreign policies (Rose
1998, 149).
2) Offensive realists—or aggressive realists– describes a classical realism, Hobbesian
world in which states seek to maximize what little security they have and, as a result,
foreign policy consists of “nervous states jockeying for position within this anarchic
framework” (Rose 1998, 149).
3) Defensive realists address external threats through subtle modifications of the power
balance. As a result, “Foreign policy consists of (largely peaceable) reactions to systemic
factors” (Rose 1998, 149).
4) Neoclassical realists reject the security-only thesis; instead, “states attempt to use their
power to direct the international system towards their own goals and preferences” (Rose
1998, 149).
All covert action employed similar tactics: the US supported anti-Soviet dissident
movements in order to overthrow the central government and establish an independent
regime, one more favorably disposed to, if not formally aligned with Washington. In his
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book, The Working Class in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Lomax writes, “The
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 has been portrayed as a revolution primarily for freedom
and truth—it arose to restore the individual and intellectual freedoms which had been
abolished by the totalitarian communist state” (2007, 27). Granville (2005) adds, “Flush
with the success of the covert operations in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) to remove
leaders of suspected leftist or pro-Soviet tendencies, Eisenhower and other US
policymakers in the 1950s appeared blind to the existence of scrupulous, reform-minded
Communists” (2005, 839). She concludes that “This prejudice led them to discredit
national Communists such as Imre Nagy of Hungary and Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam and to
prefer non-Communists no matter how unsuitable their personalities for national
leadership” (2005, 839).
Contribution of the Study to Existing Body of Literature
This dissertation contributes to the existing academic literature by analyzing
whether personality traits and leadership styles affect an individual’s survival following
US covert action. The existing literature on the consequences of regime change focuses
on successful overt operations and analyzes their effects on numerous variables,
including civil war, democratization, and state building. Other studies focus on leader
longevity and the factors that attribute to a long or brief tenure in office. Additional
scholarly publications discussed leadership structure in an organization (hierarchy or
decentralized) and whether this has an impact on survival of the organization. This
project complements this literature by analyzing the effects of covert regime change
outside the context of war and analyzing its effects on leaders’ survival.
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Chapter Summary
To summarize, the leadership legitimacy model presents five criteria that can be
used to determine why leaders lived or died after a covert action event. The major five
factors of this model consist of “neuroticism (hostile tendencies), extraversion (sociable
tendencies), openness (curious tendencies), agreeableness (accepting tendencies), and
conscientiousness (thorough tendencies)” (Goldberg 1990, 1216). “In the findings of
Judge et al. (2002), it was discovered that there is a strong correlation between the Big
Five traits and leadership. First, leaders should be accountable to both the people and the
state. Second, strong and effective political institutions that legitimize leaders are
critically important. Additionally, linkages between leaders and Western countries
cannot be underestimated. Third, the acceptance of the leader by the population and how
they treat their people is also significant. Fourth, leadership style and personality traits
must be built into the legitimacy model. Finally, policy analysts may use the model in
the planning of future covert action.
This review of relevant covert action literature has re-emphasized several policymaking considerations. Covert action is an effective tool of United States policy and has
been employed by every American President since George Washington. To use it well,
must understand how to use it. Even more complicated is that it takes Congressional
oversight, budgetary approval, intelligence assessments, and trained operators to execute
these types of activities. To make a complex topic even more difficult, the time it takes
to train an experienced covert action expert often takes decades. The model this research
intends to test proposes that personality traits and leadership styles may explain why
some leaders tend to survive after a covert action event while others do not.
26

CHAPTER III – METHODOLOGY
Chapter III identifies and explains the methodological approach employed to
address the research question: “To what extent, if any, do personality traits and
leadership styles influence survivability of leaders following US covert action?” The
level of detail inherent in the independent variables, combined with the small number of
case studies, makes this dissertation ideal for a qualitative research design.
Consequently, qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) will be used to empirically
distinguish the extent of a leader’s survival following US covert action and enable the
researcher to focus on the fate of regime leaders.
Rationale for Using the Qualitative Comparative Analysis Technique
Chapter III analyzes the selection criterion of leader survivability by using QCA
and the latest data from the ARCHIGOS, World Bank World Development Indicator, and
POLITY IV datasets. It proposes that leadership style and personality traits, combined
with institutional strength, are dominant factors in assessing the survivability of leaders
following a covert action event. It focuses both on leaders removed from power via
covert action, as well as their replacements. It also proposes that leaders’ age and level of
education plays roles but are not always positive in terms of determining survivability.
More importantly, the objective of this dissertation is to provide a useful model for
military planners and intelligence analysts to determine the probability of success for the
use of covert action. The secretive nature of covert action has generated enormous
interest in the topic. However, there is no existing systematic attempt to research and
analyze the selection criteria of the most important focus area, the survival of leaders
affected by covert action events.
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This dissertation addresses the gap in literature by utilizing the most current data
from 2018, as well as the QCA method. The findings of this study will add to the
existing range of covert action literature. Additionally, this chapter will introduce the
research method, identify the cases selected, discuss the uniqueness of the QCA
approach, present datasets, offer a description of the truth table and its importance to the
research, and present instructions on how to interpret the truth table.
Research Method
One of the benefits of QCA is that it is a “case-oriented analytic technique that
systemically addresses small numbers of cases (i.e. 5–50) by applying Boolean algebra to
implement principles of comparison used by scholars engaged in the qualitative study of
macro social phenomena” (Ragin 2005, 34). Using the survival of leaders as an example,
leader background, security environment, political institution, and personality/trait are
necessary conditions that determine a leader’s fate following a covert action event.
Regression models can only tell the researcher the extent of the frequency of such
conditions’ absence. QCA treats each variable the same and allows for the flexibility of
mixing and matching variables to determine various outcomes. It also pays attention to
the presence or absence of certain conditions and their frequency. Additionally, it uses
binary, nominal-scale variables (assigned as 1 and 0) in order to ensure accuracy. This
dissertation will employ the R Studio software program that is commonly used with
QCA. The key objective is to use this technique to determine the significant factors that
influence leader survival. The limited number of cases and the infinite causal
combinations allows the researcher to assess relationships between the independent and
dependent variables with a level of detail that does not exist in regression methodology.
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According to Ragin, “considering the small number of cases, the appropriate
number of variables should be four to six” (1987, 67). Additionally, he notes, “There are
two conditions or states in Boolean algebra: true (or present) and false (or absent). These
two states are represented in base 2: 1 indicates presence; 2 indicates absence” (1987,
86). This study selects six key independent variables as conditions for outcome. For
example, leaders who are characterized as charismatic are assigned 1 and those who are
not are assigned 0. Leaders who are age 40 or below are assigned “1” and those who are
not are assigned “0”. Leaders who left office alive are assigned “1” and leaders who did
not are assigned “0”. Leaders who were democratically-elected into office are assigned
“1” and leaders who were not are assigned “0”. Those who received a graduate degree or
higher received a “1” and those who did not received a “0”. Those who served in the
military received a “1” and those who did not received a “0”.
The goal of this dissertation is to successfully examine the relationship between
leader survival and US-sanctioned covert action in eight countries: Iran, Guatemala,
Indonesia, Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Republic of
Vietnam, and Chile. In addition, the research will integrate the elegant theory of
neoclassical realism to interpret the course of unrest in each of the historic events. The
objective is to demonstrate how different factors influence leader survival in covert action
events and, ultimately, to test the theory that decision-making and policy are shaped by
the outcome of these events. The more aspirational goal of this dissertation is to build a
convincing case that leader survival is an important consideration and to create a covert
action/leader survival model that is generalizable and useable to military planners and
decision-makers.
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QCA
The use of QCA has become increasingly popular in the field of international
relations over the past few years. (A bit more temporal specificity would be helpful
here.) While most scholars still prefer to use quantitative data or a mixed methods
approach, the QCA method is gaining popular ground, particularly in terms of research
papers presented at academic conferences such as those sponsored annually by the
International Studies Association as well as the American Political Science Association.
An important component of QCA is that the case studies are limited in number, thereby
allowing the researcher to focus on the small and intimate details of each historical case
study. The goal of this dissertation is to apply the well-established international relations
theory of neoclassical realism into this study on leader survival and covert action.
Use of the Truth Table to Represent Data
While Boolean algebra is the technique used to make qualitative comparisons, the
framework of the analysis is provided by a raw data matrix that is otherwise known as the
truth table. According to Ragin, “The idea of the truth table is simple. Once the data
have been recoded into nominal-scale variables and represented in binary form (as in 1s
and 0s), it is necessary only to sort the data into their different combinations of values on
the independent variables” (1987, 86). Additionally, each combination of variables
translates to a separate row on the truth table. Once the table is constructed, independent
variables are assigned an output value and these values are compared to the dependent
variable and summarized through the truth table.
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Table 1 Sample Truth Table with Leader Characteristics Variables.
Variable/Membership

Fully

Mostly

More

More

Mostly

Fully

In

In

In Than

Out

Out

Out

Out

Than In

Leader Characteristics
Public Dissent
Political Instability
Internal Conflict
Regime Type

Truth tables may have as many rows as logically possible. Additionally, Ragin
reminds the reader that, “Technically, there is no reason to include the frequency of each
combination as a part of the truth table; these values are included to remind the reader
that each row is not a single case, but more of a summary of all the cases with a certain
combination of input values” (Ragin 1987, 87).
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Table 2 Representative Truth Table with Four Causal Conditions (Ragin 1987, 88)

Ragin uses the example of collapsed regime to explain Boolean Logic and QCA:
“Consider the collapse of military regimes. Assume that there are three general
conditions that cause military regimes to fall: sharp conflict with older and younger
military officers (A), death of a powerful dictator (B), or CIA dissatisfaction with the
regime (C)” (Ragin 1987, 89). He adds that “any of these three conditions may be
sufficient to prompt change” (1987, 89).
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Table 3 Sample Truth Table Showing Three Causes of Leader Survival (Patton 2018)
Condition

Leader Survival

A

B

C

F

0

0

0

0

Number of Instances

0

A = Influenced population through charismatic leadership style/personality trait.
B = Entered into office through non-democratic means/force/coercion.
C = Corrupt/unstable political institution.
Each of the rows with one causal factor present and two absent can be combined with
rows with two causes present and one absent because all these rows have the same
outcome (F) and each pair differs in only one causal condition:
Cause and Theoretical Effect
Ragin notes that “A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause
that produces an outcome and it is singular” (1987, 99). Using this dissertation topic as
an example, a leader who is able to influence people through charismatic leadership and
personality traits (A), combined with their rule through coercive or forceful means (B),
within a corrupt/unstable political environment (C) may increase the likelihood of death
following a covert action event. The theory of neoclassical realism is used to
demonstrate the importance of the decision-making/policy implications in relation to
survival. The theory allows the researcher to analyze leader behavior in order to assess
the probability of their survivability following a covert action event. In addition, it
supports the argument that a leader is more likely to survive covert action event if that
individual is a confident leader who assumed power through democratic, nonviolent
means, and is operating in an environment with a stable political structure.
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In their publication titled, Case Study Methods in the International Relations
Subfield, Bennett and Elman note that, “The prominence of qualitative methods in IR
thus reflects these methods’ advantages in studying complex and relatively unstructured
and infrequent phenomena that lie at the heart of the subfield” (2007, 171). They add
that, “The study of IR will undoubtedly progress most rapidly through a combination of
methodological approaches” (2007, 171). Interestingly, “The least-likely case study
relies on what Jack Levy (2002, 144) has labeled the “Sinatra inference”: If the theory
can make it here, it can make it anywhere” (Bennett and Elman 2007, 173). Stephen
Walt’s (1996) Revolution and War is a study of “foreign policies of states both before
and after they undergo revolutions” and Schweller’s (2006) Unanswered Threats:
Political Constraints on the Balance of Power applies neoclassical realism as a template
in his case study analysis. Schweller (2006) “created a four-variable model comprising
elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and regime vulnerability” (Bennett and
Elman 2007, 180). In the model, Schweller (2006) uses a combination of “social
fragmentation, regime vulnerability, and elite fragmentation prevented the development
of an elite balancing consensus, resulting in the state’s decision to under-balance”
(Bennett and Elman 2007, 180). Bennett and Elman conclude that, “Ragin’s QCA/fuzzyset approach has sparked a considerable debate among qualitative and other
methodologists and some interest in applying both the crisp and/or fuzzy-set versions in
the study of IR” (2007, 182). They add that the use of QCA has not been as prevalent in
the study of IR as it has been in comparative politics. However, “We anticipate that
QCA/fuzzy set is likely to become significantly more prominent over time” (Bennett and
Elman 2007, 182).
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Datasets
This study analyzes the criteria of leader survivability following a covert action
event by using the QCA method. The key finding could be that charismatic leadership
style plays an insignificant role in leader survival. Additionally, charismatic leadership
styles may attempt to maximize power-sharing among leaders. Also, its significance is
diminished depending on the security environment at the time of the event. As Ragin
notes, “The use of QCA allows multiple combinations of variables which result in a
particular outcome. Its strength is that it allows for the examination of different
combinations of variables that are consistent with an observed pattern” (Ragin, 2008). In
essence, QCA offers a balance between pure quantitative statistical analysis and
qualitative methodology based on case studies, surveys, focus groups, and elite
interviews, among others. In his article titled, Using Case Studies to Expand Economic
Models of Civil War, Sambanis (2004) argues that “by combining statistical and case
study work we can better understand the political processes that lead societies to civil
war” (Sambanis, 2004, 269). Other scholars are following suit by integrating statistical
methods into a qualitative template.
Bennett and Elman conclude, “The benefits of juxtaposing statistical and case
study methods are well illustrated in recent research on civil and ethnic conflicts,
including the mechanisms behind individuals’ participation in such conflicts and the
structural conditions that make violence or reconciliation likely” (2004, 187). QCA
studies have flourished in disciplines such as political science, sociology, public
administration, and organizational and management studies. This dissertation will use
QCA to further research in international relations.
35

According to Ward and Berger (2017), the ARCHIGOS database classifies
irregular exits into ten subcategories that may be used to predict leader survival.
“From the coding manual, but ordered by occurrence:
(1) Leader removed by domestic military actors without foreign support.
(2) Leader lost power as a result of domestic popular protest without foreign support.
(3) Leader removed by domestic rebel forces without foreign support.
(4) Leader removed by other domestic government actors without foreign support.
(5) Leader removed in a power struggle within military, short of coup, i.e. without
changing institutional features such as a military council or junta.
(6) Leader removed through assassination by unsupported individual.
(7) Leader removed in an irregular manner through other means or processes.
(8) Leader removed by domestic rebel forces with foreign support.
(9) Leader removed by domestic military actors with foreign support.
(10) Leader removed by other domestic government actors with foreign support” (Ward
and Berger 2017, 143).
As with other forms of qualitative research, the congruence method is used in
tandem with QCA to impose a theory in the examination of imperfect data. As a result,
QCA experiences the same difficulties in causal inference as other qualitative and
quantitative methods that use non-experimental data (Ragin 2008). In addition, results
from the QCA method can be weakened by spurious correlation between variables as a
result of excluding other potential causal variables not included in the theory. Therefore,
Ragin cautions that adherence to the “principle that ‘context matters’ is central” to the
QCA method (Ragin 2000, 66). Applying specific templates to leaders may help
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policymakers make better decision on the utilization of covert action. In the one case, the
event may have resulted in the death of a leader, thereby resulting in a rise in violence
and requiring the need for external security from external sources. In other cases, the
death of a leader, as a result of covert action, may have had no impact on the local
security environment and, as a consequence, had no residual rise in violence. These are
just two examples of how treating two similar cases may result in faulty analysis.
According to Ragin, the combination of a congruence method case-oriented
approach and QCA should mitigate the weaknesses of both methods. The congruence
case study method will allow for the testing of the explanatory value of the model within
individual cases while minimizing misrepresenting the conditions of the cases and
allowing for the introduction of other causal variables not included in the model that
could be overlooked. QCA will allow for the identification of patterns among the cases
that are not apparent in the individual cases and minimize any deceptive data present in
individual cases. Taken together, these two methods should provide a better
understanding of the complex causality operating during covert action events.
The Research Sample
Three main selection criteria were used to select the cases for this research. The
first selection criteria is covert action event initiated by the US, the installation or
attempted installation of a new leader by force, and leaders who were in power at the
time of the event. Excluded cases included internal intervention by domestic
power/recent or ongoing political crises. As a result, eight cases met the selection
criteria. Moreover, these cases were drawn from covert action events in Asia, South
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and Europe. The main purpose
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of this criterion is to facilitate the measurement of impact of covert action events on
leader survival. Additionally, the cases selected for analysis have sufficient primary and
secondary sources of data that are well-documented and demonstrate international effects
and not just those at the local level.
The second selection criteria is the covert action event must be conducted by a
foreign force. This criterion was added for two reasons. First, studying cases involving
external intervention forces increases the applicability of the findings of this research to
future covert action events conducted by the US and other major powers. Additionally,
the results of this dissertation are intended to support military and civilian policymakers
in their decision to use covert action in the future. The second reason for this selection
criterion is to provide cases for analysis of the personality traits and leadership styles of
foreign leaders. It would be less significant to measure the influence of informal local
leaders in small-scale interventions than it is to measure the impact of leaders in grander
and more sensational covert action events.
The third selection criterion is the exclusion of internal interventions as a result of
domestic and civil unrest. While these cases are interesting and may provide good
sources for future research, the outcomes of leader survival are best studied in a more
confined scope with clearer operating parameters. Assassinations, displacements, and
disappearances of leaders occur all over the world. According to Ragin, Fuzzy Set QCA
(fsQCA) requires settled cases with adequate primary and secondary sources to make
informed judgments on the degree of membership cases demonstrated with a model. In
the cases of contemporary covert action events in Southwest Asia, much of the relevant
data remains classified.
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Using this criterion, covert action events taking place in Iraq and Afghanistan
from 2001 up to current date were not selected because these events have yet to be
declassified. However, this dissertation may be used as a template for future research
when these case studies do become available at the unclassified level.
According to Ragin, “with fuzzy sets it is possible to have the best of both worlds;
namely, the precision that is prized by quantitative researchers and the use of substantive
knowledge to calibrate measures that is central to qualitative research” (2006, 67).
Attention was paid to selecting cases that are conducted by external powers, but with as
much variation as possible in the associated independent variables. The wide range of
cases covers over 40 years of covert action events occurring in varied geographical,
social, and political settings, and involving leaders of different backgrounds. See Table 2
for a depiction of similarities and differences among the selected cases using covert
action event characteristics outlined in chapters one and two.
Table 4 Characteristics of Sample Case Studies
Country

Iran

Time

Leadership

Public

Frame

Characteristics Dissent

19521953

Guatemala

19531954

Indonesia

19551958
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Global

Internal

Regime

Instability

Conflict

Type

Table 4 Continued
Dominican

1959-

Republic

1961

Democratic
1960Republic of the
1961
Congo
Cuba

19611962

Republic of
1963
Vietnam
Chile

19701973

The cases selected for this research are eight well-established, declassified covert
action event studies. The size of the sample was based on an initial review of covert
action events during the Cold War and all available cases were included in the sample.
The first case, Iran (1952–1953), involved a coup d’état under a constitutional
monarchy with democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. The
primary objective was a joint British and American effort to orchestrate a coup d’état
against Mossadegh in favor of General Fazollah Zahedi and Shah Pahlavi. In addition,
the primary propaganda involved funding dissident groups and sabotage. Type of covert
operation was preventative in nature with a successful regime change.
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The second case, Guatemala (1953–1954), involved a coup d’état and dissidents
with a target government of democracy headed by Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, as well as a
proposed government with a regime led by General Castillo Armas. The coup against
Arbenz involved CIA recruited, trained, armed, and funded dissident forces to stage
mock invasion of country; propaganda; sabotage; regime destabilization; and limited
direct American fighting. Type of covert operation was preventative in nature with a
successful regime change.
The third case, Indonesia (1955–1958), involved a coup d’état with a target
government and an authoritarian regime led by President Sukarno and a proposed
government of non-communist, pro-American regime. Support for coup d’état plot
against President Sukarno resulted in an unsuccessful regime change.
The fourth case, Dominican Republic (1959–1961), involved coup d’état and
assassination with a target government led by Rafael Trujillo and a proposed government
of non-communist, pro-American regime. Support for coup d’état and assassination of
Trujillo resulted in a successful regime change. The fifth case, Republic of the Congo
(1960–1961), involved a coup d’état and assassination with the target democratic
government led by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and a proposed government of a
non-communist pro-American regime. At least two assassination plots were attempted
against democratically-elected Prime Minister Patrice. Type of covert operation was
preventative in nature with a successful regime change.

41

The sixth case, Cuba (1961–1962), involved coup d’état and assassination plans
with a target communist government led by Fidel Castro and a proposed government of
pro-American regime led by José Cardona, who was a Cuban exile in the United States.
Support for coup d’état resulted in an unsuccessful regime change. The seventh case,
Republic of Vietnam (1963), involved coup d’état with a target government led by Ngo
Dinh Diem and a proposed government of pro-American regime led by General Doung
Van Minh. Support for coup d’état, that inadvertently led to the assassination of South
Vietnamese ruler, Ngo Dinh Diem resulted in a successful regime change. The eighth
case, Chile (1962), involved a coup d’état with a target government led by
democratically-elected Salvador Allende and a proposed government of democraticallyelected Christian Democrats led by Eduardo Fre and a military junta. Secondary support
for coup d’état, that inadvertently led to the assassination of Renee Schneider, resulted in
a successful regime change. These selected cases represent six successful cases of USsanctioned covert action events and two unsuccessful covert action events. The criteria
for successful and unsuccessful covert action events are defined as a leader surviving or
not surviving US-sanctioned covert action. These cases provide numerous within-case
comparisons with application of the same event and they are all differentiated by
geographic location, social and security environments, and leadership style.
Data Collection Methods
Data collection for this dissertation will rely heavily on archival sources for
primary source documents and existing scholarly, peer review publications on each of the
case studies for secondary sources. Primary source documents will include detailed
memorandums, reports, and biographies of leaders, as well as historical and military
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records. These documents will be obtained from archival sources such as, but not limited
to, the United States and National Archives, dissertation research archives at Georgetown
University, George Washington University, and American University as well as
declassified documents and archives offered by the CIA. Each of the selected cases has a
large archival and historical record associated with it, thereby aiding in making an indepth data collection effort possible. Existing research by other scholars will be used as a
guide to locate pertinent records. This will also serve as a check on the potential bias of
secondary sources used in this research.
Methods for Data Analysis and Synthesis
To filter through vast amounts of information in order to get to the essence, it is
important to know what data to find, how to use it, and how to organize it once you have
it. Specific questions may be useful in gleaning information from vast swaths of
information. A full discussion of the reasoning for selections of degree of membership
with each variable will be conducted after the presentation of each case study.
Survival: The Dependent Variable
The focus of this dissertation is on leader survival following a covert action event.
Therefore, the dependent variable used in this dissertation to determine whether a
leader’s personality trait and leadership style or other factors influenced his fate
following a covert action event.
Causal Conditions of Leader Survival
This dissertation seeks to test the effects of six causal conditions on the fate of
leaders. These causal conditions are leadership characteristics, public dissent, global
instability, internal conflict, and regime type. In keeping with the QCA method, the
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following sections use existing definitions to describe each casual condition and establish
attributes for use in assigning degrees of membership for each of the cases with the
causal conditions. The intent of this process is not to establish specific cut points
between each gradation in degree of membership, but to establish characteristics of each
factor that assists the research in assigning the degree of membership of each case with
the causal factor while taking into consideration the within-case context of each case that
influenced the individual degree of membership.
Leader Characteristics
Leader characteristics can be addressed by asking the questions:
1.

Ethnicity of leader (is he a member of minority population?)

2.

The leader has a college degree (within his country or educated abroad)?

3.

Is the leader over the age of 40?

Public Dissent
Public dissent can be addressed by examining the following questions:
1.

Did the public support this leader or not?

2.

Did he assume power during a time of peace

Global Instability
Global instability can be addressed by asking the questions:
1.

Was there a major war or conflict occurring at the time the leader was deposed?

2.

Were any conflicts occurring in bordering countries at the time the leader was

deposed?
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Internal Conflict
Internal conflict can be assessed by asking:
1.

Was the country in a state of crisis at the time of the covert action event?

2.

Had there been a coup, revolution, or regime change within five years prior?

Regime Type
Political institutions can be “autocratic; democratic; not independent; occupied by
foreign troops; ruled by a provisional government charged with overseeing a transition to
democracy; or lacking a central government” (Geddes 2014, 313). Regime type can be
assessed by asking:
1.

Was this a democratic society at the time of the covert action event?

2.

Was this a totalitarian regime?
Ensuring Trustworthiness
In this dissertation research, only archival documents are explored. As such, there

is not a requirement for creating the same context and environment with human
participants. If the archival documents are limiting, then interviews with participants
would be used as an alternate plan. Additionally, not using human subjects will eliminate
the requirement for an Institutional Review Board (IRB). Most contemporary case
studies on covert action events have yet to be declassified. However, this dissertation is
focused on the Cold War period which should allow for plenty of opportunities to gather
declassified data. Future studies will delve into declassified documents from
contemporary conflicts. To mitigate potential issues of trustworthiness, every effort was
made in the data collection phase to incorporate multiple perspectives of the covert action
case study.
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Validity
This study follows the same pattern in the analysis of each case study to ensure
trustworthiness and validity. Morse et al. add, “If the principles of qualitative inquiry are
followed, the analysis is self-correcting. In other words, qualitative research is iterative
rather than linear, so that a good qualitative researcher moves back and forth between
design and implementation to ensure congruence among question formulation, literature,
recruitment, data collection strategies, and analysis” (2002, 17). Moreover, “Data are
systematically checked, focus is maintained, and the fit of data and the conceptual work
of analysis and interpretation are monitored and confirmed constantly” (2002, 17).
Limitations of the Study
The most critical limitation of this dissertation is potential gaps in the historical
record of the cases and the risk that many cases still remain classified. Additionally,
leader profiles may be difficult to acquire, particularly if they involve intimate details of
the individual and associates. Additionally, personal preference and subjectivity of the
research could bias the analysis of data and formulation of findings. The utilization of
quantitative ‘survival testing’ would also be an advantage but the researcher elected to
make this a solely qualitative research design. The utilization of the Cox Model would
have added an interesting dimension to the study. In fact, there is a whole section of
survival analysis research that uses the Cox Hazard Model. Additionally, Cox Models
are best used for cases which have identical event times. In this dissertation, events
occurred at different times and sometimes, even decades. Finally, the limited number of
cases used in this dissertation may limit the possibility of generalizing the findings of this
dissertation to the analysis of other covert action research.
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Chapter Summary
In summary, this chapter provided a detailed description of the research
methodology of this dissertation. Moreover, verification strategies that ensure reliability
and validity of data were used to ensure accuracy.
Morse et al. (2002) offer a step-by-step approach to verification: “First, the aim
of methodological coherence is to ensure congruence between the research question and
the components of the method; second, the sample must be appropriate, consisting of
participants who best represent or have knowledge of the research topic; third, collecting
and analyzing data concurrently forms a mutual interaction between what is known and
what one needs to know; and fourth, thinking theoretically is a key component of
verification (Morse et al. 2002, 17). All of these components are used together to ensure
accuracy and transparency in research.
In Issues of Validity in Qualitative Research, Kvale (1989) states, “To validate is
to investigate, to check, to question, and to theorize; all of these activities are integral
components of qualitative inquiry that insure rigor—whether quantitative or qualitative
methods are used, rigor is a desired goal that is met through specific verification
strategies” (1989). Validity is an integral component of the methodology.
The researcher took extra care to check, question, and ensure that the research
question was firmly tied to its theoretical framework. Each case study followed the same
pattern and the same questions were asked without variation. Additionally, this research
is the starting point for future projects which will allow the researcher to investigate
specific aspects of the phenomena and to study components of the topic that will
eventually contribute to the larger theoretical model.
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CHAPTER IV – POWER, POLITICS, AND PETROLEUM
Tehran, Iran, 1952–1953
“One cannot wage war without oil, and the power which will be predominant as to oil is
likely to win in the future war.”3
--Speech by Stalin at the 15th Party Congress, December 3, 1927
Introduction
This chapter will explore covert action events undertaken by the United States in
Iran from 1952 to 1953. This case study will start with a brief overview of the political
environment during that time. Additionally, it will discuss leader characteristics of
Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, and his influence on Iranian society.
After discussing the overall aftermath of the covert action operation and how American
forces used that action to influence the government, the case study will conduct a detailed
discussion of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented
in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summary of
the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix.
The August 1953 coup facilitated by the CIA was pivotal to setting the stage for the 1979
Iranian Revolution and planted the seeds of discontent for many years to come. The
British exploitation of Iran’s national resources in the forms of the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Corporation and the decades-long exploitation of precious oil would continue to haunt the
region for many decades to come. Journalist Stephen Kinzer in his book All the Shah’s
Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror noted, “Iranians will never
forget the 1953 US-supported coup that toppled the nationalist, moderate, and democratic
government of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh and ushered in a closed, dictatorial political
3
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system. Iranian society lost one of its most important historical opportunities for the
establishment of a democracy” (Kinzer 2008, 62).
In 1953, the United States implemented a plan to oust a popular nationalist hero
whose visionary goals would have brought the country closer to the United States while
ensuring future wealth for the nation. Instead, the leader was deposed and replaced with
a dictator whose draconian policies caused suffering to the Iranian people during his 25year rule. As Kinzer notes, “Today the West finds itself facing a regime in Tehran that
embodies threats far more profound than those that it sought to crush in 1953” (Kinzer
2008, 62). The United States was also concerned over the nationalization of Iran’s
petroleum industry and the possibility of Tehran leaning toward the Soviet Union rather
than the United States at a notable time in history.
This case study highlights the importance of leader characteristics as well as the
power of public dissent in changing the course of history. Moreover, global instability
created by international superpowers such as the United States, Soviet Union, and United
Kingdom fostered an environment of mutual distrust. Based on the study’s model, the
case of Iran incorporates all the facets of leader characteristics, public dissent, global
instability, internal conflict, and regime type. The brevity of the 1953 Iran coup, relative
to its domestic and international consequence, is a lesson learned on the dangers of
external influences on foreign countries. Through the use of historical documents from
Presidential libraries, this case study will show how all the factors culminated to create
the perfect conditions for a US-sanctioned coup attempt against Mossadegh. The lesson
learned from history is that poorly executed coups can, more often than not, create the
breeding ground for mass dissent and radical extremism.
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The case of Iran identifies leader characteristics as a driving force behind
survival. In addition to providing an example of the relative importance of survival in the
outcome of a covert operation, the case demonstrates the relative importance of each
factor presented in this dissertation’s model. The following case study will continue to
weave intriguing stories of covert action events and identify details that incorporate the
elements of leader characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and
regime type.
Background
As one of the oldest civilizations in the world, Persia was well-known for its
innovators of art, literature, and poetry. Above all, Persia’s leaders valued knowledge
and respected those who sought enlightenment and wisdom. Its resplendent history is full
of stories of courageous, battle-forged leaders such as Cyrus, Xerxes, and Darius and its
intellectuals made astounding contributions to the world of philosophy and poetry. This
richness formed the fabric of nationalism and communal pride. Situated at the strategic
crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, Iran (formerly Persia)
represents a vivid backdrop in history that is as beautiful as the exquisite tiled mosaics
that it produces and patriotism and nationalist pride its people embody. Rising
majestically from the mountains of southern Iran, the ancient ruins of Persepolis, former
capital of Persia, offer the modern-day tourist a glimpse of Iran’s long-lost glory;
remnants of a magnificent empire that spanned vast territories and was home to a proud
nation of people who placed the intellect, art, literature, and culture as valued wealth.
Situated along critical trade routes and seeming to have an infinite supply of natural
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resources, Iranian poets, artists, and architects created a beauty unsurpassed by any other
empire at that time.
The 1953 Iran coup sparked a cataclysmic explosion that reverberated throughout
the developed world. It occurred as a result of internal political pressure and external
influence on a fragile country that had already endured many decades of unequal
distribution of wealth, rampant corruption, greed, violence, and misfortune. The
country’s history was so tumultuous that, in its formative years, political leaders rarely
survived a year in power. As Efimenco noted in his article, An Experiment with Civilian
Dictatorship in Iran; The Case of Mohammed Mossadegh, “Modern Iran still reveals a
medieval, fragmented social order, in which sharp cleavages exist between the urban and
village centers, between the settled communities and the tribal areas, and between the
wealthy and the poor” (1955, 390).
The constitutional movement gave Iran a taste of democracy, albeit fleetingly.
Whether from foreign intervention or internal domestic power struggles, Iran has never
experienced stability because of rigid military dictatorship and factional political parties.
“Subsequent political movements produced a type of fractional party organization which
centers on personalities rather than on coherent programs of action.”4 The communistled Tudeh Party and the Muslim party, combined with resistance from Tehran’s political
elite population, created an environment that stifled any semblance of progressive
thought or reform. Scavenger-like political buzzards seeking power and control
combined with economic inequality created a recipe for chaos and spread seeds of
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'The nature of Iranian political movements is analyzed by L. P. Elwell Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran
1941-1948," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (January), 45-62.
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conflict that are still felt to this day. Moreover, the political leaders at the time were
considered uneducated, inarticulate, and incompetent. The Iranian people, weary of
exploitations from the Qajar-then-Pahlavi Dynasties, desperately needed a change in
leadership and their wish was fulfilled, albeit fleetingly.
Leader Characteristics
Leader characteristics play an important part in the study’s model, as they have a
direct influence on public dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and type of regime.
This section will analyze Mossadegh’s personal background, political experience, leader
characteristics, as well as other significant and influential factors.
Born in 1882 during the era of belle époque (era of beautiful times), Mossadegh
was described as “a precocious child who grew up to be a peculiar man with a bald head,
long, drooping nose, and thin, sensual lips, and he fainted and howled in public” (de
Bellaigue 2012,1). The eldest son of two prominent public figures in Iranian political
society, he came of age during the time when Iran was experiencing some of its most
violent conflicts. As Kinzer notes, “He showed extraordinary emotional qualities. His
boundless self-assurance led him to fight fiercely for his principles, but when he found
others unreceptive, he would storm off for long periods of brooding silence” (2008, 54).
He had a reputation for being a hypochondriac who exited the scene when things did not
go his way. According to his biographers, as a student at l’Ecole de Sciences Politiques
(the School of Political Sciences) in Paris, Mossadegh suffered from ulcers,
hemorrhaging, stomach secretions, and other ailments. As Kinzer notes, “At times he
became so passionate while delivering speeches that tears streamed down his cheeks.
Sometimes he fainted dead away, as much from emotion as from any physical condition”
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(2008, 54). At one time, British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill called him a
lunatic and named him “Mussy Duck” because of Mossadegh’s emotional instability. To
the proud people of Iran, Mossadegh was part of the drama of faith and, as such, they
embraced him as their nationalist leader and visionary.
Mossadegh completed his academic studies in France and Switzerland and
returned to Tehran after completion of his law studies. He applied for Swiss citizenship
following graduation from law school but changed his mind after discovering that it
would take at least 10 years to gain citizenship. Mossadegh was only in his 40s during
the time that he took power, but his bald head and droopy nose made him look decades
older than his real age. Writer de Bellaigue notes, “He ran Iran, which is a big and
complicated country, wearing a pair of pajamas” (2012, 1). In an environment of
rampant political corruption, inexperienced government leaders, and ever-shifting
political alignments, Mossadegh transitioned seamlessly into the political arena and into
the open and welcoming arms of his Iranian supporters. He is most well-known for his
brazen attempt to nationalize Iran’s oil through the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company (AIOC).
de Bellaigue notes,
Mossadegh was remarkable in his region in that he did not feel the need to be
cruel. He was not a soldier, deriving prestige from the pips on his shoulders and
the shine on his shoes. He did not borrow his authority, like a Mullah, from God.
Mossadegh was instrumental in his own downfall. His judgement failed him in
the zenith of events, for it is a captain’s job to steer his ship into calmer waters
and Mossadegh was driven on by his obsession, into the teeth of the storm. The
Shah lived to tell the tale, and he had pretensions to captaincy of his own. (2012,
2)
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Margaret Hermann’s study on foreign policy behavior and personality
characteristics of political leaders suggest that “aggressive leaders are high in need for
power, low in conceptual complexity, distrustful of others, nationalistic, and likely to
believe that they have some control over the events in which they are involved”
(Hermann 1980, 7). To many Iranians, Mossadegh was an inspirational leader and a
national patriot.
Mossadegh was an intellectual who earned a law degree from the highly
prestigious Paris Institute of Political Studies. On the other hand, proof of his ability to
tend to and support the needs of his followers is lacking. Biographers have noted that
Mossadegh gave up support to the Majlis (parliament) because he did not have faith in its
members’ competence or intellectual abilities. He demonstrated an average level of
extroversion and he lacked a certain level of agreeableness (especially when it came to
negotiating with British leaders and members of the shah’s royal party). Moreover, he
had a deep level of consciousness for the country’s suffering and for the promise of
democratic freedom. However, his emotional adjustment is questionable due to his
outbreaks and mood swings and his openness to experience rates fairly high as an Iranian
who left his country to attend school in France and eventually earn degrees from foreign
institutions and sought citizenship in Switzerland. Along with nationalizing oil,
Mossadegh passed land reforms, introduced social security and rent control, and
strengthened the separation of powers between the branches of government. However,
Iran was far from becoming a democracy during this time. It was, in fact, a constitutional
monarchy with the shah wielding tremendous power, to include the right to appoint or
dismiss a prime minister.
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Neuroticism
McCrae and Costa note that, “Individuals who score high on measures of
neuroticism lack self-confidence and self-esteem” (1991, 227). As Kinzer explains, “At
times he became so passionate while delivering speeches that tears streamed down his
cheeks. Sometimes he fainted dead away, as much from emotion as from any physical
condition” (2008, 54).
Extraversion
Extraversion is related to “leader emergence in groups” (Watson and Clark 1997,
767). de Bellaigue asserts,
Mossadegh was a hypochondriac known for throwing weeping fits and
conducting business from his bed. He had no weakness for girls, boys, money,
wine, the pipe or Karl Marx. Any of these vices would have made him more
understandable . . . but to his western interlocutors he was a riddle. They found
him in his camel's wool aba, or cackling on his haunches in bed, or lying low with
his hands fluttering up and down under his neck. For Mossadegh, the nation's oil
represented life, hope, freedom. (2012, 2)
Openness to Experience
McRae (1987) notes,
Openness to experience correlates with divergent thinking.
From a telegraph from Harriman to the President dated July 19, 1951:
In whipping up public emotions on this issue, Mossadegh has created an
atmosphere which has made it possible for extreme elements, both right and
communist, to establish situation under which it is practically impossible for him
substantially retreat. Mossadegh’s rigidity thus results as much from practical
political factors as from his emotionalism. There is a chance that he can be
convinced to some extent upon the practical realities on the oil company
operation, and that his emotions can to degree be tempered with realism. From
my conversation with the Shah and Ala, it is clear that they believe the Shah
cannot now afford to replace Mossadegh and install a more amenable
government, and US officials question his current power to do so in any event.
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Agreeableness
Mossadegh was certainly not agreeable to the terms of the British petroleum
export policy and he made it very well-known to those around him. In the end, his
demise left a legacy of conflict and instability in the region for many decades to come.
De Bellaigue writes, “Ousting Mossadegh, in the long run, did great harm to western
interests. It was the start of a US policy in support of shoddy Middle Eastern despots,
which suffered its first defeat in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic
revolutionaries overthrew the Shah, and unraveled further with the Arab Spring of 2011”
(2012, 3).
Conscientiousness
There is very little evidence to support the relationship between conscientiousness
and transformational leadership. However, Mossadegh was very aware of his importance
to the Iranian people. After all, he was a patriot at heart and, despite many opportunities
to leave his homeland to reside in another country, he never chose that option.
As Kinzer notes,
Although Mossadegh championed Iranian self-determination, he had little faith in
his fellow deputies, and few escaped the lash of his tongue. He accused them of
cowardice, of lacking initiative, and worst of all being unpatriotic. His
fulminations at the podium were both frightening and theatrical. Gesturing
wildly, his hand unconsciously wiping away the famous tears that sprung
unbidden from his eyes at times of nervousness or rage, he pilloried his listeners
with the righteousness of a priest who suffers with his victims even as he unmasks
them…Distinguished, highly emotional, and every inch the aristocrat, he believed
so totally in his own country that his words reached out and touched the common
man. Mossadegh was Iran’s first genuinely popular leader, and he knew it. (2008,
58)
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Public Dissent
Dissent is an interesting word in the English dictionary—even more compelling
when used within the context of a social movement such as the one in Iran in 1953.
“Dissent is always dangerous to those who practice it and vexatious to those against
whom it is directed. For both the dissenter and their target, dissent stirs up strong
emotions and often calls forth strident reactions” (Sarat 2010, 1). Moreover, “Dissenters
seek to define and occupy an in-between space, resistant to prevailing orthodoxy but
engage with it nonetheless. Gates adds, “It’s the ultimate gesture of citizenship. A way
of saying: I’m not just passing through, I live here.”5
From 1905–1911, the people of Iran experienced a Constitutional Revolution that
introduced the concept of democracy and human rights to the populace and advocated for
political rights of Iranian citizens against the authority of the shah and members of the
Pahlavi Dynasty. Further, during this period Iran experienced an awakening of a
different kind—the discovery, and eventual exploitation, of its natural resources. For
Iran, social movements and political dissent were nothing new. Many leaders had been
ousted as a result of public revolts. However, in this case, the enemy was not the
dictator. Rather, the enemy was the foreign invader and exploiter of Iran’s primary
natural resource: petroleum. Moreover, Mossadegh had his share of enemies in the form
of royalists, anglophiles, defectors, and the Tudeh. The latter, the Tudeh Party, was
perceived as growing stronger in strength, momentum, and political cohesion. As
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Gasiorowski notes, “Traditional Iranian revolts involved the active or passive supporter
of all social classes to bring down an unjust arbitrary ruler and replace him with just one”
(2004, 3). The effects of the 1953 coup had resonating effects on a society that had longhoped for democracy and human rights. As Gasiorowski and Byrne note, “Domestically,
it brought to an end a vibrant chapter in the history of Iran’s nationalist and democratic
movements” (2004, 1).
Mossadegh and the Popular Movement were intended to establish a constitutional
government, as well as democracy and political freedom for the Iranian people. While
Mossadegh and the populace believed in these rights, the political machine of Iran was
not as liberal. Mossadegh and other Popular Movement leaders believed that as long as
external governments owned rights to the country’s natural resources, Iran could never
truly be democratic or independent.
In a declassified memorandum from Ambassador Henry F. Grade to Mr.
Kiplinger from Tehran, July 20, 1951:
I am hoping the case will continue to build up against Mossadegh to the point
where he will have to step down and somebody else is brought in to straighten
things out. He is losing support in certain quarters, but it would be a mistake to
assume that he has not the Iranian people behind him almost 100%. He has
become to the Iranian people a Ghandi. They feel he is fighting for their
independence from British domination and they will make any sacrifice to support
him.
A declassified telegraph from Tehran to Department of State, No. 165, July 12th,
5pm:
Embassy has received from several sources increasing indications in political
situation that Mossadegh Government may have been considerably weakened by
developments of past two weeks. The reasons are: many deputies now realize oil
impasse threatens Iran with serious financial difficulties. They state privately
government must quickly inform country its plans to avoid or mitigate impending
economic crisis; manner in which seized [AIOC] documents were exploited for
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political purposes by national front members of government has aroused
indignation of many, especially those fearing to be implicated, and this
controversy has deprived Cabinet of some of its press support; increasing
confusion and inefficiency in conduct ordinary government affairs and lack of
confidence in integrity of Fatemi; demagogic tactics employed by Mossadegh
supporters to keep nationalist sentiment at high pitch have alarmed many
deputies, although few have voiced concern publicly; cabinet is becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with Mossadegh’s penchant for making decisions with a
small group of close advisors without full consultation of the Cabinet; Mossadegh
has announced group of physicians will submit report on his physical condition.
Purpose may be to lay basis for graceful exit.
In the case of Iran, the state’s repressive policies and external influences may
have channeled oppressive political parties to embrace radical Islam as the state’s
ideology. The 1953 Iran coup cut short one country’s hopes of rising to democratic
freedom.
Global Instability
In 1951, Iran was a country caught in a vice between global superpowers. The
United Kingdom wanted to continue its oil extraction business without disruption and the
United States wanted both countries to find an acceptable middle ground. Mossadegh
was known as an outspoken nationalist with an ardent passion for democratic freedoms
and human rights. The United Kingdom considered him a nuisance and a potential threat
to their plan. President Harry S. Truman had a soft spot for Mossadegh’s nationalist
ideals yet his successor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff viewed the prime
minister’s passion as a threat to their very non-communist neighbors.
From a letter written by Mrs. Cornelius Bryce Pinchot to Truman and Secretary of
State Dean Acheson:
The most effective point in the disastrous policy of the Prime Minister, Dr.
Mossadegh, is the crushing poverty of the Iranian people. Immediate American
aid followed by long-term assistance would answer this point. Many Iranians
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realize that Mossadegh is leading the country to ruin. Such a move on our part
would give them something tangible with which to work. I do not think that it is
farfetched to suggest that the crisis in Iran has implications that could reach as far
as the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. As
things stand now the very best that we can foresee for Iran is rapidly progressing
disintegration with little by little the Iron Curtain closing down one of the most
strategic nerve centers of the world. The danger of this leading to war is evident.
That it could influence the outcome of such a war is also evident.
The threat of global instability was apparent, and the superpowers needed to have
a plan in place before it was too late. From a declassified document titled “Iran,” 14
November 1952: “It is of critical importance to the United States that Iran remains an
independent and sovereign nation, not dominated by the USSR. Because of its key
strategic position, its petroleum resources, its vulnerability to political subversion, Iran
must be regarded as a continuing objective of Soviet expansion.
The loss of Iran by default or by Soviet intervention would:
a) Be a major threat to the security of the entire Middle East, including Pakistan
and India;
b) Permit communist denial to the free world of access to Iranian oil and
seriously threaten the loss of other Middle Eastern oil;
c) Increase the Soviet Union’s capability to threaten important United StatesUnited Kingdom lines of communication;
d) Damage United States prestige in nearby countries and with the exception of
Turkey and possibly Pakistan, seriously weaken, if not destroy, their will to
resist communist pressures;
e) Set off a series of military, political and economic developments, the
consequences of which would seriously endanger the security interests of the
60

United States. Social unrest is spreading in the wake of nationalist agitation
and disruption of the traditional structure of Iranian leadership and
institutions.”
From a “Department of State Memorandum” published for the press, dated May
18, 1951. Moreover, the United States expressed deep concern over the dispute between
the Iranian and British Governments over Iranian oil. The White House issued an official
memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to Secretary of State Dean Acheson dated
May 29, 1951.
We are firm friends of both Iran and Great Britain, and are sincerely interested in
the welfare of each country. The United States wants an amicable settlement to
this dispute, which is serious not only to the parties directly concerned but to the
whole free world. We have followed the matter closely and have told both
countries where we stand. The views which we have expressed have related to
the broad aspects of the problem, as it has not been appropriate for us to advise
with respect to specific terms of arrangements which might be worked out.
The White House issued a memorandum stating, “We have stressed the
importance of the Iranians achieving their legitimate objectives through friendly
negotiation with the other party, consistent with international responsibilities. This
would have the advantage of maintaining confidence in future commercial investments in
Iran and, indeed, in the validity of contractual arrangements all over the world.”
Moreover, there were discussions on whether the removal of the British oil company
from Iran would be beneficial to the country.
Iran was a pawn between superpowers on the global stage. On the one hand,
British exploitation of its oil within its own country was an impediment to the country’s
desires to gain democratic freedom and independence. On the other hand, despite its
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strategic geographic location and abundance of natural resources, its internal politics and
corruption prevented it from making a coherent stand against global superpowers.
Internal Conflict
This section analyzes the factors that contributed to internal conflict within Iran
from 1952 to 1953 and takes a step further to see if these factors led to larger problems in
the future. The principal questions to be addressed are twofold. First, what was the
security environment like during this time period? Second, did internal conflict result in
the spawning of other problems such as state-sponsored terrorism following the 1953
covert action event?
From a declassified memorandum written by the White House Chief of Protocol
describing the Ambassador of Iran, dated September 24, 1952 it can be reasoned that the
security environment in Iran in 1952 was tenuous:
The ambassador said that the present political situation in Iran is critical. He
described the situation there, both economically and politically, as deteriorating
from day to day. He described certain elements there, concentrating their efforts
through the Tudeh Party, as working hard to throw Iran into the Soviet camp. He
said his people had distinct resentment against past encroachments both of Russia
and Great Britain, but that there was a danger now that the encroachments of
Great Britain would become increasingly important in their minds. The
implication of what he said was that the Americans, through this type of
association, were rapidly becoming as much disliked as the British had always
been.
Two years earlier in a declassified Intelligence Memorandum No. 332, dated 20
September 1950, rumblings of a possible association with Russia were circulating:
The Iranian Government is finding it increasingly difficult to adhere firmly to its
pro-Western policy. In aligning itself with the West, Iran had hoped to receive
aid comparable to that given Greece and Turkey. Having failed to receive such
aid, the Iranians are skeptical of Western intentions and question the wisdom of
maintaining their pro-Western alignment. They are, instead, inclined to listen to
the “friendly” Soviet protestations which characterize the current attitude of the
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USSR toward Iran. This attitude is manifest in the Soviet release of captured
Iranian soldiers and in the wish to negotiate such important matters as a trade
agreement, frontier disputes, and the return of Iranian gold and dollars held in
Moscow. The USSR thus appears eager to make arrangements which would
sharply point up Soviet willingness to help Iran, and the Iranians feel that a
suitable response to the Soviet approach may lessen the likelihood of direct
intervention by the USSR.
Following the shah’s overthrow, the new Islamic Republic of Iran created the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. Their role was to enforce the new country’s
conservative values. Over the years, this group has spawned independent groups that
have been accused of recruiting and training terrorist operatives within and beyond Iran’s
borders. In the case of Iran, the mistrust stems from great powers such as Russia, Great
Britain, and the United States seeking to control and exploit the country and her resources
created an unsteady foundation for future diplomatic relations. The US State Department
still labels Iran “the most active state sponsor of terrorism.”6 Islam appears to be the
common denominator for most, if not all, of these organizations.7 Byman (2005) adds,
“Iran helped found, organize, and train Hezbollah, eventually creating a strong and
relatively independent terrorist group. In exchange, Hezbollah has served Iran loyally,
striking Iran’s various foreign enemies, helping assassinate Iranian dissidents, and
otherwise advancing the interests of the Islamic Republic” (2005, 80).
As Ranstorp (1997) notes, “Iran also gained prestige from supporting Hezbollah.
The movement’s increasingly successful resistance to Israel raised its stature in the
Muslim and Arab world, which in turn reflected well on Tehran. Theology and power
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politics went hand in hand for Tehran: without being involved against Israel, it was far
harder for Iran to portray itself as the revolutionary vanguard of the Muslim world.”8
Byman adds, “Hezbollah’s capabilities also served as a coercive tool for Iran, enabling it
to threaten the United States if it felt Washington’s pressure was too strong” (2005, 94).
As Kinzer (2009) writes, “Operation AJAX, as the CIA coup against Mossadegh was
codenamed, was a great trauma for Iran, the Middle East, and the colonial world. This
was the first time the CIA overthrew a foreign government. It set a pattern for years to
come and shaped the way millions of people view the United States” (2009, 319).
The internal conflict brought about by intense hatred for external intruders
evolved into an anti-American theocracy that ultimately adopted and cultivated terrorism
as a tool of statecraft. When diplomatic relations failed time after time, Iran chooses to
resort to extreme measures. Terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda,
ISIS/ISIL, and those learning new, lethal, and innovative skills in the shadows have
confidence that they can rely on Iran to provide them with safe haven, financial, and
political support. These events should serve as a stark reminder to any country that seeks
to change the course of history by deposing a ruler through violent means. While victors
do win coups—such was the case in 1953—they end up losing tragically in the future and
paying the price for their so-called victories.
Regime Type
Authors have often referred to Iran as a “regime of religion” but not many know
that it sought a regime built on democratic freedom and equal rights. When one hears of
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the word “regime” within the context of Iran, it conjures up a myriad of images ranging
from royalty gilded in gold, resting on the Peacock Throne, to charismatic nationalist
leaders with a long, drawn face and a crooked nose, to radical Islamic clerks, and to
terrorist extremists. The picture is clear: there is no linear way to define Iran and its
regime. Despite the pattern of cruel authoritarianism, autocracy, theocracy, pseudodemocracy, repressive and intransigent state, one common denominator exists between
all these labels: its defiance against outsiders.
More importantly, the Qajar model of domestic economy relied heavily on
exports of textiles and cottage industry products. The allure of European brand of
capitalism was becoming a force that was too strong to ignore. In essence, the social
fabric of Iran’s social class was transforming, and a new, more independent form of
government was desired by the people. The bazaar-centered middle-class (merchants,
artists etc.) combined forces with the intellectuals to rise against the upper-class. The
people’s attitudes towards the shah were also changing:
Critics and scholars have offered their own interpretation of the 1953 Iran coup.
Some scholars assessed that external pressure from Russia, Britain, and the United States
created an environment of mutual distrust with Iran. Some viewed Mossadegh as the
Middle East’s first liberal leader and others viewed him as an emotionally unstable
dictator who initiated programs that demonstrated the pretenses of democracy but, in
actuality, were inevitably lost in the greed and corruption of the local and state
government. By the time of the coup, the political institution was in shambles and any
hope for democracy was fleeting. The only lasting remnant of nationalism and
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independence is seen in the defiance of the younger generation of Iranians who only
know of the 1953 Iran coup from stories told by their parents and grandparents.
Conclusions
One of the interesting associations to note in the Iran coup case study is the link
between global instability and internal conflict. While the people of Iran had no ill will
towards the United States, they did share a bitter resentment towards the United
Kingdom. It was not until the time leading up to the coup that the Iranian people started
to view the United States in the same category as the United Kingdom. The external
influence from these two superpowers had a direct influence on the level of conflict
within the country of Iran, during a time when the country was experiencing its own
conflict that originated with the encroachment of Islam on its religious culture. While
some scholars argue that Iran’s fledgling democracy would have certainly failed due to
weak political institutions, perhaps it would have taken a charismatic leader with strong
patriotism to push the country to the next phase of independence. Mossadegh may have
turned the tide of history—had he been given the chance to do so. One of the best quotes
discovered during the research of this case study was made by Allison comments, “The
Iranian leaders did not rebel against their own failed rulers but against ours.”9
The U.S. role in the 1953 Iran coup was considered a success by the United
States. Moreover, it created a sense of invincibility among US leaders that any country
could be influenced with just the right amount of covert force. This case study
successfully proved that global instability, combined with internal conflict and leadership
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characteristics were more powerful than the other variables such as public dissent and
regime change.
Additionally, the United States paid very little attention to Iran’s strategic
importance in the Middle East. At that time, the focus was primarily on preventing Iran
from leaning towards communism. Had Mossadegh emphasized his intellectual strength
over his emotional weakness, he may have been able to harness the power of the people
into a final push towards democracy.
This case also demonstrated the less influential power of regime type to a leader’s
survival. Had Iran been on the more extreme of the spectrum in its transition to
becoming a democracy, the “regime type” factor would have been more significant to the
result. Mossadegh inherited a political institution that had been built on dictatorship,
corruption, and greed, which few leaders had survived longer than a year in power. The
1953 Iran coup case study does demonstrate the association between leader
characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and regime type as
captured in the dissertation’s model. The presence of each factor has a direct influence
on the other, albeit in varying degrees. The ensuing case studies will analyze other
countries that experienced a covert action event and will attempt a connection between
the factors and how they affect leader survival.
This case study analyzed the effects of six causal conditions on the fate of leaders
to include leadership characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict,
and regime type. Utilizing the QCA process, this case study identifies characteristics of
each factor that will be used to determine the degree of membership of each case. In
regard to leader characteristics, Mossadegh was a member of the minority population, he
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had a college degree, and he was under the age of 40 years old when he assumed power.
Public dissent is not as significant of a factor as he enjoyed a tremendous amount of
public support from the Iranian people. He assumed power during a tumultuous time
when political corruption ran rampant and very few political leaders survived longer than
12 months in office. Looking at global instability, the threat of communism was strong
and heavily influenced foreign policy behavior of the United States. Transitioning to
internal conflict, the country was in a state of crisis at the time of the covert action event.
Military coups occurred on a cyclic basis and the environment was ripe for a revolution.
Considering regime type, the people of Iran had grown weary of the monarchy and its
abuse of power as well as exploitation of the country’s resources for personal gain. The
tenuous relationship between the monarch, prime minister, and military leaders were
influential pre-conditions to inevitable regime change.
Table 5 . Membership of Iran with Survival Variables
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Leader Characteristics

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

More
Out
Than In

Mostly
Out

X

Public Dissent

X

Global Instability

X

Internal Conflict

X

Regime Type

X
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Fully
Out

CHAPTER V – DEMOCRACY THWARTED
Guatemala, 1953–1954
“We were on the crest of a wave and nobody, literally nobody on the Hill or
anywhere else ever questioned our ability to do anything if we wanted to do it [and] if we
were willing to spend the money and the effort to do it.”10
--Thomas C. Mann, Former Chief Political Officer, United States Embassy in Guatemala
in 1975
Introduction
This chapter will explore covert action events planned and carried out by the
United States in Guatemala in 1953 and 1954. It will start with a brief overview of the
political environment during that time, and then discuss the leader characteristics of
President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman and his influence on Guatemalan society. After
discussing the overall aftermath of the covert action operation and how American forces
used that action to influence the Guatemalan government, the study will conduct a
detailed discussion of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor
presented in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, this case study concludes with a
summary of the findings and an application of the findings into the degree of membership
matrix.
By the time the 1954 Guatemala Coup occurred, the country was fully immersed
in political turmoil. Two major political factions were at odds with each other, which
were the conservative side as represented by wealthy landowners and military officers,
and those who passionately fought for the left, as symbolized by the Guatemalan
Communist Party. Nationalism, communism, militarism, and strong divisions within the
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social fabric of Guatemalan society set the stage for the 1954 coup. All of these powerful
influences converged over the issue of land reform. A key stakeholder in the initiative
was the United Fruit Company, an American conglomerate which, at the time, was the
largest foreign business presence in the country. Shareholders of the company urged
politicians in Washington, D.C. to support a coup to overthrow the Arbenz Guzman
presidency. So, they did; with failed results. As Cullather notes, “Ironically, by attaining
its short-term goals, removing Jacobo Arbenz, PBSUCCESS thwarted the long-term
objective of producing a stable, non-Communist Guatemala” (1994, 91).
PBSUCCESS exploited paramilitary and psychological operations to replace a
popular, democratically-elected government with an unknown successor. The objective
of the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration was to replace a government with perceived
communist leanings with a stable government that rejected communism and would prove
more amenable to support US economic interests by using covert action. Instead, ousting
Arbenz resulted in countrywide instability and laid the groundwork for the failed Bay of
Pigs operation seven years later.
After removing Arbenz, the United States set out to use Guatemala as its
showcase for democracy. However, other forces were far stronger than those of
democratic values. This case study highlights the importance of global instability in the
form of external influence asserted by the United States on a confident but neurotic leader
of Guatemala to exploit the agricultural resources of Guatemala, which appeared to be the
primary source of internal conflict in the country. The United States exercised influence
and coercion over Arbenz and, during his tenure, the Guatemalan Army quickly
leveraged this animosity between Arbenz and the United States to challenge his authority.
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While this case illustrates the importance of the previously mentioned factors of
the model, the case of Guatemala does not demonstrate the significance of leadership
characteristics in leader survival. Arbenz was portrayed as a socialist leader who was, in
reality, leading the country under communist control. He was not a passionate nationalist
and easily influenced by his wife who was a passionate nationalist at the time. He
traveled around the Soviet Bloc countries to relocate and never settled but ensured that
his children received education in Moscow, thereby ensuring that the youngest generation
of the family would be indoctrinated into the family’s leftist ideology. Once a promising
young military officer, he never rid himself of the bitterness he felt as an outsider in
Guatemalan society.
Background
To the United States, Guatemala was on the brink of communism. To Arbenz and
his followers, land reform and progressive thinking were the means to bring equality to a
country that had been in turmoil since its inception. The deep chasm between the elite
landowners and the workers (Indians) grew deeper and wider with every leadership
transition. The successful coup to overthrow Arbenz represented the vulnerability of
small countries to larger superpowers. In this case study, the United States used
economic interests to assert its influence over a foreign country, to the detriment of its
people. In comparison to the Iran case study, Guatemala offered natural resources in the
form of agricultural products, whereas Iran had an abundant supply of oil. Both countries
were exploited by foreign powers.
The decision to overthrow the Arbenz government was based on a US perception
of Guatemala’s favorable disposition toward communism. Many scholars have argued
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that the government was not communist at all. Rather, it was a progressive version of a
reformist government that aimed to give land rights back to the indigenous population.
Additionally, there was a perception of the CIA and the Eisenhower administration
making executive decisions exclusively based on the economic interest of the United
States as opposed to giving any consideration of the socio-economic disparity in
Guatemala. Furthermore, the United States was not prepared for the international
condemnation that it faced in the aftermath. London and Paris newspapers accused the
Eisenhower administration of introducing a new form of “economic colonialism”
(Cullather 2004, 85). The fallout from the Arbenz regime removal resulted in a legacy of
anti-American sentiments that spread throughout Latin America. The regime change
occurred quickly and with absolute support from the Eisenhower administration, the CIA,
and Arbenz’s successor Castillo Armas who had recently graduated as a student in the
United States Army’s Command and General Staff College. Naturally, Armas was
viewed as a trusted friend of the United States in contrast to Arbenz who was viewed as a
friend of the socialist group influenced by communist power. According to Cullather
(1994), “Agency officials had only a dim idea of what had occurred in Guatemala before
Jacobo Arbenz Guzman came to power in 1950” (1994, 2). Cullather (2004) adds,
In Havana, Santiago, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, and Rio de Janeiro, large
crowds gathered to burn the stars and stripes and effigies of Eisenhower and
Dulles. Even before the afterglow of the White House briefing wore off, the
Eisenhower administration had reason to question whether PBSUCCESS had
delivered an undiluted victory. Agency and State Department officials were
shocked at the ferocity of international protest after the fall of Arbenz (2004, 85).
The Eisenhower administration ultimately recognized the reality of the situation
and saw events not just in the Guatemalan context but as a part of a global pattern of
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communist activity. Instead of witnessing the blossoming of a stable government which
would, in turn, lead to a favorable economic climate, many began to see Guatemala as it
truly was: a politically unstable country ravaged by decades of internal conflict; a
country deeply divided by cultural and religious beliefs; a government that provided
inadequate living conditions for a majority of its population; rampant poverty and
illiteracy; and a prime candidate for US foreign aid. As Cullather asserts, “Resentment
even found artistic expression in the work of Mexican muralist Diego Rivera, who
depicted in fresco who painted [US Ambassador] Puerifoy and the Dulles brothers
passing money to Castillo Armas…over the bodies of Guatemalan children” (2004, 86).
In Booth’s (2014, 175) book on Guatemala’s history, he notes that “Arbenz
sought to deepen social reforms despite growing conservative and US opposition. In
1951 he legalized the Communist Party, called the Guatemalan Labor Party (Partido
Guatemalteco del Trabajo, PGT)”. This organization began actively pushing for agrarian
reform under the guidance of Arbenz and his predecessor. According to Booth (2014,
175), “The 1952 Agrarian Reform Law began the conﬁscation and redistribution of
farmland to 100,000 peasants.” The new strategy had seismic effects on the local
populace and beyond. For the first time in the country’s history, economic power shifted
from the one percent of elite landowners (most of whom were foreign), to workers and
peasants from the indigenous population. The new regulations led to the nationalization
of land belonging to the United Fruit Company.
At the time, the United Fruit Company (UFCO) was described as, “Nearly
300,000 acres of banana and sugar cultivations spread over six countries and one British
colony” (Martin 2013, 238). Founded by Texas businessman Minor Cooper Keith in
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1899, UFCO created a vast caste-based wild frontier in which members of the top
hierarchy included a nucleus of white, Anglo-Saxon men who served as managers and
supervisors. Lower class laborers were mostly Hispanic and West Indian.
Martin (2013, 238) noted, “Throughout this period, there were daunting medical
obstacles to retaining a stable population of what company doctors came to term
‘temperate zone’ employees.” He added, “Reminiscent of North American frontiers,
United Fruit’s raw edges were violent places and, true to the frontier metaphor, disorder
emanated primarily from people of color” (2013, 322). The term “banana cowboys”
came to describe the men who worked the Guatemalan banana trade. They represented
the banana frontier and “its unrestrained male sociability, its transformative possibilities
and the racialized labor discipline that kept the business running” (Martin 2013, 328).
Considered an economic paradox, Guatemala was a country blessed with
abundant agricultural resources.
In his inaugural speech, Arbenz stated,
All the riches of Guatemala are not as important as the life, the freedom, the
dignity, the health and the happiness of the most humble of its people. How
wrong would we be if—mistaking the means for the end—we were to set
financial stability and economic growth as the supreme goals of our policy,
sacrificing to them the well-being of our masses…Our task is to work together in
order to produce more wealth…But we must distribute these riches so that those
who have less—and they are an immense population—benefit more, while those
who have more—and they are so few, also benefit, but to a less extent. How
could it be otherwise, given the poverty, the poor health, and the lack of education
of our people? (Trefzger 2002, 37).
The nationalization of the UFCO raised red flags for the Eisenhower
administration that had close ties with the conglomerate. In fact, nationalization, inklings
of communist affiliation, and Guatemala’s coincidental purchase of small arms from
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Czechoslovakia indicated to the US that the country was becoming increasingly
communist. The memory of the Iran coup over the threat of communism still lingered in
the collective memory of many. In response to Arbenz’s agricultural reform strategy and
nationalization of the UFCO, the United States implemented a plan to destabilize the
Arbenz administration through the use of economic sanctions, diplomatic influence,
propaganda, and psychological operations. As Trefzger (2002) notes, “In June 1954 the
tiny CIA-supported National Liberation Army led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas,
invaded Guatemala. The armed forces refused to defend the government, and President
Arbenz had to resign” (Booth 2014, 175). Guatemala’s destiny of becoming a
democratic nation had been cut short.
Leader Characteristics
Leader characteristics play an important part in the study’s model, as they have a
direct influence on public dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and type of regime.
This section will analyze Arbenz’s personal background, political experience, leader
characteristics, as well as other significant characteristics.
Born in 1913 in Guatemala, Arbenz was the son of a Swiss pharmacist who
immigrated to Guatemala and eventually married a local Guatemalan woman. His father
committed suicide in 1934 because of his addiction to morphine, and as a result of his
addiction and the Great Depression, his pharmaceutical business failed. Described as
“tall, good-looking and motivated by an intense desire to make up for his father’s
failure,” Arbenz was a hard-working student who devoted many long hours to his studies.
He graduated at the top of his class at the Military Academy but quickly came to realize
that the traditional military structure put into place by the current regime offered little, if
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any, upward mobility for a person from low economic and social class. As Immerman
suggests, “Frustrated, Arbenz came to hate the system that denied success to an
individual simply because he was from the wrong class. He gravitated toward the
revolutionary movement, and, after Ubico forced him into exile at the age of 30, he
became one of the leaders of the opposition” (1982, 1212). With his engaging
personality and vibrant voice, he soon became a favorite among the Guatemalan people.
He had all of the ingredients for success: intellect, passion for national reform issues,
rhetorical skills, and a beautiful wife who had political connections of her own as a
member of one of El Salvador’s most wealthy families. According to Immerman (1982,
1212), “Maria’s father was associated with the government’s 1931 massacre of nearly
twenty thousand Indians and mestizos. Horrified by what she had witnessed, the young
Maria adopted an almost parental concern for the Maya peasants.” Together, they
formed the perfect image of the country’s young and attractive “First Family” of
Guatemala. The perfect image would be short-lived, as the United States grew concerned
over Arbenz’s favorable leanings toward socialist theory. The threat became so extreme
that discussions over assassinations and leader removals were presented within the inner
circle of Washington leaders.
A declassified memorandum from the CIA states,
In addition to monitoring events in Guatemala, the Agency continued to try to
influence developments and to float ideas for disposing of key figures in the
government. It proposed to not only focus on sabotage, defection, penetration,
and propaganda efforts with regard to Guatemala, but to also eliminate and
assassinate key Guatemalan military leaders11
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Further, the memorandum also adds, “The CIA plan, to draw up the Western
Hemisphere Division, combined psychological warfare, economic, diplomatic, and
paramilitary actions against Guatemala. Named PBSUCCESS, and coordinated with the
State Department, the plan’s objectives was to remove covertly, and without bloodshed if
possible, the menace of the present communist-controlled government of Guatemala”
(1995, 4).
In regard to training, the memorandum notes,
Although assassination was not mentioned specifically in the overall plan, the
Chief…requested a special paper on the liquidation of personnel on 5 January
1954. A cable [delivered] the following day requested 20 silencers, for .22 caliber
rifles. The chief also discussed the training plan that would require the training of
two assassins, also known as “assassin specialists” (1995, 4). The memorandum
also revealed that, “Intense psychological warfare techniques were utilized as
well. The propaganda campaign was focused on the Arbenz administration and
included sending mourning cards to top communist leaders, letters indicating the
impending use of nerve agents, wooden coffins, hangman’s nooses and phony
bomb were delivered to leaders’ homes” (CIA and Guatemala Assassination
Proposals). A CIA station chief added, “The elimination of those in high
positions of the government would bring about its collapse. He added, even a
smaller number, around 20, would be sufficient” (CIA and Guatemala
Assassination Proposals, 1995, 6).
On 27 June 1954, Arbenz, in a bitter and anti-American speech, resigned his
presidency and left for Mexico, where he was granted asylum. He was only the second
president in Guatemalan history to be democratically-elected into office. His
predecessor, Juan Arevalo, was elected through a democratic process and won with 85
percent of the popular vote. Aybar de Soto (1978) writes, “After coming into power,
Arbenz continued most of the reform programs initiated by his predecessor. Most of the
reform programs of Arbenz proceeded within the broad framework of democracy. In fact,
many scholars evaluated his reform programs as substantially democratic. For
77

approximately ten years the fight for organizing a labor union and reforming a program
of land distribution continued with a desire for establishing a foundation of mass support
that would provide institutional bases of democracy.”12 Based on the five-factor model
of personality and transformational leadership, this section will assess Arbenz’s leader
characteristics in the areas of neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience,
agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Information captured from a sanitized and
declassified memorandum released by the CIA in 2003 offers an intimate biographical
profile of Arbenz during the period leading up to and following the coup.
Neuroticism
As noted in the previous case study, the trait of neuroticism is typically associated
with individuals who lack self-confidence and self-esteem. The following excerpts allude
to Arbenz’s unsteady personality and lack of personal discipline and self-control. It
appeared that he progressively lost confidence with the passing of time.
In the CIA character profile, the details include:
28 June 1954. Arbenz, wife and two children took refuge in the Mexican
Embassy in Guatemala. This was followed by numerous rumors of Arbenz being
ill, and many reports of his moodiness and drunkenness within the Embassy.
10 July 1954. According to diplomatic sources, Arbenz attempted to commit
suicide in the Mexican Embassy in Guatemala City on 10 July.
19 October 1955. Antonio Vilanova, Arbenz’s brother-in-law, said during a
recent trip to Mexico that he doubts that Arbenz’s wife will permit him to return
to Mexico, since she was responsible for their going to Europe in order to have
him recover from his mental depression. Vilanova said that Arbenz had tried to
commit suicide a number of times, that he has become a heavy drinker, going on
periodic, prolonged bouts of intoxication.
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November-December 1956. Arbenz continues his close relationship with José
Manuel Fortuny. Arbenz gets drunk and his conduct is poor. The difficult
relationship with his wife, her infidelities, the possibility of an increase in these
problems, and his being alone in Paris—a situation he calls a hopeless life—cause
him to drink to excess, alone or in company. Arbenz has always been a neurotic.
His desperation causes him to be locked in his room for days on end at the Hotel
Vermont, Paris, having food sent to his room, not speaking to anyone, with the
windows closed and the lights turned off day and night. He spends his time in
absolute depression, violent irritation, and crying spells. Physically Arbenz is
exhausted and looks old. His character makes him more impulsive and violent.
He seems to be a man without strength, without the desire to live; or at least one
who wants to live peacefully without fighting. Arbenz revealed a certain
reluctance to continue an intensive political life.
24 December 1956. Arbenz was arrested for drunkenness by the French police on
Christmas Eve.
31 March 1957. Arbenz’s wife wrote him from El Salvador expressing concern
that she has had no information from her daughters in two months. There is some
cross play in the letter indicating that they are accusing each other of lack of
tenderness in their letters. She states that they are no longer in the Romeo and
Juliet phase. She comments that his concern over the tone of her letters may be
due to the state of his nerves.
Extraversion
Extraversion is related to “leader emergence in groups” (Watson and Clark 1997,
767). Based on the personality profile, it does not appear that Arbenz was an extroverted
leader. In the months following the coup, he became increasingly more introverted and
depressed.
19 September 1954. Arbenz has been very depressed. This fact is confirmed by
the very few who have seen him (his assistants, Guillermo Toriello and Augusto
Charnaud MacDonald). Few of the people who sought asylum in the Mexican
Embassy have been permitted to visit Arbenz, but he has not been ill as stated by
the press.
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Openness to Experience
Scholars describe the trait of openness to experience as being associated with
creativity and open thinking. Arbenz demonstrated this trait through his experience of
traveling around the Soviet Bloc countries in order to find a home for him and his family.
19 September 1954. Jacobo Arbenz, ex-President of Guatemala, and his wife
have decided to go to Switzerland as soon as possible once they have obtained
their safe conduct permits to leave Guatemala. Arbenz’s parents were born in
Switzerland. Mrs. Arbenz has been studying German in the Mexican Embassy in
Guatemala.
20 April 1956. Maria de Arbenz in a letter from Moscow dated 20 April 1956
said that she and her husband would leave for China about the middle of May
1956. She said that their future plans would be known in about three months. At
this time consideration was being given to having Arbenz travel to India,
Indonesia and North Africa for the purpose of building himself up politically and
serving the Soviets by inspiring national liberation movements. Arbenz and his
wife might live outside the Soviet orbit. Arbenz prefers Egypt, but his wife
prefers Italy. Arbenz dislikes France.
Agreeableness
Charismatic leaders have been described as generous and concerned for others.
There are indications in the personality profile that indicate Arbenz’s tendency to be
compassionate towards others. There are even more periods when he demonstrates a
high level of disagreeableness.
27 October 1954. The weekly magazine Siempre carried an interview with
Arbenz in its 27 October 1954 issue in which Arbenz accused the Guatemalan
Army of betraying him. Comment: This and similar anti-Army themes should be
stressed in internal propaganda in Guatemala.
22 August – 24 October 1955. It is rumored among Guatemalan exiles that
Arbenz received a million dollars from the USSR for use in Mexico and Central
America for propaganda. The reported trip of Arbenz into the Soviet Bloc has
raised the hopes of the Guatemalan Communist exiles. Arbenz is believed to be
in touch with Communists in Mexico, Cuba, and Central America.
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25 November 1955. On 25 November 1955 Arbenz stated to Western journalists
in Prague that he did not plan to return to Guatemala unless the government
imposed by the American imperialists is replaced by a new, really democratic
government.
Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness is described as an awareness of importance to the people.
Unlike Iran’s Mossadegh who knew that he was a well-liked, popular leader, Arbenz had
support from the local population but appeared to have more interest in pursuing
communist doctrine then understanding the needs of the Guatemalan people. There are
moments that indicate his sensitivity to protecting the safety of fellow exiles. Following
the coup, he declined stating that he was concerned his comments would have a negative
impact on the status of exiles in Mexico.
14 October 1954. Arbenz replied he did not think it was an opportune moment
because of the promise Mexico had requested from him to abstain from any
political action which might cause a strain in relations between Mexico and
Guatemala…any statements from him to the press at this time would increase the
campaign against Guatemala exiles and would give the participants in this
campaign new reason for requesting the extradition of these exiles.
This indicates some sense of compassion towards his fellow exiles.
25 November 1954. The exile group in Mexico is not happy with Arbenz’s
planned trip to Switzerland because he has not divided the money taken from the
Guatemalan Treasury prior to his resignation. The money had been deposited in
Swiss banks.
This excerpt indicates that he was only in it for himself and was fully aware of his
actions. His lukewarm reception back into the country demonstrates a strong lack of
support from his fellow countrymen.
23 June 1955. Guatemalan exiles in Mexico expect Arbenz to return from Europe
in the immediate future. Many members of the Partido de Accion Revolucionaria
Unificado dread his return because they fear it may create a greater division
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between the Guatemala exile groups. They fear, in particular, his favoritism
towards the communists…
Public Dissent
Arbenz came into office on a wave of public support. He was a popular
nationalist leader and his removal resulted in mass protests not just from within the
country but also outside the country. As Booth notes,
Reformists under Guatemala’s democratic governments of 1944 to 1954 suffered
badly after the 1954 coup. The military’s demobilization campaign decimated the
ranks of reformist politicians, unionists, and indigenous people who had
supported the Arévalo and Arbenz governments. Marxist guerrilla opposition to
the regime ﬁrst appeared in 1962, but was set back greatly by heavy general
repression and an intense counterinsurgency campaign in the late 1960s.16
Popular mobilization rekindled during the 1970s as real wages and income
distribution worsened (2014, 178).
Booth adds, “During the post-1954 counterrevolution, Guatemalan rulers
intensely repressed union activists, students, peasant groups, indigenous peoples,
opposition parties, and other dissidents (2004, 179)” The reform strategy may have
gained traction through the popular support of President Arbenz. However, the initiative
to improve healthcare and raise literacy rates among the indigenous population was only
a Band-Aid that concealed a deeper wound: gross maldistribution of land between the
small percentage of elites and the large population of Indians. The covert action event
that ousted Arbenz would thwart any hope for democracy, independence, and equality for
the people of Guatemala.
Global Instability
International superpowers were riding a crest of so-called success with the
removal from power of Mossadegh in Iran, all in the name of thwarting communism.
Overly confident and riding the wave of success, the members of the Eisenhower
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administration was ready to expand influence on another country with the potential for
economic gain.
As Sewell contends,
In the 1950s, the Cold War was often presented as a battle of ideas, yet CIA
agents on the ground didn’t see it that way. They insisted on a strategy intended
to inspire fear more than virtue. During the period when Dwight D. Eisenhower
was president and Allen Dulles was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
disparate sources have argued, the CIA enjoyed a position of unparalleled
prominence in US foreign policy. With Eisenhower’s proclivity toward
psychological warfare and covert operations increasingly to the fore, the CIA was
an essential part of his armory in the ongoing struggle against the Soviet Union
(2011, 270).
“The Soviet Union,” John Foster Dulles quickly concurred, “had cleverly
infiltrated mass political movements in Latin America” (Sewell 2011, 283). He adds,
“Allen Dulles may have been a key protagonist in building the Cold War CIA, but his
tenure also oversaw a series of disastrous and illegal interventions. Dulles’s Agency
broke international law, subverted democratically-elected governments and supported
brutal dictatorships as long as they were pro-American – all under a banner of
legitimization provided by the Cold War.” (Sewell 2011, 270)
Internal Conflict
Deep divisions between the small population of elite landowners (mostly who
were foreigners) and uneducated indigenous population created conflict within the
country.
Fraser writes,
When former Guatemalan Army officer Jacobo Arbenz ascended to the country’s
highest office in 1950, it marked the first time in Guatemala’s 130-year history as
a nation that the reins of governance had passed from one democratically elected
leader to another. Arbenz rode to power on the crest of a wave originating from
the national revolution of October 1944. Arbenz, an army captain who had
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resigned only months earlier, and his colleague Francisco Arana, a colonel in the
Guatemalan Army’s most renowned unit, the Guardia de Honor, launched a
bloody revolt against their commanders. Under intense pressure, Ponce resigned.
Arbenz, along with Arana and prominent anti-Ponce businessman Jorge Toriello,
established a temporary government and set out a timetable for elections. It would
be the nation’s first, albeit rudimentary, experiment with democracy. (2005, 487)
Guatemala’s experiment with democracy was led by a socialist-minded,
charismatic leader by the name of Juan José Arevalo, a professor of agricultural science
who became the first civilian to lead the nation—an outlier in a country where power fell
mostly into the hands of dictators and military officers (oftentimes one and the same). It
was during this time that Jacobo Arbenz was appointed defense minister in Arevalo’s
new administration.
Since the coup, the country of Guatemala has experienced insurgency, political
revolt, civil war, genocide, and currently serves as a battleground for criminal elements
and violent gangs. Brands writes, “During the Cold War, longstanding social, political,
and economic strains mixed with the ideological polarization produced by superpower
rivalry to generate torrential bloodshed in Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Colombia, and
elsewhere. The worst of these conflicts wrecked economic capacity and government
institutions, and set Latin American countries back by decades” (2011, 230).
Regime Type
Guatemala’s regime type can be described as dictatorship, authoritarian regime on
the brink of democracy, culminating in a democratic election that led to a USorchestrated overthrow.
Brands adds,
The end of the Cold War brought down the curtain on many of these insurgencies,
but it did not bring an end to internal violence and upheaval in Latin America.
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Over the last two decades, an array of criminal groups—notably international
drug traffickers, violent youth gangs, and organized crime syndicates—have
emerged as the chief purveyors of disorder. Across the region, these groups have
exploited weak institutions, official corruption, porous borders, inequality and
social alienation, and the easy availability of small arms to expand their
operations dramatically. They have carved out nodes in a variety of illicit
activities—drug smuggling, human trafficking, arms dealing, kidnapping,
robbery, extortion, money laundering, and others—and made insecurity a fact of
life. Latin America regularly competes for the title of most violent region in the
world (in terms of homicides), and its youth murder rate was more than twice as
high as that of any other region in 2008. (2011, 230)
The roots of contemporary violence in Guatemala can be found in the culture of
ruthless dictatorships, greedy landowners, abuse of military and police authority, and
influences from external powers. The clandestine intelligence and security apparatuses
that were created during the Cold War have never been completely dismantled and, like
weapons left behind by superpower countries, these organizations continue to evolve in
the new world.
As Fraser (2005, 487) notes, “The American attempt to depose the Guatemalan
regime would certainly have failed had the Guatemalan military not abandoned Jacobo
Arbenz. Aspirations for peace and freedom ultimately failed in Guatemala, now to a
greater degree than before the architecture of that story can be revealed, as seen from
inside the American government. It is the architecture of a broken dream.”
Conclusions
The case of Guatemala demonstrates that a leader’s characteristics and personality
traits are necessary for survival. Had Arbenz been more confident of a leader, more
savvy about foreign relations, and had made an effort to negotiate with the United States;
he may have fared better in the end. Instead, he left his country to find residence in
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communist-friendly locales—a message that was viewed with much suspicion by the CIA
and the Eisenhower administration.
The 1954 Guatemala coup case study shares similar themes with the previous case
study on Iran’s 1953 coup. Both countries were viewed under suspicious auspices by the
United States for communist leanings and both countries were blessed with bountiful
natural resources. In both cases, external powers asserted economic and political control
over the country’s leaders, resulting in their untimely removal from office.
It is interesting to note that the Guatemala case study highlights global instability
and internal conflict as the strongest factors in influencing leader survival. Arbenz
enjoyed popular support and sought to improve living conditions for the indigenous
population of Guatemala. While his leadership characteristics were not necessarily
strong, per se, it is assessed that he was easily influenced by external factors. For
example, his wife Maria was a critical factor for his interest and eventual obsession with
communist theory and doctrine. Together, they shared a passion for social reform and a
new brand of democracy—at least in their own minds. His abrupt removal from office
triggered internal conflict and external forces shaped his direction towards communist
associations. In the end, those factors were far stronger than the others.
The U.S. role in the Guatemalan coup was viewed as a victory by the United
States. As with previous cases, the Guatemala coup case study also analyzed the effects
of six causal conditions on the fate of leaders. Considering leader characteristics, Arbenz
was a member of the middle-class and son to a Swiss expatriate and Guatemalan mother,
he was a graduate of the country’s most elite military institution, and he was under the
age of 40 years old when he assumed power. Public dissent was divided with more than
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half of the population supporting Arbenz and several political groups wanting to oust him
from power. He assumed power during a tumultuous time when land reform was at its
most contentious with a small one percent owning the majority of arable land. Global
instability was an influential factor as the world was greatly divided between democracy
and communism and national leaders who did not fall in line with democratic values were
often viewed with suspicion by the United States. Internal conflict played a large role as
the country was in a state of crisis at the time of the covert action event. There had been
a revolution over land reform and rights for the minority population. One of the most
successful aspects of this case study was the ample information provided by the CIA on
Arbenz’s personal life. It seemed that every detail about his life was documented and
recorded for over a decade until his death. Personal information on other leaders in this
research has not been as easily accessible or declassified at the time of this research.
Table 6 Membership of Guatemala with Survival Variables
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

Leader Characteristics

More
Out
Than In
X

Public Dissent

X

Global Instability

X

Internal Conflict

X

Regime Type

X
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Mostly
Out

Fully
Out

CHAPTER VI – CULT OF PERSONALITY
Indonesia, 1955–1958
“The world is quite capable of going to hell without the CIA.”
--Norman Birnbaum, “Failure of Intelligence,” Nation, January 20, 1979
Introduction
This chapter will explore covert action events planned and carried out by the
United States in Indonesia from 1955–1958. It will begin with a brief overview of the
political environment during that time and then discuss the leader characteristics of
Indonesian President Sukarno and his impact on Indonesian society. After discussing the
overall aftermath of the covert action operation and explaining how American forces used
that action to influence the Indonesian government, the chapter will continue with a
detailed discussion of the degree of membership this case demonstrated for each factor
presented in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, this case study concludes with a
summary of the findings and a thorough explanation of the application of the findings
into the degree of membership matrix.
In the 1950s, Indonesia was in the crosshairs of the United States and the Soviet
Union; the first through democracy and freedom and the latter through communism as
both countries competed for political and economic influence on the global stage. The
United States’ foreign policy at the time, both globally and in the Asian region, was
driven by containment of the communist threat. Indonesia, in its decision to maintain
neutrality was viewed with much suspicion and, to add to this suspicion, the newly
independent nation of Indonesia was experiencing a surge of membership in its
Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI). Moreover, members of the PKI were gaining
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coveted positions within the political institutions led by Indonesian President Sukarno.
The United States responded to this influx of communist influence with the
implementation of its two-track foreign policy: the first option of persuading Indonesia
to pull away from neutrality by working through official diplomatic channels at the
embassy in Jakarta, and the second option by covert action through insurgents located
throughout Indonesia’s outer islands.
It was also during this time that the CIA was riding the crest of recent covert
action successes in Iran and Guatemala. With President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
approval, they were preparing to initiate another operation in Indonesia under the code
name Operation HAIK. Unlike Iran’s democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadegh who had his country perched on the edge and leaning more toward
democracy and Guatemala’s democratically-elected President Jacobo Arbenz who
implemented land reform programs with a socialist flavor, Indonesia was not close to
becoming a democracy and nor did its leader, Sukarno, have plans to make to make it a
democracy. Instead, he saw a path of what he called “Guided Democracy,” a cross
between democracy and socialism, and he would be the plan’s guide for the people of
Indonesia.
This case study highlights the importance of leader characteristics as well as the
power of internal conflict, stemming from competing political factions, and the
persuasive and strong-arm influence of a country’s military and security apparatus.
Moreover, as seen in the previous two case studies, global instability was primarily
created by international superpowers, such as the United States and Soviet Union, and the
divisive line drawn between the democratic and communist ideologies. Based on the
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study’s model, the case of Indonesia incorporates all the facets of leader characteristics,
public dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and regime type. The outcome of the
1958 Indonesian failed coup opened the Pandora’s Box for a myriad of socio-cultural and
security issues for the country for many decades to follow. The poor execution of coups,
more often than not, provides an impetus for a country’s transition to internal turmoil,
dissent, radical terrorism, and human rights issues as illustrated in Indonesia post the
1958 failed coup attempt.
Background
As the world’s most populous Muslim majority country, largest archipelago in
Asia and straddling the equator, Indonesia is a country that is well-known for its beautiful
scenery, exotic culture, and brutal history of religion-sparked violence, political
corruption, and radical Islamic terrorism. The history of Indonesia is complex, especially
within the context of covert action. As a beautiful and relatively peaceful archipelago in
Asia, the country was a mystery to most foreigners in 1389. Its mysticism and mix of
cultures made it a land of intrigue and its natural resources were in abundant supply. It
seemed like the perfect location for European colonialists to settle and that is exactly
what they did. It also became a haven for Islam, a religion that was introduced to
Indonesia in the 11th Century, quickly spread throughout the outer islands and, eventually
on the main island. Ethnic divisions and political factions obstructed Indonesia from
becoming a unified country. More importantly, the divisions and cultural differences
made it fertile ground for exploitation by external forces.
As Frederick and Worden note in Indonesia: A Country Study, “Although
Indonesia is extremely diverse ethnically (more than 300 distinct ethnic groups are
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recognized), most Indonesians are linguistically, and culturally, part of a larger IndoMalaysian world encompassing present-day Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and other
parts of insular and mainland Asia”(1993,1). The two most significant developments in
Indonesia’s history under the Sukarno government were its quest to gain land in West
New Guinea and development and growth of Indonesia’s military force. As it turns out,
the latter became the most successful and powerful effort out of the two. The battle of
West New Guinea was a common platform with which a majority of Indonesians could
identify. Having won independence from the Dutch, the people of Indonesia were
stalwart in their claim over land they deemed was rightfully theirs.
Indonesian culture is a complex blend of Javanese tradition, mysticism, and
Islamic influence, further complicated by ethnic and cultural divisions between the
members of the island and those who lived on the smaller islands. The influence of Islam
was also a powerful force that created deep religious divisions. As Frederick and
Worden note (1993, 4), “Because of the antiquity of Java’s civilizations and the relative
isolation of some of its most powerful kingdoms, the process of Islamization there was
both complex and protracted.” The presence of Dutch colonialists also created another
opportunity to blend Eastern and Western ways. A select few of Indonesia’s elite class
were afforded the opportunity to send their sons to Dutch primary schools. This
opportunity was only offered to those who enjoyed social position and influence. Many
of the Indonesian youth chosen to attend Dutch schools grew up to be men who were
influential in local and national politics. They recalled the days when they experienced
discrimination from their Dutch peers and they used that collective memory to shape their
views of politics and society as a whole. Many, like Sukarno, had a deep dislike for the
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Dutch and believed they represented a threat to Indonesia’s independence from
colonialization. Sukarno believed that Islam, specifically Saraket Islam, which was
introduced to the island of Indonesia during the Dutch colonialism years, was a religion
that represented the downtrodden and, thus, he associated it with the nationalist cause.
He also viewed Marxism as an ideology that represented anti-capitalism, which made it
an easy fit into Indonesia’s progressive and new political framework. Sukarno had a
deep passion for unifying the influences swirling around him. He believed that he could
use elements of Marxism and Islam to bring together the people of Indonesia, despite the
varied culture, ethnic and religious divisions, and general mistrust between the city and
village populations and those who inhabited the outer lying islands.
A key theme present in this research is Sukarno’s passion for theatrics and using
his charisma and rhetoric to influence the masses. He believed he could use his oratory
gifts to synthesize ideas and mobilize the masses as, ultimately, he found his words
needed powerful actions behind them. After completing his engineer degree, Sukarno
was on his way to becoming a political leader and had the innate ability to mesmerize any
audience as many Indonesians viewed him as a visionary leader. Sukarno’s downfall was
his inability to deal with the reality of leading a country, navigating through the turbulent
waters of cultural/religious divisions, and skillfully representing himself as a competent
leader in the international arena. While he was idolized by many Indonesians as a
visionary leader and nationalist, his critics knew his weakness was in vanity. As
Frederick and Worden (1993, 7) noted, Indonesia's ailing economy grew worse as
Sukarno built expensive public monuments of himself and government buildings to
celebrate his position and status.
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Leader Characteristics
Sukarno was born on 6 June 1901 in Surabaya, Java, and Dutch East Indies. He
held the honor of being Indonesia’s first president and led the people during the country’s
first independence movement. His vision of a “Guided Democracy” and his
determination to maintain neutrality in the midst of Cold War tension sealed his legacy as
a charismatic and confident leader.
As the son of a poor Javanese school teacher and his Balinese wife, Sukarno was
known by his peers as one who had leader qualities despite his pattern of ill health. He
was a loyal and devoted follower of the art of wayang shadow puppetry, which told the
story of Indonesia with nothing but paper and bedsheets. He became the protégé of a
local religious leader who funded his schooling and eventually married him off to his 16year-old daughter. As a student, he had a natural ease with languages, to include
Javanese, Sundanese, Balinese, modern Indonesian, Arabic, Dutch, German, French,
English, and eventually Japanese. According to his biographers, he was blessed with a
commanding presence, a radiant personality, a photographic memory, and selfconfidence.
During his tenure as president, he was well-known for his elaborate banquets,
nightly soirees, music, and wayang theatrical performances. Meanwhile, the Indonesian
economy continued its perilous descent. While Sukarno had a strong vision of unity for
the country, cultural, moral, religious, political, and economic differences created a
steady state of disunity. Separatist movements also created internal instability. As the
population continued to increase, food production began to decrease as a result of the
destruction of plantations during the war. A majority of the population was illiterate, and
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the lack of skilled workers also wreaked havoc on a war-weary economy. His critics
claimed that Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” was touted as the antithesis of democratic
values, but the reality was that it leaned more towards the communist ideology.
Sukarno has been described as everything from a nationalist leader and hero of
the people to disastrous president who dismantled the framework for democracy in the
1950s, the source of confrontational foreign policy relationships with Malaysia in 1963,
and the leader responsible for leading Indonesia down an economic spiral from which it
has yet to recover. On the other hand, many people remember Sukarno as a gifted leader
who had the ability to relate to and communicate with people from all social classes.
According to Legge,
He was a highly individual leader with his own distinctive and mercurial style.
His vanity, his charm, his political resourcefulness and his unpredictability were a
source both of admiration and exasperation to observers. Among his countrymen
he inspired devotion or hostility, but never indifference. Even his most consistent
critics were fascinated by him in spite of themselves. To some he was a dedicated
leader—a real maker of Indonesia and the sustainer and preserver of the nation
after independence. To others he was a disaster, the waster of the nation’s
resources in policies of domestic extravagance and foreign adventure, a man
seduced by power and by the material pleasure of presidency, the corrupter of his
people and himself. (Legge 1972, 52)
As Judge and Bono in their work on transformational leadership, “Idealized
influence can be defined as serving as a charismatic role model to followers.
Inspirational motivation involves articulation of a clear, appealing, and inspiring vision to
followers” (2000, 751). Sukarno certainly had the ability to influence people from all
cross-sections of Indonesian society, ranging from the village farmer to the military and
members of the elite political circle. He appeared to be committed to unifying the
country and leading it toward independence. As Eden (1992, 271) noted, “Setting high
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performance standards and then convincing followers that attainment of these standards
is possible lies in the heart of transformational leadership.” House and Howell (1992, 87)
added that, “Theoretically, charismatic leaders need to have a very high degree of selfconfidence and moral conviction because their mission is usually unconventional and
likely to be resisted by those who have a stake in preserving the status quo.”
Neuroticism
Sukarno’s relationship with the people of Indonesia was shaped by his belief in
mysticism and his passion for theater. He created an image of himself that was, in
essence, mystical. His ability to put on a new personal or take on a new role—much like
an actor in a theater production—allowed him to interact with the population in a myriad
of ways. The people responded to his chameleon-like personality and their perception of
him as a lauded leader was firmly ensconced in the public’s mind.
A memorandum from Mr. Walter S. Rogers, Institute of World Affairs, dated
November 20, 1954:
When Sukarno speaks, the eyes and minds of the audience seem to be riveted on
his commanding figure and each turn of phrase in his speech. Critics claim that
Sukarno has an unequalled knowledge of the habits, hopes, and prejudices of each
group he addresses, whether it be Javanese, Sudanese, or Dayak, hence his great
success in formulating and manipulating nationalistic opinion. (Rogers 1964, 1)
Another scholar noted in the book Sukarno: A Political Biography,
Sukarno’s most noticeable skills were those of exhortation and persuasion. As an
orator he could hold an audience in the hollow of his hand. By his words he
sought to bridge differences, to bring together diverse elements within the nation
and to give them a sense of common identity. He was sensitive to subtle changes
in the political climate and was uniquely able to catch and formulate the
frustration of the masses. (Legge 1972)
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Sukarno has been described by scholars as a complex person who viewed himself
as a revolutionary leader. His exceptional ability to build rapport with and relate to
individuals through personal associations made him one of the most influential leaders of
the twentieth century.
Legge continued,
The striking characteristics of Sukarno…were his tremendous self-assurance. [He
was] always at the center of events, uniformed and neat in appearance, brisk in his
movements, sparkling in his assumption of his central role, he seemed to
dominate every situation. He read widely and identified himself with
revolutionary leaders of the past and displaying a strongly romantic element in his
sense of history. (1972)
Openness to Experience
Conger and Kanungo note, “Charismatic leaders are not group facilitators like
consensual leaders, but they are active innovators…their behaviors must be novel,
unconventional, and out of the ordinary” (1987, 643). Sukarno embraced openness to
new experience when he moved from the small village where he grew up to the
cosmopolitan city of Surabaya. As Legge (1972) notes, “The move from a small country
town to a large commercial city must have been disturbing as well as exciting for
Sukarno, and his high hopes were no doubt tinged with anxiety as he embarked on his
new experience.” Imagine a city that served as a melting pot to Dutch expatriates, a
thriving Chinese population, and many more Indonesians converging into the city seeking
work in the burgeoning labor industry. It was in this environment that Sukarno witnessed
the convergence of ideas and thoughts that inevitably shaped his view on politics and the
world in general. Legge (1972) adds, “He became an omnivorous reader and, shut away
in his room, he introduced himself with growing excitement to a wide range of political
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thought—to Jeffersonian democracy, to the Fabianisms, to Marxism. All of these
contributed in different ways to shaping his thought.”
The influence of city life, his mentoring from his adoptive house father, and the
racial discrimination he experienced through his childhood shaped his view on life. His
first marriage was to the daughter of his mentor, Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and was
more of a sign of mutual respect to Mangoenkoesoemo than it was for love. Whereas
Mossadegh was fueled by nationalist pride for Iran, Arbenz was driven by a passion to
help the indigenous population of Guatemala; Sukarno, by contrast, seemed to have been
driven by his own vanity and a deep hatred of the Dutch, although it appears that he did
feel a sense of nationalism for his people. “He saw the necessity for unity and began to
feel his way towards the idea of an all-embracing mass organization as a means of
developing a power which could challenge that of the colonial regime” (Legge 1972). To
Sukarno, Indonesia was a “soul arising from a common history and from a desire and
urge to live as one. Moved partly by passion and partly by consideration of political
utility, Sukarno was quick to see this as a potentially unifying idea which could be used
to bring together opposing factions” (Legge 1972). Hanna adds an excerpt from one of
Sukarno’s passionate speeches:
The burning desire to set my people free was beyond mere personal ambition. I
was consumed with it. It permeated my whole being. It filled my nostrils; it
coursed through my veins. It’s what a man serves his whole lifetime for. It was
more than a duty, more than a calling. For me it was a—religion. (1964)
Legge (1972) comments, “Even before he made his final choice of a political
career, his romanticism had made him see himself as a great leader, moving the masses,
providing a national ideology and in the forefront of the struggle against the oppressor.”
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Agreeableness
Judge and Bono (2000) describe “agreeableness” as a leader’s ability to show
concern towards his or her followers. Bass (1985) adds, “Transformational leaders give
special attention to neglected group members, treat each subordinate as an individual, and
express appreciation for a job well done.”
As Mr. Walter Rogers noted after witnessing one of Sukarno’s public speeches,
Sukarno not only understands his audience, he quite obviously identifies himself
with it. Speaking to farmers, he is the Javanese aristocrat and understanding
father of the people. With political leaders, he is the revolutionary comrade.
With university students, he forgets his role as papa and joshes or talks heart-toheart as an equal. With Moslems, he is wholeheartedly Moslem. (Rogers, 1954)
Perhaps it was Sukarno’s passion for Wayang Theater as a child and young adult
that taught him how to play different roles. Nevertheless, he was able to seamlessly
transition into a character that suited the needs of the situation at the time. In his mind,
his greatest role was that of revolutionary leader of Indonesia.
Conscientiousness
Conscientiousness is based on a strong sense of self-determination. Moreover,
achievement and self-discipline are key components of conscientiousness. Sukarno
enjoyed many achievements as a student in the Dutch primary school. He had an innate
ability to perform for a myriad of audiences, depending on the context and situation.
Sukarno enjoyed his reputation as a dominant leader amongst his peers. As a
youth, he was known to lead games, organize activities, and place himself in the center of
all the activity. He remarked that he asserted himself because he did not believe anyone
had the confidence to usurp his authority. He appeared destined to become a national
leader even at a young age. While he felt the sharp pain of discrimination from the Dutch
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school children, he overcame this by focusing on his sexual prowess, especially when it
came to chasing and seducing the Dutch girls in his age group. While discovered by his
father in a compromising position, his father merely replied that he hoped Sukarno was
learning the Dutch language more efficiently as a result of his dalliances. The evidence
suggests that all of these experiences culminated into a powerful force that eventually
thrust him into the political realm—a world that he had prepared for his entire life. He
had a reputation for being self-assured, confident, and intelligent. That foundation,
combined with this experience in the urban environment as a teenager, created him into
the role of a national leader.
Public Dissent
Considered a charismatic president, Sukarno was well-known among his
supporters as a leader who was anti-Western colonialism and was driven by a passion for
unity and independence. Easter adds, “Sukarno openly aligned himself with the
communist bloc in this struggle, proclaiming support for the North Vietnamese in the
Vietnam War, establishing close ties with the People’s Republic of China and angrily
pulling Indonesia out of the United Nations in January 1965” (Easter 2005, 55). At the
same time, Sukarno implemented a policy based on confrontation in which he publicly
denounced Malaysia as a creation of British colonialism. Easter comments, “To leaders
in Washington, London and Canberra, Sukarno appeared to be mounting a
comprehensive challenge to Western interests in South-East Asia” (2005, 55). In
essence, he was becoming the country’s revolutionary leader. He used the influences of
wayang theater, Islam, Javanese mysticism, Christianity like thread to weave the country
into one unifying whole.
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Global Instability
By the time the United States became involved in Indonesia, it had implemented a
reverse course policy that was considered to be an important victory for Western powers
in the Cold War. It eliminated the threat of a communist Indonesia and diluted the
strength of Sukarno’s anti-Malaysia message to the world. As Easter (2005, 57) notes,
“By the summer of 1965 there was a consensus amongst Britain, the United States,
Australia and Malaysia that Sukarno was an implacable enemy, threatening the stability
of the region and leading his country to communism.” The United States feared that
Sukarno’s death would push Indonesia directly into the arms of communism.
As Easter notes,
The Western powers responded to this threat in a similar way: by using
propaganda and covert action. British and Australian soldiers secretly crossed the
jungle border to attack guerrilla units inside Indonesia and Britain and Malaysia
gave aid to rebel groups in the outer Indonesian islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi.
In addition, the British and Malaysians used covert propaganda to erode support
for Confrontation and encourage disunity in Indonesia. (2005, 57)
Internal Conflict
Internal conflict within Indonesia at this time could be described as an ethnic
bloodbath. Sukarno was steadily moving Indonesia to the left toward adopting
communist ideology, and the rift between the staunchly anti-communist army and the
large Indonesian community party was growing wider. Sukarno’s vision for unity based
on Marxist and Islamic beliefs was miscommunicated to many as an opportunity to gain
justice and initiate violent retaliation towards others who they believed had done them
wrong.
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Easter describes the violence during that period,
The killings were not just political acts in the Cold War, they were also a complex
sociological phenomenon and the perpetrators had a wide variety of local motives.
The PKI had supported land reform in rural areas and this had created bitter
resentment between peasant party members and small landlords. Muslims and, in
Bali, Hindus were driven by religious fervor to slaughter the atheist communists.
The killings sometimes had racial overtones, such as attacks on ethnic Chinese in
North Sumatra. In the frenzy of violence people saw a chance to satisfy personal
vendettas. Factors other than propaganda drove civilians to murder suspected
communists. The killings were not a reaction to Western propaganda – they were
the culmination of years of built up tension and hatred. (2005, 68)
It was during this time that the CIA decided to initiate a plot to assassinate
Sukarno. Richard Bissell, a former CIA Deputy Director of Plans, testified that “There
was discussion within the Agency of the possibility of an attempt on the life of President
Achmed Sukarno of Indonesia which progressed as far as the identification of an asset
who it was felt might be recruited for this purpose” (Report on CIA Assassination Plots
of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, dated June 5,
1975).
Bissell adds, “The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where
it seemed feasible…the Agency had absolutely nothing to do with the death of Sukarno”
(Report on CIA Assassination Plots of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford
Presidential Library, dated June 5, 1975). In reactionary mode, Sukarno banned rival
political parties from government and opened the portal even more for communist
activities. The media was used to spread Marxist and anti-Western propaganda. By this
time, Sukarno was 64 years old and was suffering from health issues. It was well-known
to many that his plan was to hand over presidential power to the communist PKI who
would, in turn, control Indonesia after his passing.
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The realization of Sukarno’s vision would have been a failure for the United
States. Indonesia was at a location of geo-strategic significance with access to vital sea
lanes, with an abundant amount of natural resources and a population that exceeded 103
million people at the time. Easter comments, “The loss of Indonesia would also outflank
American efforts to contain communism in South Vietnam” (2005, 56). Sukarno’s selfcreated sense of invincibility was delusional. In one of his revolutionary speeches,
I feel like Dante in his Divine Comedy. I feel that our Revolution has suffered all
kinds of tortures, from all kinds of devils, all the kinds of suffering from the
Inferno, and now, with our return to the 1945 constitution, we experience
purification so that later we can enter Heaven…The devil of liberalism, the devil
of feudalism, the devil of individualism, the devil of suku-ism, the devil of
groupism, the devil of deviation, the devil of adventurism, the devil of four kinds
of dualisms, the devil of corruption, the devil of scraping up wealth at one blow,
the devil of the multi-party system, the devil of rebellion—all kinds of devils have
jumped on us in the realm of the Inferno, and now we are undergoing purgatory.
(President Sukarno)
Further, as Frederick and Worden note,
By 1965 Indonesia had become a dangerous cocktail of social and political
antagonisms. The PKI's rapid growth aroused the hostility of Islamic groups and
the military. One of the most serious points of contention was the PKI's desire to
establish a force of armed peasants and workers in conjunction with the four
branches of the regular armed forces. Many officers were bitterly hostile,
especially after Chinese premier Zhou Enlai offered to supply the "fifth force"
with arms. Sukarno's collapse at a speech and rumors that he was dying also
added to the atmosphere of instability. (Frederick and Worden 1993, 12)
Regime Type
Indonesia’s regime type could be portrayed as a wayang theater production. Two
political cultures played an influential role in governance: the Javanese aristocrats and
the Islamic entrepreneurs. Adding even more complexity to the equation is the addition
of ethnic, cultural, and economic cleavages as well as dissention from Indonesia’s outer
lying islands. Within the constitution, there are six components of state.
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For his part, In Sukarno saw an Indonesia operating under its own unique form of
democracy. In an essay he wrote shortly after being released from prison, he articulates
his vision for a new Guided Democracy: “Our democracy…must not be a democracy a
la Europe and America, which is just a portrait of parties, a political democracy
only…but a political and democratic democracy which gives one hundred percent
sovereignty to the people in the ordering of their political and economic affairs.”13
Calling on his self-appointed prestige as leader and visionary of Indonesia’s unity and
independence, Sukarno proceeded to articulate the key components of his “Guided
Democracy” initiative.
Conclusions
The U.S. role in the 1958 Indonesian coup has been downplayed to a significant
degree. Very little information can be found regarding details of Washington’s role. It is
assessed that the hasty successes of covert action in Iran and Guatemala may have created
some policy “speed bumps” as to how these actions are planned and executed. As
Stiefler notes, “The CIA’s attitude towards covert action has vacillated over time. From
1947–1965, during what I call the ‘honeymoon’ period, CIA leadership could be counted
on to enthusiastically support covert action in a variety of forms” (2004, 634).
The U.S. role in covert action was downplayed because, unlike the cases of Iran
and Guatemala, the United States had failed to influence the Sukarno government. In this
case study, the influence of public dissent and leadership characteristics were more
powerful than the other variables of global instability and regime change. US failure to
mobilize the masses, despite the use of propaganda, shows that Sukarno’s leadership and
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intense desire to unify the country were influential factors. Internal conflict, as translated
by the failure to mobilize anti-Sukarno political parties that would run against Sukarno or
gain seats in political institutions, such as what the PKI did, would also prove to be
another powerful force. The lesson to be learned is that Sukarno defeated the CIA
attempt to oust him because, despite his faults, he had still earned the trust and faith of his
fellow countrymen and, indeed, exhibited a “cult of personality.” He had an innate
ability to relate to people of all classes and he identified himself with the cause of
Indonesian independence. He viewed himself as a revolutionary leader and people
believed in him. However, once ousted from power, Sukarno spent the rest of his
lifetime living in seclusion, ostracized by Indonesians, and died from kidney failure.
Frederick and Worden note,
The international scene was, for Sukarno, a gigantic stage upon which a dramatic
confrontation between (as he termed them) the New Emerging Forces and Old
Established Forces was played out in the manner of the wayang contest between
the virtuous and the evil. (1993, 10)
Overall, this case study analyzed the effects of five causal conditions on the fate
of leaders. These causal conditions are leadership characteristics, public dissent, global
instability, internal conflict, and regime type. The intent of the QCA process is to
establish characteristics of each factor that assists the research in assigning the degree of
membership of each case with the causal factor while taking into consideration the
within-case context of each case that influenced the individual degree of membership.
Sukarno was a member of the minority population, he had a college degree, and
he was under the age of 40 years old when he assumed power. Public dissent is divided,
with more than half of the population supporting him and several political groups
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wanting to oust him from power. He assumed power during a tumultuous time when
Islamic influences were becoming stronger within the country and in, in regard to global
instability, the world was greatly divided between democracy and communism. With
respect to internal conflict, the country was in a state of crisis at the time of the covert
action event. While there was no coup, revolution, or regime change within five years
prior, the country was undergoing a cultural shift between religious groups, as well as
growing dissent from inhabitants of outlying islands. Considering regime type, Indonesia
was attempting to create a system based on democracy and communism. Sukarno called
this new authoritarian regime “Guided Democracy” with him as the guide.
Table 7 Membership of Indonesia with Survival Variables
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Leader Characteristics

X

Public Dissent

Mostly
In

More In
Than
Out

Mostly
Out

X

Global Instability
Internal Conflict

More
Out
Than In

X
X

Regime Type

X
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Fully
Out

CHAPTER VII – DEMOCRACY DENIED
Dominican Republic, 1959–1961
“The best government is a benevolent tyranny tempered by an occasional
assassination.”14
--Voltaire
Introduction
This chapter will explore covert action events planned and carried out by the
United States in the Dominican Republic from 1961–1963. It will start with a brief
overview of the political environment during that time, and then discuss the leader
characteristics of Dominican Republic President Rafael Trujillo and his influence on
society. After discussing the overall aftermath of the covert action operation and
explaining how American forces used that action to influence the government, the study
will conduct a detailed assessment of the degree of membership this case demonstrates
for each factor presented in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, the case study
concludes with a summary of the findings and an application of the findings into the
degree of membership matrix.
The decision of the CIA to leverage the dissident community in order to
overthrow President Trujillo in May 1960 was a watershed moment in the history of US
covert action. By providing funding to a small group of Dominicans, the United States
was able to plan and execute the removal of a leader from power in an effort to prevent a
country from falling under the influence of communist control. This strategy involved
the training of a paramilitary force and equipping them with small machine guns and
grenades, funding Dominican dissidents to operate radios that were used to spread anti-
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Trujillo messages to the civilian population, managing administrative tasks within
government institutions, and conducting psychological operations in the form of leaflets
and pamphlets droplets over the Dominican Republic that were intended to exploit the
excesses of the Trujillo regime.
A group of Dominican dissidents assassinated Trujillo on 30 May 1961. The
duration of Trujillo’s rule from 1930–1961 brought stability to the country; the nature of
his rule was based on terror and brutality. It was during this time that civil liberties for
the people were non-existent and human rights violations were common. Trujillo was
also an egotist who, after assuming power, set out to recreate the country in his image by
renaming cities and towns in his name and installing monuments in his image.
This case study highlights the importance of leader characteristics as well as the
power of public dissent in changing the course of Dominican history. Moreover, the
United States’ nonintervention policy, known as the “Good Neighbor Policy,” allowed a
dictator to wield unchecked power in his country without retribution. Based on the
study’s model, the case of the Dominican Republic incorporates leader characteristics,
public dissent, and global instability as the key factors that influenced leader survival.
Background
On the western side of the Atlantic Ocean lies a wide arc of land that was
formerly formed by the coast of North America with roughly 5,000 miles of shoreline.
Its native inhabitants originated from what are now known as Cuba and Puerto Rico.
Santo Domingo became the capital of a Spanish colony and formed the hub for
commerce to and from neighboring islands. Soon thereafter, English, Dutch, and French
colonists began to produce food crops, such as tobacco, cotton, and sugar. In 1697,
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French Saint Domingo became the most prosperous colony while Spanish Santo
Domingo, located on the eastern side of the island, became “an imperial backwater.”
Inevitably, the brutality of slave labor to serve the predominantly white segment of the
colonial population, combined with the black slave population created a volatile mix for
violence and discrimination.
According to Roordin,
Haitian rule brought the abolition of Dominican slavery and caused many of the
landowning Dominican elite to leave the island. When the Dominican Republic
won independence from Haiti in 1844, it reentered the arena of imperial rivalry.
(1998, 9)
The onset of World War I had virtually removed European competition for
commercial ascendency in the Caribbean, and the military occupations of Haiti
and the Dominican Republic supplanted the remaining Germany interests in those
countries. (1998, 16)
Previously dominant foreign and domestic partners had all but been eliminated,
thereby leaving the occupation government of the Dominican Republic to take on the
large task of developing its infrastructure and commerce system. The trailblazers for this
vast international development project were the members United States Marine Corps
who essentially rebuilt the country while maintaining peacekeeping operations within the
city and out in the rural hinterlands.
Calder writes,
Marine guards patrolled the streets of Dominican cities, and Marine intelligence
officers gathered information about those who opposed the occupation. When
nationalist demonstrations occurred in Santo Domingo and Santiago during
patriotic week in May 1920, the military governor jailed more than a score of
writers for inciting unrest and asked for reinforcements; five hundred more
marines arrived to bolster the existing force of two thousand. (1984, 17)
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The Eastern District of the Marine command included the main sugar plantations,
which prospered from expansion of the cane production business. Companies
headquartered in the United States owned a large share of these plantations and benefited
from the profits they produced. To protect them and the American assets, the US
Marines recruited and trained Dominican soldiers to form the bulk of the security
apparatus, also known as the Guardia Nacional. Fuller notes, “The Guardia Nacional
remained an undisciplined organization with no commissioned Dominican officers”
(Fuller, 1974).
Leader Characteristics
Rafael Leonidas Trujillo came from a modest, barely literate rural family; he was
the third oldest among eleven brothers and sisters. His father, José Trujillo Valdez, was a
postal clerk who was rumored to supplement his income with cattle herding. Trujillo was
not considered well-educated, and at the age of 16, he earned a modest income as a
telegraph operator and security guard at a sugar plantation. He was also involved in gang
activity that specialized in theft and blackmail.
Roordin explains,
While still a boy, he demonstrated the fascination with personal appearance,
clothing and military decorations that suited him for a military career, earning the
nickname “Chapita” for the battle caps he collected like medals. The year before
his appointment to the academy, Second Lieutenant Trujillo had been acquitted of
credible charges of rape and extortion by a commission of eight Marine officers.
(1998, 21)
Trujillo’s career path would have taken a different turn had he not taken the
initiative to draft a calligraphed letter to the United States Marine Corps. In the letter,
dated 18 December 1918, Trujillo requested (and was granted) a position with the
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Dominican National Guard. After becoming commissioned as an officer, it took Trujillo
less than 10 years to make Brigadier General and Commander-in-Chief of the National
Army. Trujillo held a stalwart admiration for the United States Marine Corps until his
demise more than 30 years later. The United States initially supported Trujillo and
viewed him as a protégé. However, as time passed, rumors of Trujillo’s unbridled
brutality quickly began to surface in conversations among policy makers in Washington,
D.C. Many of the US political elite were close and personal friends with high society
Dominicans. Once firmly in power, Trujillo began to target the upper-class Dominican
population by systematically eliminating them through false imprisonment and
assassination.
Neuroticism
Neuroticism is a term used to describe an individual who is highly emotional,
highly prone to anxiety, depression, violence, and anger. This trait is evident in Trujillo’s
self-proclaimed titles of Generalissimo Doctor Rafael Leonidas Trujillo; Benefactor of
the Fatherland; High Chief Commander of Ground, Sea and Air Forces; Grand Patron of
Arts and Letters; Father of the New Nation; among others. Scholars note that as
Trujillo’s power grew, so did his paranoia about his own personal security. He employed
hundreds of spies and special researchers to pore over published periodicals to ensure that
all negative press about him was eliminated from public scrutiny. The older he became,
the more deranged and mentally unstable he appeared. His personal pursuit of wealth,
power, and self-aggrandizement were veiled attempts to overcome his lower class
origins. He punished those around him who he considered high in status, wealthier, and
more successful.
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Extraversion
Extraversion is described as personality types that seek excitement and
experiences beyond their comfort zone. Essentially, it is the quality of being confident
and outgoing. Trujillo joined military service and underwent training with the US Marine
Corps. After successful completion of training, he graduated and rose to the ranks of
lieutenant colonel within four years after graduation. He made the rank of general officer
shortly thereafter. His meteoric rise within the military ranks is largely attributed to his
quest for more power and influence. The military was the fastest route to this objective.
The military was where he perfected his extroverted and narcissistic tendencies.
Openness to Experience
This type of personality describes individuals who are bold and adventurous,
dislike routine, prefer abstract thinking, and have a wide range of interests. The opposite
of this personality trait is individuals who are traditional, non-artistic, and non-analytical.
Trujillo’s biographer Robert Crassweller discusses Trujillo’s relationship with women in
detail, noting,
The Boss enjoyed thousands of conquests and groups of young girls were brought
to his palatial residence two or three times a week for sexual orgies; the older
“The Big One” grew, the younger his paramours. To cater to the Generalissimo’s
spectacularly carnal demands the National Palace maintained a fully staffed
Office of Procurement whose agents scouted the Caribbean and the world in the
search for new girls to entertain The Boss. (1966, 47)
Additionally, Trujillo secured his position by eliminating his opponents. His
infamous death squads systematically located and eliminated opposition leaders or those
who demonstrated any sign of resistance. His brutality had no limits. Methods employed
included pushing victims off piers and leaving them to drown, using machetes to kill, and
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throwing children against trees. The brutal Guatemalan death squads executed most
techniques as a means of eradicating the minority population. During this turbulent
period, the United States held firm to its Good Neighbor Policy and chose to maintain a
position of nonintervention. Under Trujillo's rule, the Dominican Republic was
modernizing its sugar industry; creating a solid internal infrastructure of roads, schools,
and hospitals; and liquidated the country’s debt to a zero sum within his first seven years
in office. It was also noted that his personal income was $200,000 a month which equals
close to $2,000,000 in 2018.
Agreeableness
This personality trait describes individuals who are compassionate, trustworthy,
lenient, and softhearted. In contrast, it can also describe individuals who are hostile,
cynical, manipulative, vengeful, and ruthless. Trujillo often hosted visits from Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt and other dignitaries. However, the relationship soured toward the
end of his rein in power. In an act of vengefulness against a Dominican scholar and
Columbia University professor who was outspoken about the regime, Trujillo ordered the
kidnapping of Dr. Jesús de Galíndez from the United States and transferred him to the
Dominican Republic where he was tortured, killed, and buried in an unmarked grave.
Others who played a part in the kidnapping, including US citizen Gerald Murphy, the US
pilot who unknowingly transported the scholar to the Dominican Republic, also
disappeared without a trace.
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Conscientiousness
The personality trait of conscientiousness describes individuals who are able to
manage their impulsive behavior through persistence motivation. These individuals also
prize perfectionism in their quest for success and status.
Diederich recalls in Trujillo: Death of the Goat,
The cult of adulation had no limits. The capital city bore Trujillo's name, as did
the highest mountain peak and hundreds of streets, parks and sites. The tropical
landscape was literally dotted with his likeness in statues and on bronze plaques.
Every town, sports event, or billiard game had to be dedicated to the Benefactor
of the Fatherland and Father of the New Fatherland. The humblest dirt-floor hut
carried the sign: "In this house Trujillo is Chief.” In the streets of the capital,
neon signs blinked the message “God and Trujillo.” (1978, 27)
Roordin adds,
Trujillo asserted complete authority over the rebuilding of the city, which he
would rechristen Ciudad Trujillo in 1936, giving him the ability to reorient the
social organization of its population to reflect his control. His reconstruction of
Santo Domingo, including a new bridge over the Ozama and greatly improved
port facilities, deepened the respect that many Marines and Navy officers already
had for him, while his reconfiguration of Dominican society through grandiose
personalism (symbolized by naming the new bridge, the new port, and the city
itself for himself) heightened the diplomats’ distaste for him. (1998, 58)
Public Dissent
It is interesting to note that this is the first case study in which the dissident
population had a tremendous influence on the life or death of a leader. Dissent is an
important component of the Trujillo chapter. During this time, speaking out against the
government guaranteed execution, torture, and certain death. Trujillo had created a
corrupt government based on fear and punishment. His most loyal officers benefited
from the power and prestige by taking wealth for themselves.
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Global Instability
In December 1960, five months prior to the assassination of Trujillo, the CIA
station chief at Santo Domingo, Henry Dearborn, described the local security situation as
a police state run by the Trujillo regime. Formal diplomatic relations between the United
States and the Dominican Republic did not exist at this time. However, the station chief
was successful in developing a relationship with the Consul General who was “able to
establish direct contact with leaders of various opposition groups whose sole aim at this
time was to bring about the assassination of General Trujillo” (declassified CIA letter,
John F. Blake, May 1, 1976).
From the declassified CIA letter:
When opposition plans to attempt the assassination reached the stage that it would
be attempted at any time, the chief of station arranged with an opposition leader
for the passing of a coded telephone message which, when made would confirm
that the attempt had been successful. When the assassination had been carried out
successfully, the station, when it received the message, was able to verify the fact
many hours before it was announced officially by Dominican authorities.
Immediately following the assassination, the station obtained additional details
from an informant and three other sources which had previously been developed
by the station for the purpose of following up on such an eventuality (declassified
CIA letter, John F. Blake, May 1, 1976).
Following the assassination of Generalissimo Trujillo, in the Dominican
Republic, the Agency began a program designed to aid and strengthens the
development of viable, non-communist organizations to play an active role in the
post-Trujillo political life of the country. Moderate organizations were composed
largely, but not exclusively, of middle class elements. The majority of leaders are
vigorous young men, well-intentioned, though at times politically immature.
During the Trujillo era many were jailed and tortured (declassified CIA letter,
John F. Blake, May 1, 1976).
The threat of global instability was growing increasingly large and the looming
specter of communism could not be ignored. From a Memo Regarding Policies toward
the Trujillo government:
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The Department has at various times emphasized to the delegation in Santo
Domingo the necessity of cordial relations with the Trujillo regime and with
Trujillo himself…I submit that a desire to maintain an attitude of cordiality and
sympathy should not preclude an adequate taking into account of the following
points:
1.
Trujillo came into power by gross treachery to the man who made him
commander of the army and in spite of promises made to the legation.
2.

He won the elections purely and simply by force.

3.
He has (in my opinion) almost no support in the country outside of the
army; he appears to be intensely hated by the great majority of the Dominican
people…It must be pointed out that it is generally thought in Santo Domingo that
the American government is positively favoring Trujillo. (Cabot, “Memo
Regarding Policies toward the Trujillo government,” 13 March 1931,
839.00/3477, RG 59, NA).
This declassified memorandum offers an intimate look into the world of US
advisors and gives insight on the exhausting, deliberate, and meticulous nature of
executive decision-making during this poignant period in history.
Internal Conflict
This section analyzes the factors that contributed to internal conflict within the
Dominican Republic from 1959–1961 and if these factors led to larger problems in the
future. The principal questions to be addressed are twofold. First, what was the security
environment like during this time? Second, did internal conflict result in the spawning of
other problems following the 1961 covert action event?
The plan to kill President Trujillo, as laid out by the conspirators, was simple and
direct. An action group of eight gunmen deployed in three high-powered sedans was
responsible for shooting the dictator. Once Trujillo was dead, General Ferdinand, the
military minister and ranking army general, was to assume power in Santo Domingo.
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Regime Type
The US foreign policy of non-intervention allowed the Dominican Republic and
its dictator to operate without oversight or accountability. Goss humanitarian violations
were committed without consequences. The country was far from earning its Good
Neighbor title. Roordin adds, “The connection between the Good Neighbor Policy and
the Trujillo regime offers a revealing perspective on the debate over how democratic
states should treat authoritarian governments in the United States to control or even to
consistently influence the forces of nationalism and personalism that intertwine in the
figure of a dictator, whatever he is called: Fuhrer, Duce, Chairman, First Secretary, or
Generalissimo” (1998, 1).
According to Roordin,
Dictatorship has been the greatest problem of the twentieth century, rising up after
the Great War to fuse the worst aspects of the old autocracies to new ways of
thinking and of mobilizing the masses. Gaining momentum with the global
depression in the late 1920s and 1930s, the formation of dictatorships in Europe,
Asia, and Latin America was a central challenge to the Hoover and Roosevelt
administrations. (1998, 4)
These states essentially operated without discipline, oversight, or accountability.
They were single-party political systems that fed off of hyper militarism, ethnic hatred,
and political greed and corruption. Trujillo’s dictatorship represented the antithesis of
democratic principles espoused by the United States in its foreign policy.
He adds,
The Good Neighbor Policy developed an effort to encourage order, solvency,
cooperation, and liberalism in Latin America through persuasion and benefits,
rather than by force, but it would be put to a variety of unforeseen uses by Latin
American leaders, especially those with autocratic power like Trujillo. (1998, 4)
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Conclusions
An interesting pattern to note in the Dominican Republic case study is the link
between leadership characteristics and public dissent. Trujillo was a brutal dictator who
grew increasingly more deranged as he advanced in age and surrounded himself with
intelligence officers and henchmen who ensured that any semblance of resistance was
eliminated with vicious brutality. His strongest supporter was John Abbes, who was also
his chief interrogator and mastermind of various torture techniques. Abbes had a
notorious reputation for devising ways to make Trujillo’s enemies suffer for their
opposition to the regime. His death squad was responsible for the kidnapping, extortion,
and elimination of thousands of Haitians and Dominicans. Trujillo even went so far as to
kidnap an anti-regime professor from the streets of New York City. He had no limits to
his power and the United States turned a blind eye to this brutal regime. Another
interesting association is the link between leader characteristics and global instability.
This case study, more so than the others, effectively showcases US foreign policy toward
Latin American countries. Trujillo and his staff feted American dignitaries during their
visits to the Dominican Republic. The lengths the United States went through to
establish the Dominican Republic as a good neighbor appeared almost excessive during
that time. In addition, Trujillo was considered more of an annoyance by American
policymakers than a true peer.
Roordin writes,
Curtis and Cabot were disdainful of Trujillo’s lower class social status. Both
were upper-class, white Easterners who favored the companionship of the
traditionally dominant Dominican Republic, an oligarchy of light-skinned, welleducated elite families in Santiago, Puerto Plata, and Santo Domingo. (1998, 43)
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The extent of the Trujillo regime’s brutality was viewed skeptically considered by
White House policymakers. It was not until friends of US policymakers, elite members
of Dominican society, were kidnapped and tortured that the administration began to take
notice. For the first time in this series of case studies, the concept of dissidents is
introduced as an influential factor in determining a leader’s fate.
According to declassified transcripts, it was noted that, “During the course of a
cocktail party in the Dominican Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to
Ambassador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic sights and the
ambassador promised to pass on the request” (Farland Affidavit, 9/7/75, p. 1). According
to the Church Committee Report, “Documents indicate that consideration was given
within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.” At a 21 June 1960,
meeting with an officer of the CIA’s Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland
reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops (CIA memo, 6/21/60). Additionally, the
report states “The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided, since the fall of
the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable, and therefore United States relations with the
opposition should be as close as possible. Providing the arms as requested would
contribute significantly toward this end” (Church Committee Report, 183, and CIA
memo, 7/1/60). Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930 and,
for most of his time in office; the United States supported him and was considered its
protégé. However, as time passed, Trujillo’s rule became increasingly dictatorial and
cruel which placed him in the crosshairs of the United States for further scrutiny.
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Roordin explains,
Trujillo’s control of the Dominican military assured that stability would prevail
under his rule, but sometimes stability did not live up to its billing. Although
imposing order with devastating force, the regime’s foreign and domestic policies
did not coincide with US interests in several important regards. The Dominican
Republic became a difficult place to do business, a querulous participant in
negotiations, and a major cause of Caribbean disquiet, including genocide, war
scares, and assassinations. (1998, 2)
The U.S. simply could not be seen as an associate of a Latin American dictator
with a penchant for cruelty and brutality. This brutality and fear caused US policy
makers to make parallel comparisons between Trujillo and Castro. Thus, plans were put
into motion to remove Trujillo from power. According to Special Group Minutes dated
10 February1960, the Eisenhower administration gave “high level consideration to a
program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents” (Special Group Minutes).
This case study analyzed the effects of six causal conditions on the fate of leaders
to include leadership characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict,
and regime type. With respect to leader characteristics, Trujillo was a member of the
minority population, he did not have a college degree, and he was under the age of 40
years old when he assumed power. Public dissent was a strong factor as most Dominican
men by the age of 40 had endured and survived Trujillo’s reign of terror during which he
eliminated men, women, and children on a whim. Minority members of society were
massacred by the thousands and his people were kidnapped, tortured, and murdered. His
affinity for women, as he was known for having four wives, countless mistresses, and
thousands of sexual escapades with young girls, also created resentment within the
machismo culture. He was hated and despised by those below and above him and
assumed power during a chaotic time when the country had endured a devastating
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hurricane that left six thousand people dead. Trujillo exploited the opportunity to use
state funds to rebuild the country while claiming that the money came from his personal
account. As pertains to global instability, the threat of communism was strong and
heavily influenced foreign policy behavior of the United States. The United States was
deeply mired in the Great Depression and considered the Dominican Republic to be a
good neighbor and Trujillo to be its protégé as he had been vetted and trained by the
United States Marine Corps.
With respect to internal conflict, the country was in a state of crisis at the time of
the covert action event. The island was divided between the fairer skinned sugar
plantation owners and the black slave workers. As to regime type, the country was an
autocracy run by an egotist and brutal dictator who became more sadistic and deranged in
his old age.
Table 8 Membership of Dominican Republic with Survival Variables
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Leader Characteristics

X

Public Dissent

X

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

Global Instability

More
Out
Than In

Mostly
Out

X

Internal Conflict

X

Regime Type

X
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Fully
Out

CHAPTER VIII – A GLIMMER OF LIGHT IN THE HEART OF DARKNESS
Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Democratic Republic of the Congo, 19601961
“Good news is rare these days, and every glittering ounce of it should be
cherished and hoarded and worshipped and fondled like a priceless diamond.”15
--Hunter S. Thompson

Introduction
This chapter will explore covert action events planned and carried out by the
United States in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1960-1961. It will begin
with a brief overview of the political environment during that time and then discuss the
leader characteristics of ousted pro-Soviet Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who had a
good chance of returning to power prior to his assassination in 1961, and the effects of
his leadership and policies on Congolese society. After discussing the overall aftermath
of the covert action operation and how American forces used that action to influence the
Congolese government, the chapter will conduct a detailed discussion of the degree of
membership this case demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s QCA
model. Finally, this case study concludes with a summary of the findings and an
application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix.
This case study highlights the importance of leader characteristics, as well as the
power of internal conflict in changing the course of history. Additionally, it highlights
leader characteristics as a driving force behind survival. Moreover, regime type is also an
influential factor in this case study, as the Congolese people’s desire to create
independence from Belgian colonialization was the key impetus for the events that took
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place during this time period. This case study will continue the analysis of US-supported
covert action events and determine the extent to which leader characteristics, public
dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and regime type were influential factors in the
leader’s survival.
Background
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is roughly the size of Mississippi and
centrally located on the African continent. The Belgians discovered it in 1869 on a
search for a missing missionary, David Livingstone, who was presumed lost somewhere
in the vast spans of the Congo. Upon discovery of the country’s abundant supply of
natural resources, and Britain’s rejection of adding Congo to its already existing colonies,
Belgium took advantage of an opportunity to establish its own colony on the African
continent. As Zeilig (2008, 63) notes, “Few had seen the written word before, and they
were being asked to mark their X’s to documents in a foreign language and in legalese.
The idea of a treaty of friendship between two clans or villages was familiar; the idea of
signing over one’s land to someone on the other side of the world was inconceivable.”
As of 30 June 1960, the Congo and Central African Republics were French
colonies; Uganda, Tanzania, and Northern Rhodesia were British colonies; Rwanda and
Burundi were Belgian colonies; and Angola was a Portuguese colony. Also, at that time,
the Congo produced eight percent of the world’s copper, 8 percent of its diamonds, 73
percent of its cobalt, and 60 percent of its uranium, gold, and zinc. Described by scholars
as a place of extreme “dysfunctionalism,” it seemed that the country never recovered
from its colonial legacy under Belgian King Leopold II, who murdered millions of
Congolese in his quest to extra natural resources for his personal gain.
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In 1961, Undersecretary of State George Ball stated, “Should the Congo crumble
into chaos and become a successful object of communist penetration, the Soviet Bloc will
have acquired an asset without a price—a base of operations in the heart of Africa from
which to spread its tentacles over this newest of continents.” On 30 June 1960, under the
leadership of its first democratically elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, the
Congo was granted independence. It was at that time, Belgium immediately sent 75,000
troops to protect its resources, thereby demonstrating to the world that the Congo was not
truly independent. The United States’ national security policy at that time, under the
Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, was based on the containment of communism.
The story of the Congo is a tragic one. It is a country blessed with an
extraordinary amount of natural resources, bountiful wealth, proud of its rich and colorful
traditions, and infused with a strong spirit of independence. Yet, neither the country nor
its people were ever free from colonial rule. Despite the efforts made to establish
independence, the newly designated Congolese leaders used their power and authority to
horde their own wealth and create terror and fear against their own people, both as means
to reinforce their own power. The brutality of King Leopold II, while cruel and vicious,
was stark comparisons to the atrocities that the Congolese military and its leaders
committed against innocent civilians. “Huntington uses the term praetorians, which
speciﬁcally deﬁnes politicization of the military, to deﬁne the broad phenomenon of a
politicized society. What differs about military involvement is that its coercive power
‘trumps’ all other political competition” (Barron 2013, 101). Many decades of civil war
continued long after colonial rule disintegrated. The tragedy lies in the story of a vibrant
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and charismatic leader, Patrice Lumumba, who had a vision of independence for the
Congo. He was a glimmer of light in the heart of darkness.
Leader Characteristics
Patrice Lumumba was born on 2 July 1925 in the Kasai Province, Belgian Congo.
Lumumba’s father was a farmer; he and had three brothers, one half-brother, and
received his primary education from a Catholic missionary school. He was a complex
man, who had a voracious appetite for reading, and a strong desire for self-improvement.
He has been described as passionate, articulate, and intelligent but also very naïve. He
saw endless potential for the independence of the Congolese people.
By 1960, King Leopold II’s brutal reign on the colony had loosened and the
country was undergoing reform of its administrative processes, which included the
creation of formal corporations owned by Belgium for the sole purpose of exploiting its
natural resources. Additionally, Belgian and Congolese traditions had been grafted
together, creating a hybrid culture of new customs based on the interweaving of Belgium
and Congolese traditions. Lumumba had learned this hybrid culture and leveraged it to
obtain popular support.
Neuroticism
Neuroticism is one of the most interesting categories of the personality model. It
is characterized by an individual’s outward demonstration of moodiness, anxiety, worry,
envy, frustration, jealousy, and loneliness. Lumumba started out as an obedient postal
clerk in Stanleyville. However, his demeanor began to change once he sensed the harsh
racism and segregation that came with Belgian rule. In one instance, Lumumba disputed
a salary discrepancy by writing a letter to the head of provincial finances. His polite
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query was answered with a vicious response and Lumumba became more determined to
stand against the perceived racism of his Belgian superiors. As Zeilig (2008, 398) noted,
“From now on Lumumba would not be intimidated by his white bosses, nor would he
accept their edicts if he regarded them as unjust. These were not revolutionary demands
but important challenges to his white employers. The following years were marked by
similar complaints, often disputes about irregularities in his salary, loans, and allowances.
Lumumba had a growing sense of unease at the racism inherent in colonialism.”
Extraversion
Extraversion, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, is described as an
individual who is friendly and uninhibited, talkative, energetic nature, whereas introverts
are often described as solitary and reserved. A New York Times reporter wrote, “Tall,
thin, intense, his eyes flashing behind his spectacles, Patrice Lumumba was a
spellbinding orator who had created a nationalist party and had led it to victory in the
Congo's first election” (New York Times Magazine 1981). Lumumba was certainly an
extrovert with an outgoing and gregarious personality. He was a gifted orator and could
relate to people from different social classes. In one of his earlier jobs as a beer
distributor, he took this opportunity to sell Polar beer to local bars and restaurants and, as
a result, was able to mingle and network with people of all social classes.
Kuklick describes him as
A flamboyant and charismatic leader, Lumumba had high hopes as a panAfricanist for directing his new country into an honored place on the continent
and in the world political community. But stability in the just-born country
immediately broke down, and uncontrolled, the Congo’s army mutinied and
spread havoc rather than peace. (2014, 144)
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Similarly, Zeilig notes,
Lumumba also had to straddle two worlds, and sought acceptance in both. There
was the rural one of his family in Onalua, who found him a bride, and insisted
repeatedly that he stay with her. In addition there was the urban one and the
prospect of social advance. Lumumba sought to negotiate both. He was also
becoming a public figure, who participated in political and cultural discussions in
the city. In managing these two, distinct universes, there were contradictions in
his behavior. In the perfect and educated Congo that he envisaged in the 1950s he
was the enlightened liberal, seeing women in a much more prominent position,
even if they did not always play this role in his household. Lumumba had a keen
sense of the struggle he faced to improve himself. This effort at self-education
was a defining one. (2008, 459)
.
His first speech demonstrated his gift for public speaking and his ability to spark
the fire of independence among the Congolese people:
We are proud of this struggle, of tears, of fire, and of blood, to the depths of our
being, for it was a noble and just struggle, and indispensable to put an end to the
humiliating slavery which was imposed upon us by force. This was our fate for
eighty years of colonial regime; our wounds are too fresh and too painful still for
us to drive them from our memory. We have known harassing work, exacted in
exchange for salaries which did not permit us to eat enough to drive away hunger,
or to clothe ourselves, or to house ourselves decently, or to raise our children as
creatures dear to us. We have seen our lands seized in the name of allegedly legal
laws which in fact recognized only that might is right. The Republic of Congo
has been proclaimed, and our country is now in the hands of its own children.16
Openness to Experience
As Zeilig (2008, 211) notes, “From an early age Lumumba forged his own path.
Before long he chose his own schools, made his own decisions, and fought his own
battles. As an adolescent, he immediately stood out, as a popular and strong character.
Friends and family remember him as curious and audacious, confident in his own
abilities.” He also had three wives and several lovers, all within a six-year period.
According to his son, Francoise Lumumba, “[his father] discovered in the course of 1960
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that not all Congolese had the same interpretation of independence, our ‘brothers’ were
fighting for something completely different” (Zeilig 2008, 148). Zeilig adds, “Lumumba
wanted true national liberation and participatory democracy. However, the Congolese
elite were jealous and fearful of what that meant and conspired with the Western
groomed political and economic classes to have him removed” (2008, 148). The United
States feared that he was leaning too far toward the Marxist Socialist left. Interestingly
enough, considering that Lumumba was a prolific reader, he had very little knowledge
about Marxist literature and ideology (Zeilig 2008, 148). His most significant
vulnerability was himself and his innocent faith in independence for Congo, which was a
region ripe with internal strife, corruption, and greed.
Agreeableness
The movie “Lumumba,” produced by Jacques Bidou and Raoul Peck and
premiering at the Cannes Film Festival in 2000, portrays the young leader as a
charismatic, intelligent, and articulate man who had the confidence to challenge injustice.
He was well-liked by the Congolese people and they supported his path toward political
success. The film was distributed to Belgium, France, Switzerland, the United States,
and Canada with positive reception. Film critics mentioned that the documentary
provided an accurate depiction of the leader’s life based on his biography written by
Ludo de Witte's The Assassination of Lumumba. It was not presented as a propaganda
film but more so as a documentary of the leader.
As Zeilig describes him,
Lumumba had to straddle two worlds, and sought acceptance in both. There was
a rural one of his family in Onalua, who found him a bride, and insisted
repeatedly that he stay with her. In addition there was the urban one and the
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prospect of social advance. Lumumba sought to negotiate both. He was also
becoming a public figure, who participated in political and cultural discussions in
the city. In managing these two, distinct universes, there were contradictions in
his behavior. In the perfect and educated Congo that he envisaged in the 1950s he
was the enlightened liberal, seeing women in a much more prominent position,
even if they did not always play this role in his household. (2008, 471)
Conscientiousness
Lumumba deeply understood the pain his people had endured under colonialism,
which included torture and abuse under Belgian prison authorities. Lumumba’s daughter
Juliana commented in an interview,
My father’s political life lasted just three years, he developed with incredible
speed. Everything that he finally demanded, immediate independence he was not
the first to demand but he became the incarnation of independence; he became the
representative and the symbol for immediate independence. He worked
enormously hard, and I would watch him work, rewriting or practicing a speech.
My father was a very affectionate person, when he was with us he always chatted
and played…when he was there, he was really there.17
Public Dissent
By the early 1950s, a new class of Congolese intelligentsia arose from the
population. This group consisted of Congolese men who were campaigning for national
liberation and members of this group were actively involved in the struggle for
independence. As Africa Scholar George Nzongola-Ntalaja notes, “It was a continuation
of their fight for equality of opportunity in the colonial political economy where they
experienced discrimination in respect to career and other economic opportunities, in
addition to daily humiliation of colonial racism” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 31).
Segmented tribal factions and a new social class created social tensions. “The Congolese
elite possessed no capital of their own, major mining companies and businesses were
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owned by foreign companies. Most were employees themselves, as clerks and
administrators in the colonial state. While the Congolese elite had a thirst for wealth,
they were not involved in the ownership or production of it” (Ziegler 2008, 522). Many
of the members of this newly-established social class were born and raised under Belgian
colonial rule. Many of these members undertook the requisite process to become
enlightened and cultured in the way that was expected of them. As Lumumba’s daughter
recalls, the process to become an evolué, a French term to describe native Africans who
were Europeanized through a process of education and assimilation and accepted
European behaviors and values, was highly demeaning. Nevertheless, Lumumba and
many others believed that it was the only path to opportunities for Congolese
independence. It was merely a matter of time before they realized that this was not
actually the case.
Global Instability
The breakdown of colonial ties in Africa left unstable and underdeveloped nation
states vulnerable to Soviet influence. According to the Department of State Historian’s
office, “The decolonization of Sub-Saharan Africa from the late 1950s to the mid-1970s
resulted in several proxy Cold War confrontations between the United States and the
Soviet Union over the dozens of newly independent, non-aligned nations. The first such
confrontation occurred in the former Belgian Congo, which gained its independence on
June 30, 1960.” Ultimately, a process intended to achieve independence in a decade was
compressed into less than 12 months. During this time the Congolese people elected a
president, Joseph Kasavubu, a prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, and also established a
senate. According to the Department of State Historian’s office, “The Eisenhower
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administration had high hopes that the Republic of the Congo would form a stable, proWestern, central government. Those hopes vanished in a matter of days as the newly
independent nation descended into chaos.” Within a matter of weeks, the Force Publique,
comprised of Congolese military members, undertook a mutiny against their Belgian
officer corps. What resulted was chaos and violence, thereby prompting a mass exodus
of Belgians from the Congo.
Members of the Eisenhower administration, to include Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles, Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, incoming Secretary of State
Christian Herter, as well as Henry Cabot Lodge, American Ambassador to the United
Nations, became increasingly concerned that the Congo crisis would provide an opening
for Soviet intervention. This concern led to an invitation to bring Lumumba to
Washington, where he was regaled with the honors of a distinguished visitor. After the
failed attempt to establish positive relations with Lumumba, the United States decided
that it was better to remove the threat as opposed to letting it continue to exist. The result
was a failed attempt to assassinate a foreign leader. The CIA’s confidence over successes
in Iran and Guatemala were short-sighted.
Internal Conflict
Following the end of Belgian colonial rule, the Congo was left with a fledgling
and fragile framework for governance, a new elite class of cultured Congolese, and a
disgruntled army that ran amuck and became increasingly more powerful, violent, and
corrupt as it grew. Described as “A vestige of premodern barbarism, populated by
rapists, and bearing no resemblance to the world of modern armies” (Baaz and Stern
2011, 563)” and “the ramshackle armed forces pulled together from the current warring
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factions” (Robinson 2012, 475), the Congolese Army, also known as the Forces Arme´es
de la Re´publique De´mocratique au Congo (FARDC), became the symbol of the
country’s highly corrupt, violent, dysfunctional, and decentralized military apparatus.
Historically, the organization’s modus operandi has emphasized exploitation rather than
protection of the populace. As Robinson notes, “The sad truth is that the Congo/Zaire
has never had any military tradition of its soldiers behaving properly, because its ethos
has always been one of exploitation, not protection. The task of the original Belgian
Congo’s Force publique was to break all resistance to the economic exploitation of the
state so that Leopold and his agents could plunder the territory” (Robinson 2012, 475).
The Congo’s armed forces had never been trained to provide security or
protection. Simply, its sole purpose was to extract resources on behalf of its patrons
through a vast patronage network. As Robinson asserts, “The mere fact that the troops
are armed is enough to overawe the populace; little more is required” (2012, 475). Its
lackluster history dates back to 1888 when King Leopold II created the force as his
private tool of resource extraction management. The Force publique was led by Belgian
officers with Congolese natives forming the majority of the enlisted force. Lumumba’s
lightning-fast trajectory towards independence resulted in a haphazard construction of a
Congolese army with natives in the officer ranks. The Force publique was renamed the
Arme´e Nationale Congolaise (ANC), or Congolese National Army, but, as Robinson
notes, “quickly degenerated into armed gangs of renegades often loyal to local ethnic
leaders or secessionist regions rather than the central government” (2012, 477).
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Regime Type
Belgium’s decision to grant independence so expeditiously was connected to
political change in 1959, and it wanted to move quickly in hopes that, at the time of the
election, there would be a Belgian ruling elite—that 80 percent of the Congolese
parliament would be comprised of docile pro-Belgian members, with only 20 percent
radicals. They miscalculated the extent of the radicalization, and their objective to curtail
radical change failed, which was a common practice by foreign powers in many African
countries in the 1950s. In most instances, the strategy succeeded, but in the Congo, it
failed and Congo's problems were a direct outcome of Belgium's botched transition of
Congo to independence in 1960.
The Belgian government had planned for a protracted path toward democracy.
However, internal strife and violence accelerated the process which resulted in chaos.
Unwilling to walk away from the vast wealth of the Congo region, Belgium was forced to
assuage to the demands of the newly-installed Congolese government. Lack of a
disciplined Congolese military force and internal political corruption created an
environment of fear and violence.
Lumumba was also pulled into the influence of external support. As a result of
his sympathies, Soviet diplomats started spreading money around in support of
Lumumba, pushing US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the brink of requesting the
deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. Lumumba also
caused the Belgian business community to hire mercenaries to help the secessionist
ambitions. By August 1960, the country was a total mess and, only a successful UN
peacekeeping mission initiated by the Eisenhower administration, stabilized the Congo
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for five years after its independence. Contractors from the UN and the World Bank kept
the public works and other services going in lieu of a stable Congolese political system.
The United States was concerned about Lumumba’s public appeal and his leaning
toward the Soviet Union. He had enlisted Moscow’s help to ship Soviet airplanes, trucks,
and technicians to the province where his support was strongest. In the final days,
accounts of Lumumba’s circumstances and death vary. The UN investigation concluded
that he was killed on 17 January 1961. Coincidentally, President Eisenhower, in a
nationally televised speech, addressed the American people for the last time as president
on this day. The planning of operations involved only a handful of people: the Director
of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles; CIA Congo station chief Larry Devlin; and a CIA
scientist who was asked to make preparations to assassinate or incapacitate an
unspecified African leader. The CIA station chief testified that he had been ordered by
the president to kill Lumumba. Assassination was intended to be conducted through
biological materials (needles, rubber gloves, gauze masks), and it was to occur anytime
and anywhere. The objective was to eliminate the threat. Method was injection into
something Lumumba ate or used regularly for personal hygiene (e.g., food or a
toothbrush). Shooting was also considered. Toxin was supposed to produce a disease
that was indigenous. Code word was PROP. On September 24, 1961, Dulles sent a cable
to Leopoldville stating, “We wish to give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba
from any possibility of resuming governmental position.” Lumumba was referred to as a
political threat. CIA technicians developed and stockpiled toxins that could immobilize
an individual for hours, days, or even months, or could kill a human being in a way that
appeared to be the result of a deadly disease. “A formerly classified CIA document notes
133

that in November 1962, an agent (name redacted, but suspected to be Devlin) had advised
Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick that he had, at one time, been directed by Mr. Richard Bissell to
assume responsibility, for a project involving the assassination of Patrice Lumumba”
(declassified CIA memorandum dated 14 February 1972). According to (name redacted),
poison was to have been the vehicle as he made reference to having been instructed to see
Dr. Sidney Gottlieb in order to procure the appropriate vehicle. Gerard and Kuklick add,
“Regarding the US role at the end, they present a very strong circumstantial case. The
United States, through the CIA, was demonstrably trying to do Lumumba in—directly
and through its cooperating Congolese leaders— from August through November 1960.
In January 1961, these same clients gave the station chief advance notice of their plan to
ship Lumumba to his bitterest enemies and he did nothing to discourage them” (2015,
276). “Focus on the importance of the military, arguing that the weaknesses, rather than
strengths, in the military’s structure and function contribute to military coups and to the
nature of the broader political context in which it exists” (Barron 2013, 101).
Conclusions
Barron suggests that “The structure and functions of the military contributed to
and reﬂected the complex political, social, and economic turmoil of the period. Between
independence and Mobutu’s second coup, violence, instability, and foreign intervention
were consistently integral to the Congo’s political power struggles, in which Mobutu had,
from the beginning, signiﬁcant and growing inﬂuence” (2013, 112). This case
demonstrated the influential power of leader characteristic, internal conflict, and regime
type to a leader’s survival. Had Lumumba been given the opportunity to make his dream
of Congolese independence a reality, the world could have seen a very different turnout
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for this Central African country. Lumumba was intelligent, articulate, and passionate but
he grossly underestimated the greed, selfishness, and corruption of his country’s elite
leaders. The Congo case study does demonstrate the association between leader
characteristics, internal conflict, and regime type as captured in the dissertation’s model.
The presence of each factor had a direct influence on the other, albeit in varying degrees.
One of the interesting associations to note in the Congo coup case study is the link
between personality characteristics and internal conflict. While Lumumba enjoyed
popularity among the Congolese people, his enemies from opposing regional factions
were intent on his demise. It appears that no Congolese leader, no matter how educated,
would stand a chance against opposing forces within the country and outside of the
country.
This case also demonstrated the more influential power of regime type to a
leader’s survival. Had Lumumba and his league of educated peers had the foresight to
understand the meaning of independence, they may have had a chance to see it succeed.
The Congo case study does demonstrate the association between leader characteristics,
internal conflict, and regime type as captured in the dissertation’s model. The presence
of these factors has a direct influence on the other, albeit in varying degrees. Of all the
case studies presented in this dissertation, the story of the Congo is the most tragic. It is a
story of the Congo’s young and experienced politicians, a greedy Belgian government
that refused to let go of its most prized colonial asset, and American leaders who
unnecessarily influenced the history of a country in the most flawed and ill-prepared
manner.
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Finally, this case study analyzed the effects of six causal conditions on the fate of
leaders to include leadership characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal
conflict, and regime type. Lumumba was a member of the minority population, did not
have a college degree, and was under the age of 40 years old when he assumed power.
Public dissent was not as significant of a factor as he enjoyed a tremendous amount of
public support from the Congolese people. He assumed power during a tumultuous time
when the country was on the verge of gaining independence after enduring 75 years
under Belgian colonialism. Moreover, internal strife ran rampant and tribal factions and
independent political parties were asserting power and influence for control. With
respect to global instability, the threat of communism was strong and heavily influenced
foreign policy behavior of the United States. Regarding internal conflict, the country was
embroiled in civil strife. A major military uprising occurred within days of Lumumba’s
assumption to power. As pertains to regime type, the Congolese people were passionate
about gaining independence. They wanted to have control over their destiny.
Table 9 Membership of Democratic Republic of the Congo with Survival Variables.
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Leader Characteristics

X

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

More
Out
Than In

Public Dissent

Mostly
Out

X

Global Instability

X

Internal Conflict

X

Regime Type

X
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Fully
Out

CHAPTER IX – DICTATORSHIP, DISSIDENTS, AND DECEPTIVE DIPLOMACY
Cuba, 1961–1962
“A revolution is not a bed of roses.”i
--Fidel Castro
Introduction
This chapter explores covert action events planned and carried out by the United
States in Cuba from 1961–1962. It will begin with a brief overview of the political
environment during that time, and then discuss the leader characteristics of Fidel Castro
and the effects of his leadership and policies on Cuban society. After discussing the
overall aftermath of the covert action operation and explaining how and why American
forces used that action to influence the Cuban government, the study will conduct a
detailed analysis of the degree of membership this case demonstrates for each factor
presented in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, this case study concludes with a
summary and application of the findings into the degree of membership matrix. It
highlights the importance of public dissent and internal conflict in determining a leader’s
fate.
Background
The state manages and governs Cuba and its people. Repression comes in the
form of a strict single-party communist state run by, now the deceased Fidel Castro, and
his brother, Raul Castro. Under their leadership, the country is managed and surveilled
by a tight network of government spies who have a great amount of control over the
media, education, business, and foreign relations. This inward society prompted interest
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from outsiders, especially when its new leader began the process of agricultural reform
and nationalization of its natural resources.
Husain notes,
The day before President-elect Kennedy’s inauguration, then-President Dwight D.
Eisenhower had briefed him about numerous foreign policy issues, including
Cuba, and a secret US effort to train anti-Castro guerrillas in Guatemala. In
advising Kennedy on what to do with the thorny issue of Cuba, Eisenhower had
recommended that this effort be continued and accelerated. Three days later, at a
State Department meeting on Cuba, the then CIA Director Allen Dulles reported
that US Special Forces teams from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, had trained
between ﬁve and six hundred Cubans in Retalhuleu, Guatemala, for an invasion of
Cuba. Whereas the previous administration had authorized eventual airdrops of
the trained guerrillas onto the island, Kennedy now faced the decision of whether
to continue the secret operation. One of the dilemmas confronting the
administration, Kennedy’s advisers told him, was the difﬁculty of maintaining
secrecy. (2005, 24)
He adds,
The landing point at the Bay of Pigs was part of the deception. The site was a
remote swampy area on the southern coast of Cuba, where a night landing might
bring a force ashore against little resistance and help to hide any US involvement.
The original invasion plan called for two air strikes against Cuban air bases. A
1,400-man invasion force would disembark under cover of darkness and launch a
surprise attack. Paratroopers dropped in advance of the invasion would disrupt
transportation and repel Cuban forces. Simultaneously, a smaller force would
land on the east coast of Cuba to create confusion. (2005. 27)
Unfortunately, many of the Air Force bombers missed their targets and failed to
destroy any of Castro’s air force assets. Shortly thereafter, the media reported the news
and the plan was thus no longer secret. Put simply, the invasion failed. “Determined to
make up for the failed invasion, the administration initiated Operation Mongoose—a plan
to sabotage and destabilize the Cuban government and economy, which included the
possibility of assassinating Castro” (John F. Kennedy Library Collection). The covert
action strategy involved sabotage, psychological warfare, and intelligence collection.
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Husain ventures even further to explain,
Secret US plots to assassinate Castro had been in place since 1960, and a total of
at least eight were planned between 1960 and 1965. Some of the outlandish
proposals included lacing Castro’s shoes with thallium salts so that his beard
would fall out, and poisoning the dictator’s beloved cigars with botulinum. (2005,
27)
Leader Characteristics
In his article titled, Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, “Fidel Castro Ruz
was born on August 13, 1926, on his family’s sugar plantation near Biran, Oriente
Province. His father, an immigrant laborer from Spain, owned a 23-acre plantation. As a
boy, Castro worked on his family’s sugarcane fields. However, unlike many young
Cubans of that time, he received an excellent education at Jesuit institutions Colegio La
Salle and Colegio Dolopes in Santiago and then Colegio Belen in Havana. He was voted
the school’s best athlete mainly based on his baseball prowess. Castro continued his
education at the University of Havana, where he worked on a law degree” (Prevost 2007,
19).
As Castro’s interviewer, Ramonet captures Castro’s words,
I made myself into a revolutionary. I’ve reflected from time to time about the
factors that had to do with that. Beginning with the fact of the place where I was
born, way out in the country, on a large estate. (2007, 23)
Castro described his father, Don Angel, as “a man of great will and great
determination. He taught himself to read and write, with great effort” (Ramonet 2007,
24). He recalled his mother Lina, a Cuban, as “Practically illiterate, and, like my father,
she learned to read and write practically on her own. An extraordinarily hard-working
woman, she was a cook, a doctor, a caretaker for all of us” (Ramonet 2007, 30). Critics
and scholars have described Castro as a murderer, an avenger with a martyr complex, a
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liar, a control freak, dangerous, and a powerful individual who had a vengeful streak. To
others, he is viewed as a revolutionary, charismatic, gifted orator with a keen intellect,
and the ability to capture every detail.
Neuroticism
According to Judge et al. (2002), neuroticism is used to describe individuals who
demonstrate high levels of anxiety, are prone to depression, insecure, hostile and
vulnerable.
A declassified CIA personality profile notes,
Castro's egoism is his Achilles heel. The extreme narcissistic qualities of his
personality are so evident as to suggest predictable patterns of action during both
victory and defeat. When he is winning, he must control the situation himself
without delegation of authority, and he must continue to seek new areas of
authority to overthrow. When faced with defeat, his first concern is to retreat
strategically to a place where he can regroup his assets and personally lead
another rebellion (Declassified document from Central Intelligence Agency,
Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro, 1961).
Extraversion
Judge et al. (2002) also point out that extraversion describes leaders who are
sociable and assertive and exude positive energy. According to the CIA,
Castro's aggressiveness stems from constant attempts to achieve a special position
that is denied him. When he achieves what he desires, he needs constant
reassurance that he is justified in occupying this special position. In the past, he
has sought approval from varying sources but currently he is wringing it from the
Cuban masses, the current source of his sense of power and prestige. As long as
the masses continue to support him, he will not suffer from anxiety, depression, or
overt psychiatric symptoms. The chronic threat to the equilibrium of his
personality is that this source of gratification might be withdrawn (declassified
document from Central Intelligence Agency, Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric
Personality Study of Fidel Castro, 1961).
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Ramonet recalls,
He is a leader, who lives, so far as I could see, modestly, austerely, in almost
Spartan conditions: there is no need for luxury; his furniture is sober; his food is
frugal, healthy, and macrobiotic. His are the habits of a solder-monk. (2007, 11)
Further, Guerra adds that, “While US observers often ridiculed Fidel’s endless
capacity to talk, leaders argued that his purpose was always “to educate the people—
above all the simple people—in the meaning and problems of the Revolution (2007, 45).
He explains,
Brilliant and baroque, Fidel Castro has a visceral need to communicate with the
public. He is aware that one of his main qualities is his ability to speak—to
convince and persuade. He is better than anyone at capturing an audience’s
attention, holding them in his power, subjugating them, electrifying them, and
eliciting storms of applause. There is no spectacle that can compare with Fidel
Castro giving a speech. Standing, his body swaying, his hand often on the
microphone, his voice thunders, his eyes fix on the crowd, he pauses…then
moves his arms like a bronco-rider, raises his index finger and points at the
suddenly tame crowd. (2007, 13)
Openness to Experience
This leadership trait describes individuals who are curious about the world and
who seek knowledge at different levels. Castro, for example,
Castro is an ideal revolutionary leader, agitator, and fomenter of unrest, but he has
no capabilities for organization and administration nor does he have any concern
for the implementation of detailed plans. Furthermore, he can trust no one
sufficiently to enable him to delegate authority. (Declassified document from
Central Intelligence Agency, Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric Personality Study of
Fidel Castro, 1961).
Agreeableness
According to a declassified CIA personality profile,
Castro has a constant need to rebel, to find an adversary, and to extend his
personal power by overthrowing existing authority. When his self-concept is
slightly disrupted by criticism, he becomes as emotionally unstable as to lose to
some degree his contact with reality. If significant vulnerable aspects of his
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personality were consistently attacked by those he now looks to for approval, the
result could be personality disorganization and ineffectuality -- possibly even
clinical emotional illness. This illness would probably be depression or some
variant of depression, such as an overexcited state, an addiction, or an increase in
suspicion to the point of complete withdrawal from reality (Declassified
document from Central Intelligence Agency, Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric
Personality Study of Fidel Castro, 1961).
Conscientiousness
Ramonet notes,
Castro likes precision, accuracy, exactitude, punctuality. Whatever the subject he
may be talking about, he does mathematical calculations at amazing speed. No
approximations for Fidel. He remembers the smallest detail. (2007, 13)
According to a declassified CIA personality profile,
Additional sources of gratification and ego bolstering appear to be his relationship
to Che Guevara and his brother Raul. There are strong indications that Castro is
dependent and submissive to Che intellectually and that his emotional stability
would suffer if Che did not maintain a steady, positive attitude toward him.
Disruption of this relationship, therefore, would discomfit Castro and reduce his
effectiveness (Declassified document from Central Intelligence Agency,
Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro, 1961).
Paradoxically, Castro seems to be basically a passive individual who defends
himself against his fears of passivity by overreacting in aggressive and sadistic
ways. His over-activity, avoidance of routine, lack of organization,
impulsiveness, temper tantrums, and masochistic tendencies (including a wish for
martyrdom) appear related to passive feminine wishes or identification. His
compulsive need to be "on top" and never to submit to control or authority is
another indication of his fears regarding passivity (declassified document from
Central Intelligence Agency, Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric Personality Study of
Fidel Castro, 1961).
Castro's consistent pattern of strong insistence on undoing the wrongs of "the little
people," his preoccupation with the care and feeding of the poor masses, his
concern for educational opportunities for the underprivileged, and his wish to be
known to them as a benevolent "brother" indicate that he is to some degree
conscience-stricken. His extreme punitive measures against rape and theft also
indicate a backlog of unconscious guilt, which may be exploited to his
disadvantage (Declassified document from Central Intelligence Agency,
Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro, 1961).
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The personality profile concludes with the following assessment,
Although he depends on the masses for support, he has no real regard for them
and does not trust them sufficiently to hold elections. His first consideration is to
maintain power control for himself. He probably would destroy both himself and
the Cuban people to preserve this status. This is the basis for his continuing the
revolutionary stage beyond its period of usefulness (Declassified document from
Central Intelligence Agency, Psychiatric Staff, “Psychiatric Personality Study of
Fidel Castro, 1961).
A leader born from a wealthy family, which began with an immigrant laborer
from Spain and illiterate mother who owned a sugar plantation, took control following an
era of repression and violence. His passion and faith for communist ideology led him to
create a course of history for Cuba that initially created positive success for its people but
ultimately ended in a dictatorship that controlled every aspect of civil society.
Public Dissent
Following the fall of Cuban Dictator Fulgencio Batista, Cuba was left with a
politically fragmented society and a deep collective memory of violence, fear, and
repression. It was during this time that Castro assumed leadership. As Guerra notes,
“Unlike previous politicians, Fidel’s rapid-fire vocal delivery paralleled the legislative
velocity of his government. Creating agencies of state power and issuing laws by decree,
the revolutionaries swept in a new age of ethical, activist government within weeks of
victory” (2012, 45). Within one year of his assumption to power, Cuba’s economy
experienced positive changes. While prices fell and salaries increased, there was still a
drastic difference between the luxuries experienced by urban dwellers and those who
lived in the rural hinterlands. The former enjoyed modern luxuries such as indoor
plumbing and running water whereas the latter did not.
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According to the CIA Weekly Current Intelligence Report dated 22 December
1960,
The Cuban opposition to Castro at present includes large number groups both
inside and outside Cuba ranging from organizations of former Batista associates
to those of disillusioned ex-supporters of Castro. While the opposition has grown
rapidly in recent months, it is not at this time a serious threat to Castro’s position
(1961, 1).
A further handicap has been the failure of much of the opposition to come up with
a well-defined political and economic program, which would have sufficient
appeal to win support among Castro’s present backers. Those groups having
adequate programs lack the means of communicating them to the Cuban people.
Despite reports of increasing discontent among peasants and other low-income
groups—the broad base on which Castro’s power was built—such
disenchantment has yet to become critical (1960, 2-3).
In sum, while there were ample numbers of dissident groups in existence during
Castro’s reign, very few had effective means to communicate their platform to the Cuban
people. Despite sharing common ground through their support for Batista, the groups did
not have a singular, cohesive political platform from which to develop their message.
That, combined with Castro’s tight hold on all workings of Cuban society, made the
dissemination of information difficult.
Global Instability
Cuba’s charismatic and very socialist leader, Fidel Castro, quickly dashed any
notion of a peaceful democratic transition. He believed passionately that any change that
would come to Cuba would be determined and implemented from within the country.
Despite commercial, economic, and financial embargoes led by the United States in the
early 1960s, Castro remained stalwart in his vision for the country. Moreover, influence
from the international community through political means did nothing to deter the
domestic politics of the small island country.
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By May 1959 when Fidel signed the long-awaited national Law of Agrarian
Reform, complaints from US investors flooded the US Embassy in Havana. With
massive sugar plantations and other major US investments now at stake, the same
unsubstantiated charges of incipient communism that Batista had used against all
opponents acquired renewed currency in the Eisenhower administration, some of whose
top members were major stockholders in the UFCO, Cuba’s largest landholder.
According to a an intelligence report, “There was great concern on the part of American
leadership about the presence of a government so closely aligned with the Soviet Union
barely ninety miles from American shores” (Box 7, folder “Intelligence - Report on CIA
Assassination Plots (1)” of the Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library). A Memorandum for the Record dated May 15, 1975 states,
During the period 1959–1961: a number of documents were found that referred
to the intent on the part of some of the Cuban teams operating inside Cuba to
attempt to assassinate Castro. Additionally, the files indicate that there was
considerable interest in procurement of an air plane and air drop of Springfield
rifles with telescopic sights. Phase I Plans involved the preparation of poison
botulism pills by the CIA; the delivery of those pills to organized crime figures
that in turn were to get the pills delivered to contacts they had in Cuba for
placement in a beverage to be drunk by Premier Castro. Participants included
Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of Plans and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, the
Director of the Office of Security of the CIA (Declassified CIA Memorandum for
the Record dated May 15, 1975).
The following facts primarily come from interrogation of Colonel Edwards and
the Phase I case officer: the particular means by which the plans were to be
carried out was by placing botulism pills in his food. The syndicate personnel
were to get the pills to a person in Cuba who would have access to Castro.
Supposedly, the reason pills were used was that the syndicate personnel could not
recruit personnel to undertake the assassination through gunfire because the
chance of survival and escape was small. However, the case officer felt that it
was the Agency itself that desired to have pills used rather than gunfire. Colonel
Edwards said that he, himself, checked out the pills on some guinea pigs because I
wanted to be sure they worked (Declassified CIA Memorandum for the Record
dated May 15, 1975).
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Fidel Castro ceased visiting that particular restaurant at approximately the same
time the pills purportedly arrived. The case officer said it was his recollection
that there were two passages of pills to Cuba, the second one which was made to
someone who had access to a restaurant which Castro frequented. After the
second attempt failed, the case officer said the pills were returned to the CIA
(Declassified CIA Memorandum for the Record dated May 15, 1975).
Internal Conflict
As Guerra describes,
By any measure, life in Cuba during last two years of the Batista regime can be
characterized as controlled chaos. In addition to suffering economic recession,
massive graft at all levels of government, and the takeover of the most profitable
sectors of the tourist trade by the US mafia, Cubans contended with a political
context of violence that they did not fully comprehend until January 1959.
Behind years of fragmented reporting and contradictory accounts was a fullfledged, much bloodier civil war than most had realized. (2012, 39)
While Castro promised better conditions and an improved economy for the
people, his vision changed during his tenure to manipulation and eventual termination of
opponents within his regime. He believed in a united country under communist rule.
Despite his Spartan lifestyle, he still enjoyed many luxuries that were not afforded to the
masses. Some examples include palatial seaside homes rented to him by wealthy Cuban
landowners for a mere one dollar. While other Latin American countries such as
Guatemala and Chile were transitioning away from totalitarian rule, Castro enforced his
draconian policies even harder on the people. The Cuban Constitution included verbiage
on state-sanctioned repression and described punishments for those who disobeyed.
During his reign, virtually all civil and political rights were stripped from the people.
While schools were built and children were afforded education, the curriculum was only
centered on Marxist Socialist ideology. There was no room for independent thinking in a
repressive, collective society bound together in a right network of surveillance and spies.
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Regime Type
Cuba is a one-party communist state. Castro’s control over every aspect of the
country and its citizens created a repressive environment that operated in a power
vacuum. Individual freedoms were ignored and human rights violations were common.
According to the CIA Weekly Review, “On September 28, Castro called for the
establishment of a block warden informant network in cities and towns as another
instrument to combat counterrevolutionary intrigue” (CIA Current Intelligence Weekly
Review dated 22 December 1960).
The report also adds,
The counterrevolutionary forces still have formidable obstacles to overcome
before they can constitute any serious threat to Castro’s position—particular in
view of the increasing strength of his instruments of popular repression. The
government’s 200,000-man revolutionary militia is daily gaining in effectiveness.
Moreover, despite the questionable reliability of some components, the militia
manpower and firepower still greatly exceed those known to be available to
Castro’s opponents (1960, 5).
Conclusions
Castro and the Cuban revolution survived many decades because it was fueled by
the people’s passion for nationalism and independence. Through fear and control, Castro
wielded his influence over the people and infused element of Cuban society with his
brand of socialism. The Cuba case study highlights the significance between leader
characteristics and public dissent. The presence of these two primary factors has a direct
influence on the other, and, ultimately, on the fate of the leader. Finally, this case study
analyzed the effects of six causal conditions on the fate of leaders, to include leadership
characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict, and regime type. With
respect to leader characteristics, Castro was not a member of the minority population, he
147

did hold a college degree, and was under the age of 40 years old when he assumed power.
Public dissent was an insignificant factor, as dissenters lacked an organized platform and
failed to distribute their message effectively to the people. Castro was viewed as an
egotist, as well as a charismatic and a gifted orator. He was born into wealth but instead
chose to embrace a Spartan lifestyle based on minimalism. He embraced communist
ideology and infused into every aspect of Cuban society. He assumed power during a
tumultuous time when the country had ended a brutal dictatorship under Batiste.
Regarding global instability, the threat of communism was strong and heavily influenced
foreign policy behavior of the United States. In reference to internal conflict, the country
was undergoing upheaval with a leader who was socialist and communist. Communism
is typically identified as a political system, whereas socialism is an economic system. As
pertains to regime type, there were no aspirations to become a democracy nor did its new
leader envision any such plans. The leader whose battle cry was “Socialism or Death!”
passed away at the age of 90 on 26 November 2016.
Table 10 Membership of Cuba with Survival Variables
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Leader Characteristics

X

Public Dissent
Global Instability

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

More
Out
Than In

X
X

Internal Conflict

X

Regime Type

X
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Mostly
Out

Fully
Out

CHAPTER X – NO COUNTRY FOR OLD MEN
Republic of Vietnam, May – November 1963
“That is no country for old men. The young
In one another's arms, birds in the trees.
Those dying generations at their song,
The salmon‐falls, the mackerel‐crowded seas,
Fish, flesh, or fowl, commend all summer long
Whatever is begotten, born, and dies.” ii
--William Butler Yeats, Sailing to Byzantium
Introduction
In the classic poem, Sailing to Byzantium, poet William Butler Yeats opines about
the tragedy of old age and describes a passionate desire to escape into a dreamland full of
beauty. The lesson learned in this case study is that the gift of old age is not always a
guarantee, as seen in case studies focusing on episodes in which leaders were
assassinated at an early age.
This chapter explores covert action events planned and carried out by the United
States in the Republic of Vietnam in 1963. It will begin with a brief overview of the
political environment during that time, and then discuss the leader characteristics of
President Ngo Dinh Diem, who had a good chance of returning to power prior to his
assassination in 1963, and the effects of his leadership and policies on Vietnamese
society. After discussing the overall aftermath of the covert action operation and how
and why American forces used that action to influence the Vietnamese government, the
study will conduct a detailed analysis of the degree of membership this case demonstrates
for each factor presented in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, this case study
concludes with a summary and application of the findings into the degree of membership
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matrix. It highlights the importance of public dissent and internal conflict in determining
a leader’s fate.
Background
At the time of the covert action event under consideration, Vietnam, a long-time
French colony, was still adjusting to its newly-established role as an independent nation.
Previously, it had endured a prolonged battle with its French colonial masters that played
out in the form of a rebellion, which resorted to guerilla warfare as well as conventional
military strategies. Unable to hold on to its power in the country, France relinquished
control and withdrew its forces in 1941. Many years of colonialism resulted in the
creation of strong nationalist movements that were supported by Vietnam’s Chinese
neighbors to the north. These movements played a key role in leader survival.
Extending from the Chinese border to the Gulf of Siam, Vietnam stretches out
roughly 1,000 miles long, with its physical geographic characteristics resembling two
large breadbaskets held together by a slender pole. This physical separation also
manifested itself into political differences between the people’s democracy, allied with
communist forces—on one hand and a pro-Western autocratic republic on the other.
Dense forest and predominantly mountainous, combined with rich land for rice
cultivation, Vietnam had one common language: Vietnamese. With the exception of a
small minority population comprised of Thai, Khmer, and Hmong members who were
deeply antagonistic of the Vietnamese, the majority of the population lived in rural areas
and cultivated rice, rubber, and fish as their primary means of sustenance.
Political groups and parties were organized after the French took control and
many of those actors received support from China and Japan. These groups, primarily
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the Vietnamese Nationalist Party founded by Nguyen Ai Quoc (also known as Ho Chi
Minh), implemented change through terrorist techniques. They had no primary platform
except to oppose the existing regime. It was not until later that the groups integrated
political objectives into their platforms, which ultimately gave them more strength and
influence against the opposition.
While the French were efficient in running the country, they also created
significant cultural and economic disparities between themselves and the Vietnamese
people. Specifically, the French enjoyed elite positions in government, opulent living
conditions, and high-quality healthcare, opportunities for education, medical aid,
employment, and basic housing and sustenance were denied to the local population. This
disparity created a deep, antagonistic relationship between the two cultures. As uprisings
and social movements began to gain momentum, the French responded with immediate
force by imprisoning and executing dissenters. Violence fueled the motivation of
nationalist groups and, soon, these groups would reemerge with a political purpose. This
new platform gave them greater influence and control against the opposition.
Ho Chi Minh was considered a visionary leader with Marxist-Leninist
orientations. He was a loyal communist who played a key role in shaping the nationalist
party in Vietnam. General Vho Ngyen Giap, Vietnam’s lauded military revolutionary,
was also a loyal communist who had been educated in China, earned a doctorate in
Chinese history, and was well-versed in Mao Tse Tung’s theory of guerilla warfare.
These two leaders laid the foundation for the future of the country’s political path. By
1951, the Vietnam Worker’s Party was firmly an influential engine behind the fledgling
Republic of Vietnam. It was also during this time that villages were organized into local,
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regional, and national hierarchies. Not long after, a military force was created utilizing
the same template. The sheer will and determination of Minh and Giap, along with
support in the form of military aid and equipment from communist China, as well as
support from the peasant class resulted in an overwhelming victory against the French in
1954. Support from the local populace was gained primarily through a propaganda
campaign of psychological operations and information warfare.
Leader Characteristics
Born in the northern region of the Qang Binh Province, Ngo Dinh Diem was a
member of one of Vietnam’s elite families with strong ties to Mandarin Chinese roots.
His father was a court minister and Diem grew up with a strong Roman Catholic faith
with a strong foundation in Confucianism. He had a strong work ethic and demonstrated
steadfastness in his commitment to education. As biographer Shaw (2015, 25) noted,
“Diem’s exceptional determination, which did not alter in the face of adversity, became
the mark of the man’s later political life.” Growing up, his parents hosted political
dignitaries in their home, giving Diem constant exposure to many of Vietnam’s visionary
leaders.
According to Shaw,
Diem’s father was unshakable in his opposition to violence or bloodshed. He
stressed the revolution must come only through education. When the Vietnamese
people were ready to look after their affairs, he argued, Vietnam would gain its
independence from France naturally, with no need for killing. (2015, 25)
Diem embraced the Confucian teachings and demonstrated commitment to his studies at
a very young age. He attended college and earned high marks as a dedicated student.
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As Shaw explains,
He earned such high marks in the final examinations that the French offered him a
scholarship to attend university in Paris. But Diem’s great desire was to serve the
Vietnamese people, and he turned down the French offer, choosing instead to stay
in Vietnam, where he continued to excel academically. (2015, 27)
Scholars such as Jones (2003, 9) describe Diem as “cold, aloof, and nepotistic.
He never revealed any propensity for democracy and preferred to keep power in the
hands of himself and his family.” This perception of the Vietnamese leader ultimately
created a cultural divide between him and US advisors. As Shaw (2015, 27) emphasizes,
“Diem’s sturdy emphasis on religious, familial, and social duties placed a spiritual, moral
and intellectual gulf between him and many of his American advisors.”
He adds,
Diem led a disciplined life, and this was something the Vietnamese people
revered because they believed that the quality of a man was determined by his
ability to withstand hardship. Diem’s scholarly, monk-like personality made him
far more attractive to the Vietnamese people as a leader than, for example, a
Western-styled, big-toothed, glad-handing, baby-kissing politician. Indeed, such
a politician offended Vietnamese sensibilities, and yet it was this very model that
many American advisors tried to push on Diem. (2015, 28)
Diem’s strong sense of discipline and strong reputation for virtue made him a
strong opponent to Ho Chi Minh. As a faithful Catholic in a predominantly Buddhist
society, Diem did not have the foundation to refute religious differences. However, he
concentrated his studies on Marxism and communism as a way to better understand his
opponents’ ideology. He was known for his administrative talents, which showcased his
role within the local government. He was known for his disdain of Minh, who murdered
Diem’s brother by burying him alive and raiding the Ngo Dinh home, and destroyed his
collection of valuable books. Even after his assassination, Diem was revered by the
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Vietnamese people and his enemies for being steadfast in his faith as well as his honesty.
He was also admired for standing firm against French colonialists, a trait that garnered
loyalty from the people of Vietnam.
Shaw goes even further to explain,
Diem believed that the individual needed to submit his will and talents to the
greater good of the family, the community, and the nation. In his political
philosophy, the individual did not have a right to political activity that threatened
the downfall of a legitimate government. Diem’s Catholic faith and Confucian
principles were so robustly integrated as to make his political philosophy all but
impermeable to contrary argument. (2015, 27)
Neuroticism
According to Judge et al. (2002), neuroticism is used to describe individuals who
demonstrate high levels of anxiety, are prone to depression, insecure, hostile and
vulnerable. Diem was often described as cool and aloof by American advisors. He stood
firmly by his Confucian faith and displayed stoicism to the public, even while
experiencing tremendous hardship, believing that the traditional family and cultural ways
of the Vietnamese should be protected from new, modernized changes.
As Jones notes,
Diem personified a complex mixture of good and bad. He was a man of the
highest moral principles, of strong will and, above all, a man who never panics,
fully confident that he is the invisible hand of the Lord in everything he does. But
he also had political blind spots that resulted from great caution, monumental
stubbornness and equally monumental prejudices. He believed that the struggle
against the Communists was purely military and that his government would suffer
from a broadened political base. (2003, 33-34)
Extraversion
Judge et al. (2002) also note that extraversion describe leaders who are sociable
and assertive and who exude positive energy.
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Shaw argues,
Diem had formed a pattern of going in and out of worldly affairs, a pattern he
would continue until his death. When troubled, under threat, or just in need of
quiet and reflection, he would retreat into a monastery or a similar religious
institution. After his soul had been calmed and his thoughts organized through
Christian contemplation, he would return to the hurly-burly of politics once more.
(2015, 37)
Openness to Experience
This leadership trait describes individuals who are curious about the world and
seek knowledge at different levels. Diem demonstrated an ability to open his mind to
new avenues of knowledge by studying Marxist and communist ideology as a university
student.
Agreeableness
The characteristic of agreeableness is used to describe a leader who conforms, is
trusting of others, nurturing, and accepting (Judge et al., 2002).
Additionally, Shaw writes,
A good friend of the Ngo Dinh family, Andre Nguyen Van Chau, recalled the
gentleness of Diem’s character when he noted that the man never liked being
harsh with anyone. Despite the portrait drawn by his critics, Diem was not a
violent man, nor even the authoritarian type. (2015, 25)
Diem’s ability to cooperate with US policymakers and military leaders was the
critical ingredient needed to implement a successful counterinsurgency campaign against
communist forces in Vietnam. Against the recommendation of American advisors, Diem
believed that a decentralized government would threaten the war effort by bringing in
outsiders to the decision-making process. He was very much opposed to delegating
duties and had a foundational distrust of outsiders. As Jones (2003) explains, “Diem’s
stand against decentralization ran deeper than wartime considerations. To delegate more
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authority to field officers would provide the military with the means for staging another
coup attempt” (Jones 2003, 29). American advisors had erroneously assumed that an
anti-communist leader with a disciplined disposition would be the ideal partner in the
fight against the opposition. They quickly realized that Diem was not amenable to their
ideas and very much opposed associations with outsiders in general.
Conscientiousness
According to Judge et al. (2002), conscientiousness is described as a tendency to
be organized, meticulous, detailed, thorough, controlled, and decisive. While Diem felt
strongly about his faith and family values, he was conflicted between an attraction to a
religious life and responsibilities of leading a country. As Shaw (2015, 37) notes, “Many
years later, in a moment of exasperation with Diem’s political naiveté during the
Buddhist crisis of 1963, his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu shouted that he should have been a
monk and not a president.”
Jones asserts,
Diem was not superstitious; he was very rational and pragmatic. However, he had
lost all touch with reality and feared a coup more than he feared the Vietcong.
His refusal to delegate authority had resulted in administrative bottlenecks that
obstructed mobilization of resources and seriously damaged the war effort. His
unbending resistance to delegating authority ensured continued frustration in
Washington and prolonged instability in Saigon. (2003, 108)
Public Dissent
While the Vietnamese people trusted and respected Diem, his government’s
repressive actions against the Buddhist monks was beginning to affect popular support,
thereby offering the opposition a new vulnerability to exploit. One of the primary factors
resulting in Diem’s eventual downfall was the government’s crackdown on a Buddhist
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religious protest in Hue on 8 May 1963. The protests stemmed from the people’s
frustrations with politics and repression. They viewed Diem’s government as being
autocratic in nature. During this protest, which occurred on the birth date of Buddha,
nine people were killed and another fourteen injured. The image of a Buddhist monk
performing self-immolation, or setting fire to himself as a form of sacrifice, was captured
by international press and viewed by millions of people all over the world. Diem had a
Buddhist struggle and movement on his hands. This was not merely a dissident religious
minority movement. Rather, it created distrust between Diem and the people of Vietnam
and marked the beginning of his fall from power.
A declassified Department of State telegram from Saigon to the Department of State
dated August 24, 1963 at 4:37 a.m. states,
Conflicting figures given on casualties at Hue. General Tri states no one killed, 8
Buddhists slightly injured and 2 needed hospitalization, 10 combat police slightly
injured and 6 seriously injured, and four ARVN soldiers seriously injured. Some
Buddhists killed. Figure of 30 not impossible by any means. In Qui Non there are
reports that homes of four Buddhists were broken into and ransacked on morning
of August 23 and Buddhists arrested (declassified memorandum from Saigon to
Department of State, signed “Lodge”).
The Buddhist protests revealed the glaring extravagance and excessive cruelty of
Diem’s regime, now led by his well-connected brother and his outspoken wife Madam
Ngo Dinh Nhu. A journalist’s well-timed photograph of a monk setting himself on fire in
the streets of Saigon reached an international audience almost immediately. One
photograph captured a fleeting moment in history and the conflict between the Catholic
South Vietnam president and the Buddhist monk majority population. Photographer
Malcolm Browne recalled the event,
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It was a particularly hot day. The monks suddenly rose and we walked out into
the street and began moving in a long column toward the center of town. An old
Austin automobile, carrying several monks, led the procession. That struck me as
unusual. At that point, the old Austin drove up to the center of this group and out
stepped an old man, a very old monk, who I learned later was Thich Quang Due,
and two younger monks. He was resting his hands on their arms, and going over
to the center of this circle. They put down a tan cushion in the middle of the
asphalt.... It is a horrible recollection.
The young monk went back to the car and got out a polyethylene jerry can, filled
with pink gasoline, which I learned later had been diluted with jet fuel to make it
burn for a longer time. They poured it over his head and took a few steps back.
At that point the elderly monk pulled out a box of matches and struck one of them
and dropped it in his lap. And the flames engulfed him immediately. He winced.
You could tell from his expression that he was in terrible pain, but he never cried
out. He burned for 10 minutes or so, or perhaps a bit more; it seemed like an
eternity. The whole intersection smelled of roasted flesh, and the monks and nuns
were crying out and screaming. Oh, the screaming and moaning (from an
interview with Hal Buell, Photography Director at the Associated Press, 2013, 4344).
Global Instability
Diem’s regime in South Vietnam received US assistance against continued North
Vietnamese communist efforts. The communist threat was pervasive and seeped into
every aspect of US foreign policy. In the case of the Republic of Vietnam, the
communist threat was very real and its presence created violence and wreaked havoc on
the Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh’s communist guerillas had sided with the Soviet
Bloc. Consequently, US policy makers feared a “Domino Effect” such that if the
Republic of Vietnam fell under communist control, then the rest of the Southeast Asian
countries would experience the same fate. As a result, Washington was more than
supportive in assisting an anti-communist leader who appeared to be disciplined and
restrained in his words and actions. Even at this time, the Republic of Vietnam was still
in the early phases of development as an independent country. Moreover, US
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intervention on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950 in response to North Korea’s invasion
of South Korea represented a comparable concern.
The events leading up to the assassination of Diem changed the course of history
for US foreign policy toward the Southeast Asian nation. It also brought a sense of
realism to American policymakers in a way that forced them out of looking at every
country through Cold War lenses. Ho Chi Minh’s bloody insurgency also forced the US
military to reconsider its stance on conventional warfare. Large tanks, massive amounts
of weaponry, firepower, and soldiers were discovered to be ineffective against an
unconventional enemy that hid in the shadows of the jungle. It was during this time that
President John F. Kennedy brought the US Army Special Forces into roles of military
advisors and specialists in unconventional warfare. These tactics allowed the Green
Berets to train indigenous forces and it was an effective means of fighting an enemy
while leaving a small footprint.
Internal Conflict
The internal threat of communist was very real and very violent. As Jones
explains,
Many Vietcong members were married to South Vietnamese women or were
brothers or sons of people in the south. Thus, the Vietcong could easily
intimidate relatives into collaboration. When Diem took office, the outgoing
French controlled only the main towns and highways. During the next two years
he had worked to regain the countryside and establish internal security. He had
been so successful that the Vietcong resorted to terrorism. (2003, 36)
Vietnamese society and the concept of a nucleus family were centered on Confucian
philosophy. In actuality, the Viet Cong was known as an agrarian peasant movement.
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As Chinese leader Mao Zedong once stated, “Peasants are to the Guerilla as fish
is to water.”18 Notorious for brutal and violent tactics against their own people, Vietcong
methods had intensified in brutality since the end of 1960. Until then, the Vietminh had
sought to undermine the Diem regime by propaganda and terror. However, the pace of
activity had quickened along with its savagery. Millions of party pamphlets propagated
lies about the Saigon government, while the Vietcong engaged in abductions, murders,
and mutilations. When the Vietcong hit the capital of Phuoc Thanh province in midSeptember 1961, they brazenly executed its chief, his assistant, and ten civil servants and
inhabitants, including a woman and child. As recently as October 12, 1960, the
International Control Commission received reports of 806 deaths and 770 kidnappings.
Photographs recorded grisly sights: numerous beheadings of women and children along
with government officials and teachers. The Communist Party spread the saying, ‘Kill
the Land Robbers,’ to encourage the wanton seizure of land from Diem’s supporters”
(Jones 2003, 103).
Regime Type
Recently, in the disputes between China and the Soviet Union, Minh sided with
the Soviet Union. Diem’s philosophy was Confucian in principle, emphasizing a
bureaucratic order that placed him at the top as the Son of Heaven, served by welleducated civilian and military figures known as Mandarins, whose authority extended
down to the district and provincial levels. The relationship between the United States and
South Vietnam once the former included in its requirements that Diem forego his

18

Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, tr. S.B. Griffith (New York, 2005), p. 93.

160

Mandarin principles in order to embrace democratic reforms—something he was not
willing to do.
The assassinations of Diem and his brother and advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu on 2
November 1963 changed the trajectory of the war in Vietnam. Not more than three
weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated in Texas. Lyndon B. Johnson assumed
the presidency and continued the policy to keep American troops in Vietnam. According
to the Assassinations Report issued by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in
December of 1975, the initial coup plan failed because “the Generals did not feel ready
and did not have sufficient balance of focus” (Assassinations Report 1975). In addition,
on September 12, 1975, Senator Frank Church, with President Kennedy’s endorsement,
introduced a resolution in the Senate denouncing the Diem regime for its “repressive
measures” and called for immediate discontinuation of aid to the country (Assassinations
Report 1975).
On 1 November 1963, ARVN soldiers took over police headquarters and radio
stations in Saigon and began their way to the presidential palace. It was at this time that
they confronted Diem and demanded that he give up control of the country. Diem, in
turn, called US advisor Henry Cabot Lodge, who told him that there was nothing
Washington could do at this time. Diem and Nhu attempted to escape through a secret
tunnel but were discovered and taken into custody. Shortly thereafter, both were
assassinated in an armored vehicle while being transported to a military headquarters
building. The Assassinations Report concluded by stating, “The details of Diem’s and
Nhu’s deaths are not known and none of the informed sources give any indications of
direct or indirect involvement of the United States” (The Assassinations Report 1975).
161

According to the Assassinations Report, CIA Director John McCone later stated after a
meeting with both the president and Attorney General Robert Kennedy, he believed that
President Kennedy agreed with his recommendation to assemble intelligence on the coup
plot. The Assassinations Report also stated that an unnamed CIA station chief in Saigon
cabled Washington that he had recommended to Ambassador Lodge that the United
States “not set ourselves up irrevocably against the assassination plot” (Assassinations
Report 1975). When President Kennedy heard about the assassination of Diem and his
brother Nhu, it was reported that he demonstrated shock at the news. President Kennedy
had not officially approved plans to assassinate Diem. Rather, it had been agreed and
assumed by US leaders at the time that the course of action would involve withholding
aid to Vietnam and sending more US troops to the country. General Don, one of the coup
plotters, alluded to Ambassador Lodge that it was too late and nothing could stop the
coup from happening. This case study showcases how Eisenhower, Dulles, Lodge,
Kennedy and other US policymakers viewed events in the Republic of Vietnam through a
Cold War template. It was crucial to keep the country out of communist influence.
Conclusions
The overt influences of China and the Soviet Union instilled a sense of urgency
over US policymakers’ containment policy. The establishment of NATO in April 1949
created the impetus for more collective security in Asia. It was at this time that several
economic and military assistance programs were inaugurated.
According to Jones,
The Diem coup was one of those critical events in the history of US policy that
could have altered our commitment. The choices were there: (1 ) continue to plod
along in a limited fashion with Diem -- despite his growing unpopularity; (2)
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encourage or tacitly support the overthrow of Diem, taking the risk that the GVN
might accommodate to the VC; and (3) grasp the opportunity—with the obvious
risks—of the political instability in South Vietnam to disengage. The United
States had two major options: either promote a coup, which it preferred not to do,
or enhance the American military presence, which more than a few presidential
advisers were willing to do. (2003, 109)
The Republic of Vietnam case study highlights the significance between internal
conflict and public dissent. The presence of these two primary factors has a direct
influence on the other, and, ultimately on the fate of the leader. Of all the case studies
presented in this dissertation, the story of Vietnam is the most puzzling. American
diplomats knew very little and appeared to care even less for the culture and traditions of
South Vietnam in the 1950s. It was even more surprising to them as well as US
policymakers at the time that nationalism could turn into violence and chaos as illustrated
by the Buddhist protest and the rise of terrorism through the Viet Cong. Moreover, the
divisive nature of South Vietnamese politics, combined with a Catholic leader with
Confucius roots, created a pendulum-like situation in Washington that swung from
disinterest to investment in preventing a Southeast Asian country from falling toward
communism. According to President Dwight Eisenhower’s domino theory, it was crucial
that communist expansion not occur.
Finally, this case study analyzed the effects of five causal conditions on the fate of
leaders to include leadership characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal
conflict, and regime type. In regard to leader characteristics, Diem was not a member of
the minority population, he did hold a college degree, and was over the age of 40 years
old when he assumed power (he was 53 years old). Public dissent was not as significant
of a factor, given that he enjoyed a tremendous amount of public support from the
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Vietnamese people. He was viewed as very disciplined in his actions and deeply rooted
in his Catholic faith. He assumed power during a tumultuous time when the country was
on the verge of gaining independence after enduring colonialism under French rule. With
respect to global instability, the threat of communism was strong and heavily influenced
foreign policy behavior of the United States. Regarding internal conflict, the country was
experiencing newfound independence following French colonialism. As pertains to
regime type, the South Vietnam government was an aspiring democracy that was still
bound by autocratic rule. The government of the north had communist leanings.
Looking at events during that time, it can be assumed that the assassination of
President Kennedy merely three days after the Diem coup may have overshadowed
events in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the case study is one that is rich with history and one
cannot help but want to seek more ways to learn about how this small Southeast Asian
country changed the US military’s doctrine on conventional warfare.
Table 11 Membership of Republic of Vietnam with Survival Variables.
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

Leader Characteristics
Public Dissent

X
X

Global Instability
Internal Conflict

More
Out
Than In

X
X

Regime Type

X
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Mostly
Out

Fully
Out

CHAPTER XI – DEMOCRACY LOST
Chile, 1970–1973
“There is a graveyard smell to Chile, the fumes of democracy in
decomposition.”19
-- Edward M. Korry, US Ambassador to Chile (1967-1971)
Introduction
This chapter explores covert action events planned and carried out by the United
States in Chile from 1970–1973. It starts with a brief overview of the political
environment during that time, and then identifies and explains the leader characteristics
of Chilean president Salvador Allende and the effects of his leadership and policies on
Chilean society. After discussing the overall aftermath of the covert action operation and
explaining how American forces used that action to influence the Chilean government,
the study will conduct a detailed discussion of the degree of membership this case
demonstrates for each factor presented in this dissertation’s QCA model. Finally, this
case study concludes with a summary of the findings and an application of the findings
into the degree of membership matrix.
The September 1973 coup in Chile, facilitated by the United States government,
created an idea that a superpower could overthrow a democracy, especially if there was
any semblance of a communist threat. Chile was developed by the United States as a
sophisticated nation with strong political institutions, which established a solid reputation
as a democratic government. As Hove (2007, 626) notes in, The Arbenz Factor:
Salvador Allende, US-Chilean Relations, and the 1954 US Intervention in Guatemala,
“When Dwight D. Eisenhower entered the White House in January 1953, he approached
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US-Latin American relations with a sense of urgency…he adopted a new statement of US
policy toward Latin America, NSC 144, which sought greater support for US policy
among Latin Americans, political and economic development, reduction of the
communist menace, and greater access to and production of raw materials.”
Background
Characterized by President Harry S. Truman as the “greatest functioning
democracy” in South America, Chile was elevated to this status as a result of its
commitment to freedom of press, speech, and religion. From its independence in 1818 to
the coup of September 1973, Chile had only experienced four brief interruptions in its
democratic tradition (declassified memorandum, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities, Gerald R. Ford Library). In comparison to Guatemala and Congo case studies,
Chile boasted a literacy rate of an impressive 91 percent—over a majority of its
population. Also interesting to note that Chilean ethnicity was based largely on
indigenous American and European roots. “Faced with threats from the Right and the
Left, US officials navigated a middle, anti-totalitarian course in order to preserve
democracy and political stability in Chile” (Hove 2009, 27).
According to a declassified memorandum, “An Allende government would move,
gradually and cautiously, to establish an authoritarian Marxist state in Chile. To do this,
Allende would seek to destroy, neutralize, or obtain the support of various groups and
institutions which might block his progress” (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities, Gerald R. Ford Library, III.2). “One of Allende’s goals would be the
expulsion of US influence from Chile, although he would try to avoid a serious
provocation of the US” (Declassified memorandum from the Senate Select Committee on
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Intelligence Activities, Gerald R. Ford Library, and III.2). He also sought to strengthen
ties with socialist countries and the Chilean Communist Party, which wholeheartedly
supported the Soviets.
Leader Characteristics
Salvador Allende was born in 1908 into a wealthy family and entered into the
political realm while he was a young medical student at the University of Chile in 1926.
It was also during this time that Allende cultivated a close friendship with Cuba’s Fidel
Castro. It is interesting to note that Allende’s daughter, Beatriz, married a Cuban
diplomat and close confidant of Castro’s, thereby creating an even more intimate merger
between the two families.
Flynn notes,
Although Allende trained as a physician, he thought that he would be better able
to serve the people through direct political action. In 1933, he helped found the
Socialist Party of Chile. The Socialist Party of Chile adhered to many basic
socialist ideals including the belief that capitalist exploitation of the land must be
stopped and that the state of private property must be discontinued and
transformed into a system of collective ownership. (2014, 281–282)
Neuroticism
Neuroticism is a term used to describe an individual who is highly emotional,
highly prone to anxiety, depression, violence, and anger. As a young man, Allende had
witnessed the Chilean government’s control over its people. Despite his privileged
upbringing, a fact he was often embarrassed to admit to his followers, Allende felt a close
association to the needs of the Chilean people and he devoted his life to fighting for
justice and equality.

167

Extraversion
Extraversion is described as personality types that seek excitement and
experiences beyond their comfort zone. Essentially, it is the quality of being confident
and outgoing.
As Hove describes,
Allende himself consciously used the rhetoric of Marxism within his party but
nonetheless tried to maintain the external image of a democrat. His personal
habits did little to discourage this impression. Allende was known for his
conspicuous consumption, his lavish lifestyle, and his personal eccentricities.
(2007, 27)
Former U.S. defense attaché in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert adds,
This beautiful yacht came gliding across the water to hoop up to the wharf. There
was this gentleman in a white hat and a white cravat with a blue admiral’s coat
and white duck pants and shoes. He looked [like] one of the old wealthy
people—the Vanderbilts of America—I couldn’t believe it was Allende…he was
beautifully groomed, and of course his sailing ship was one of the nicest ones
there. It didn’t sit right that he was supposed to be communist or socialist (Paul
Wimert, interview for the George Washington University National Security
Archive, “Backyard,” The Cold War, CNN, February 21, 1999).
In a memo to President Lyndon B. Johnson, McGeorge Bundy notes,
The problem we face is that a very popular and attractive candidate, named
Allende, who is thrown in his lot with the Communists, has more than a fighting
chance to win (McGeorge Bundy, “Presidential Election in Chile,” memorandum
to Lyndon B. Johnson, May 13, 1964, NSF, Country File, vol. 1, 1/64-8/64,
Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, vol. 4, LBJPA).
According to the KGB archives,
Allende’s characteristics traits were arrogance, vanity, desire for glorification and
a longing to be in the spotlight at any price. He was easily influenced by strong
and more determined personalities. He was also described as something of a
womanizer (The Mitrokhin Archive II).
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Openness to Experience
This type of personality describes individuals who are bold and adventurous who
dislike routine, prefer abstract thinking, and have a wide range of interests. The opposite
of this personality trait is individuals who are traditional, non-artistic, and non-analytical.
Hove notes that,
The KGB issued the appropriate code name LEADER to Allende, though the
Chilean was not officially recruited as an agent nor did he ever take KGB
payments. Systematic contact between Allende and the KGB was established in
1961, when relations were restored and the KGB set up a residency in a new trade
mission. To the KGB, Allende had stated his willingness to cooperate on a
confidential basis and provide any necessary assistance, since he considered
himself a friend of the Soviet Union. He willingly shared political information.
(2007, 30)
Agreeableness
This personality trait describes individuals who are compassionate, trustworthy,
lenient, and softhearted. In contrast, it can also describe individuals who are hostile,
cynical, manipulative, vengeful, and ruthless.
Flynn suggests,
Despite his disagreement with their style of governing, Allende worked to foster
positive foreign relations with the majority of the world. He felt that is was
important for Latin-American countries to maintain a united front in order to
improve the lives of their people and the strength of their individual countries.
(2014, 283)
Conscientiousness
The personality trait of conscientiousness describes individuals who are able to
manage their impulsive behavior through persistent motivation. These individuals also
prize perfectionism in their quest for success and status.
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Flynn goes even further to explain,
Allende ran unsuccessfully for president in 1952, 1958, and 1964. Each time he
gained more support and as his political strength increased he became well known
on an international level. Unlike other leaders who became jaded or simply give
up, Allende became more determined to bring democracy to Chile. (2014, 282)
In his September 5, 1970 victory speech to the citizens of Santiago, Allende
expressed a deep appreciation for the support of the people. Allende referred to
himself as the “companero president” and Chile as “their country.” He also
commented that a revolution “does not mean to destroy but to build.” Allende’s
speech was eloquent and simple; dramatic and calm; practical and hopeful. (2014,
282)
Public Dissent
During U.S. covert operation planning against the newly democratically-elected
Allende government, Chile began to experience a deterioration of its social and economic
infrastructure as a result of ineffective governance. This was due primarily to the
infighting that took place among Marxist parties of the Unidad Popular coalition (UP).
Illegal land seizures and unsuccessful management of the government created a chaotic
environment that proved a fertile breeding ground for public dissent. Paranoia and
distrust was common as a result of the recent kidnapping and assassination of General
René Schneider Chereau, commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army during the 1970
presidential election. As Gustafson noted,
One extreme Left party, the Organized Vanguard of the People (VOP)
assassinated Edmundo Perez Zujovic, President Frei’s former interior minister, in
June 1971. Such actions by dissident leftist groups contributed to a growing sense
of physical insecurity in Chile. (2007, 147)
In terms of economic stability, a brief growth spurt of foreign reserves was used
to boost the salaries of public employees whose ranks had swelled shortly after the
election. The Chilean people grew increasingly dissatisfied with the inefficiency of
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government management executed by the UP coalition. The first major protest occurred
on 1 December 1971 when 30,000 women protested in the streets. At that time, several
UP coalition members were removed from their government positions and a drop in
copper prices and agricultural production all began simultaneously. Moreover, it
appeared that the country was precariously close to an economic collapse.
Gustafson informs,
Beginning in mid-1972 a series of violent and protracted strikes slowly
destabilized the UP government. The first of these began on August 21 and was
led by the nation’s independent shopkeepers. Strikes and street violence followed
and continued until police closed off downtown Santiago after a two-day running
street fight between youth arms of the rival political parties MIR and Patria y
Libertad. (2007, 148)
Global Instability
In 1964, US interests in Chile were very clear—to prevent the ascension of a
Marxist leader who could cause the United States economic impairment and allow
unwanted Soviet influence in the Americas. That Marxist leader was Allende, who rose
to power during a time of political and economic chaos in Chile. Additionally, the
Americans viewed him suspiciously for his Marxist leanings to other Marxist leaders in
the Americas.
In a Memorandum for Dr. Henry Kissinger from the CIA, dated 13 September
1973,
This agency did not conduct operations in support of either of the two democratic
candidates who opposed Salvador Allende in the 1970 presidential election. Our
role in the election was limited to an effort to denigrate Allende and his Popular
Unity coalition during the campaign. After the March 1973 elections, it became
increasingly apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the
fabric of Chilean society to the breaking point. (1973)
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Internal Conflict
Beginning in 1961, the administration of John F. Kennedy formed a committee of
top-level officials from the State Department, the White House, and the CIA. In addition,
there were perhaps 100 intelligence operatives working within Chile. In the years leading
up to the 1964 election, these intelligence agents began establishing relationships and
providing funds to Chilean political parties that opposed Allende.
As the election neared in 1964, the United States decided that the best candidate
was the centrist Eduardo Frei of the Christian Democratic Party. To aid Frei, the CIA
covered approximately half of his campaign costs, spending up to an estimated $20
million in Chile. The CIA also launched a massive anti-communist campaign to alarm
the general population of what communism would mean in Chilean life. Furthermore,
US intelligence operatives subsidized the anti-Allende media and provided funds for
grassroots organizations that promoted reform rather than left-wing revolution. US
intelligence efforts in Chile succeeded, as Frei won 56 percent of the votes compared to
Allende's 39 percent.
The United States continued its intelligence efforts in Chile in the years after the
1964 election. In the 1965 and 1969 Chilean congressional elections, America backed
anti-Allende candidates. Despite continued US efforts, in the 1970 presidential election,
Allende won with a plurality of the votes. Due to the fact that Allende did not win a
majority, the Chilean constitution stipulated that the Congress would choose between
Allende and runner-up Jorge Alessandri. The United States continued to prevent Allende
from taking power.
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However, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army, René Schneider, insisted
on respecting the constitutional process. Then, in a kidnapping attempt, Schneider was
killed. However, instead of allowing the coup to go forward, Schneider's murder
discredited the right-wing political parties and rallied the Chilean military around the
country's constitution, allowing Allende to become president.
After failing to prevent Allende from taking office, US intelligence sought to
destabilize Chile by targeting the country's economy. The United States government
provided virtually no economic aid to the Chilean government and pressured the United
States Export-Import Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank
to withhold aid. Furthermore, Chilean businesses had difficulty acquiring goods from US
suppliers. Soon the country became politically polarized between pro- and anti-Allende
camps.
The United States also increased its military aid to Chilean dissidents and
expanded the training of Chilean military personnel in the United States and in Panama.
Furthermore, the CIA encouraged and aided labor strikes in the country. For example, in
October 1972, US intelligence supported a strike by private truck owners, which
disrupted the flow of many goods. Later, bus companies went on strike, as did many
professional workers. The CIA continued to influence the media and sought the support
of the military against Allende. Even in Washington, D.C., US intelligence bugged the
Chilean Embassy and stole documents. Despite these efforts, in the March 1973
congressional elections, Allende's coalition won 44 percent of the votes, a greater
percentage than it had won in 1970.
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In September 1973, the Chilean military acted, staging a coup that overthrew
Allende. Gen. Augusto Pinochet led the military coup that caused the death of Allende
and marked the beginning of a brutal dictatorship that lasted until 1989. Pinochet
abolished political parties, dissolved Congress, banned union activities, and suppressed
civil liberties. The Pinochet regime was also known for its human rights abuses, as
thousands of Chileans were tortured or killed.
According to Meade,
Beginning in 1974, prisoners were brought to the nearby airstrip and from there
they were loaded onto trucks and brought the short distance to Villa Grimaldi.
Those brought via the airﬁeld were combined with the people who were trucked
in from neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, and universities throughout the city.
The trucks pulled up to a wooden gate, which remains today, complete with the
sliding door that had enabled the guards to check the identity of the driver and his
cargo. The prisoners, all with arms tied behind their backs and blindfolded, were
unloaded in much the same way that livestock had been delivered to the villa
when it was a country estate. According to testimonies from ex-prisoners, six
agents “greeted” the arrivals with clubs. They were then taken to the “grill,” a
converted metal-frame bed, where they were subjected to one to one-and-a-half
hours of electric shock torture, not quite enough to kill them. Those who did pass
out or suffered heart attacks were revived by torturers (trained by military
physicians) who either threw cold water on the victims or performed CPR to keep
them alive. Variations on the standard shock torture included turning the “rack” of
the bed upside down or conducting the torture in front of the prisoner’s friends
and family members who were also being held. (2012, 129)
Regime Type
According to the Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities: United States Senate,
The CIA conducted a massive anti-Communist propaganda campaign using the
press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, direct mailings, paper streamers,
and wall paintings. The Agency directed a scare campaign at women using
images of Soviet tanks and Cuban firing squads. (Staff Report of the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities: United States Senate, published by the US Government Printing
Office, Washington: 1975, 148)
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The CIA’s covert action strategy relied heavily on propaganda in its attempt to
influence various sectors of Chilean society. One avenue was to spread the pro-Christian
Democratic message throughout the urban cities within the slums as well as outside the
urban environment to include villages and towns outside of the main city. The CIA also
heavily endorsed women’s groups that advocated an anti-communist message. They also
supported university student protests as well as women’s group marches.
According to the Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities: United States Senate,
Covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973
was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence Agency spent three
million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome of the 1964 Chilean
presidential elections. The range of clandestine activities undertaken by the CIA
includes covert action, clandestine intelligence collection, liaison with local police
and intelligence services, and counterintelligence (Staff Report of the Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities: United States Senate, published by the US Government Printing
Office, Washington: 1975, 148).
When the coup attempt failed and Allende was inaugurated president, the CIA
began funding opposition sectors in Chile. Declassified memorandum from an
interagency meeting held on 17 October 1970 read,
The Department of State paper entitled “Action in support of US Posture towards
Chile Par 2A states to bolster by covert action those forces opposed to the
establishment in Chile of a Marxist-Leninist system. Para Ten lists eight actions
as follows. Covert: Financial support to anti-Allende forces; financial support to
selected anti-Allende personalities in the armed forces. (Declassified
memorandum from the President to Jack Marsh, dated November 1, 1975)
The precedence set forth by US leaders in regard to Chile was that no amount of
money was too great to overthrow a communist regime. After the failure of the coup and
Allende’s eventual inauguration as the new president, the US still continued to pour
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millions of dollars into subverting the political system in Chile. Chile had initially begun
as a model for democracy and was viewed by the US as a platform for which to launch
new development programs. Ultimately, its tendency to lean toward communism was the
critical factor that changed the course of history. It took Allende four times as a
presidential candidate to finally win the presidency. A self-proclaimed Marxist, Allende
was able to persuade the people’s support through his grassroots approach to the
country’s development.
Conclusions
One of the interesting associations to note in the Chilean case study is the link
between leader characteristics and global instability. The United States viewed Allende
with suspicion and the CIA devoted much of its time to attempting to prevent his
ascension to power and when that tactic failed, to assassinating him. The external
influence from the United States had a direct influence on the leader’s demise. Allende’s
flamboyant leadership style, combined with his inability to manage his country’s
economic and political systems effectively, provided the CIA with ample opportunities to
dispose of him. Allende’s election was viewed as a defeat and direct threat to Chile’s
long-standing democracy. It was, after all, to that point, a model democracy.
This case study analyzed the effects of six causal conditions on the fate of leaders,
to include leadership characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict,
and regime type. With respect to leader characteristics, Allende was a member of the
minority population, he had a medical degree, and he was under the age of 40 years old
when he assumed power. Public dissent was a significant factor as the country was
thrown into chaos and economic upheaval as a result of political infighting between
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Marxist groups and governmental mismanagement of the country. He assumed power
during a time when Chile was held in high regard by the United States. As pertains to
global instability, the threat of communism was strong and heavily influenced foreign
policy behavior of the United States. Regarding internal conflict, the country was not in
a state of crisis at the time of the covert action event. The economy was strong and many
of the Chilean people were well off economically. With respect to regime type, Chile’s
long-term democracy was viewed in high regard by the United States. It was not until
Allende’s election that the United States expressed concerns about the fragility of Chile’s
role as a model democracy in the Americas.
Table 12 Membership of Chile with Survival Variables.
Variable/Membership

Fully
In

Leader Characteristics

X

Public Dissent
Global Instability
Internal Conflict

Mostly More In
In
Than
Out

X
X
X

Regime Type

X
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More
Out
Than In

Mostly
Out

Fully
Out

CHAPTER XII – CONCLUSIONS
“And soon now we shall go out of the house and go into the convulsion of the
world, out of history into history and the awful responsibility of Time.”20
― Robert Penn Warren, All the King's Men
Introduction
This dissertation sought to develop a model for covert action decisions that result
in leader survival. Additionally, this research uses neoclassical realism theory as the
theoretical framework through which to evaluate the relevant covert action literature.
The model proposed in this dissertation presents variables believed to influence the
potential for leader survival after a covert action event. Specifically, this research takes
into consideration the survival of the leaders replaced and their respective replacements
as well as details about their personal lives. Despite the large collections of Cold War era
covert action literature, many of the works are focused on the success or failure of the
events, the role of the CIA in facilitating the events, as well as the relevant literature on
the intelligence tradecraft used during these events. Not much, if any, of the literature is
focused on covert action from the perspective of the leader who experienced it. The
unique aspect of this research is that it delves into the political and socio-cultural contexts
of the targeted country at the time of the event. Each case study offered the researcher a
rare opportunity to become fully immersed in the personal and private lives of each
leader. The personal aspects of a leader are documented and meticulously researched in
order to uncover the driving force behind a leader’s future development, personal

20

Warren, Robert Penn. 1946. All the King’s Men. New York: NY. Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt Publishing Company.
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ambitions, private vices, and insatiable appetites for power, control, knowledge, and
compassion or, in some cases, cold-blooded brutality.
This research addresses the following research question: “To what extent, if any,
can leader survival be predicted based on analyses of US-sanctioned covert action events
during the Cold War?” From a review of the relevant literature on covert action,
international relations, and democracies, the following model was produced: Survival (s)
= Leader Characteristics (lc) + Public Dissent (Pd) + Global Instability (gi) + Internal
Conflict (IC) + Regime Type (RT) or s= lc+Pd+gi+IC+RT. In addition to the hypothesis
that, collectively, these factors determine the outcome of leader survival, it was further
proposed that leadership characteristics and regime type would have the most influence
on an outcome.
As stated in the methodology section, fsQCA is applicable in this research
because it remains relatively uncommon in international relations research. However, its
potential holds much promise. The foundation of QCA is the truth table which allows the
researcher to list and analyze many possible combinations of variables prior to arriving at
the outcome. Ragin and Rihoux outline the steps to creating a truth table: “First,
construct the truth table based on theoretical and case study information. Second,
analyze the truth table. Finally, take the results back to the cases and theory to evaluate
the findings” (2004, 4). Employing fsQCA this researcher assessed how various
constellations of leader characteristics, public dissent, global instability, internal conflict,
and regime type affected leader survival after covert action events.
Leader Characteristics (LDR) sets the foundation for the case study in relation to
the leader and the political and socio-cultural environments in the country at the time, as
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well as any relationships the leader had with American or other mentors, confidantes,
decision-makers, or advisors. Details captured in declassified national security
documents and psychological profiles of leaders gleaned from CIA documents and
personal biographies contributed to the assessment that those who had more agreeable
personalities and enjoyed close ties with the United States may have experienced a more
favorable fate. Conversely, leaders who did not enjoy close relations with US advisors,
who had disagreeable, violent, and irrational temperaments, tended to amplify the
political and socio-cultural situation in the country at the time, thereby resulting in a less
favorable fate.
Public dissent (DISS) explores the existence of protests or mass mobilization of
local populace against the leader at the time. The existence of mass protests or popular
dissatisfaction with the leader indicates a weak support network for the individual.
Intense tribal rivalries, hatred of minorities, discrimination and violence toward ethnic
minorities, and any type of social injustice are fuel to the fire for mass social movements
against a leader and their administration.
Global instability (INS) indicates that the country endured war or conflict that
may have altered its future course and demonstrates the influence of powerful political
actors: the United States represented democratic values and freedom while the Soviet
Union’s communist doctrine espoused socialism at all levels of society. A leader’s
position in either camp was an indicator of a favorable or unfavorable fate. In some
cases, such as that of Indonesia, a leader advocated for democratic values but had
intentions to ground it in communist doctrine.
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Internal conflict (CON) indicates that the country has experienced or is
experiencing a coup and/or revolution. Constant churning of political turmoil weakens
the country’s foundation and creates chaos at all levels. In addition, internal conflict
wreaks havoc on a country’s socio-economic conditions and eliminates it from being a
competitor in the global economy.
In many of the case studies under consideration in this dissertation, including Iran,
Guatemala, Chile, and Democratic Republic of the Congo, the country involved had
abundant amounts of natural resources that were seized or exploited by external forces.
Actions by leaders to regain these natural resources more often than not led to the
leader’s unfavorable fate.
Regime type (REG) describes the type of political system in place during the time
of the covert action event. Iran was a parliamentary political system operating as a
fledgling democracy; Guatemala was a praetorian-centric authoritarian regime that placed
an tremendous amount of authority and influence on the military; Indonesia was a
communist regime thinly veiled as a pseudo democracy; Chile had a reputation for being
a long-standing democracy until the election of Salvador Allende; Democratic Republic
of the Congo was a tribal-based governance that had a passionate desire to become a
democratically free country free from colonialism’s brutality; Dominican Republic’s
decades-long reign of terror at the hands of a brutal dictator; the Republic of Vietnam
was divided between the communists led by Ho Chi Min in the north and a puppet
president reluctant to risk his safety to pursue democracy for his people in the south; and
Cuba never pretended to be anything more than it was. Castro lived, breathed, and died a
communist leader. Surprisingly, the type of regime had a minimal effect on a leader’s
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favorable or unfavorable fate. Below, Table 14 offers a visual summary of the
relationships of the variables in relation to the factors of the model and their outcome. It
also demonstrates the different combinations that can be used in the QCA methodology.
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Table 13 Summary of Adherence to Factors of Model
Country

Leader

Public

Global

Internal

Regime Outcome

Characteristics Dissent Instability Conflict Type
(LDR)

Iran

Mostly In

(DISS)

More

(INS)

Fully In

(CON)

(REG)

Fully In

Mostly

In

Success

Out

Than
Out
Guatemala

Indonesia

Dominican

More Out

More

Than In

In

Out

Than

Than

Out

In

Fully In

Fully In

Republic

Fully In

Fully In

Fully In

More

Mostly

More In

Mostly

In

Than Out

Fully

More In

More

Mostly

In

than Out

Out

Out

Success

Unsuccessful

Out
Successful

Than In
Democratic
Republic of

Fully In

Mostly

More Out

Out

Than In

the Congo
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Fully In

Fully
In

Successful

Table 13
Continued
Cuba

Fully In

Mostly

Fully In

In

More

More

Out

Out

Than In

Than

Unsuccessful

In
Vietnam

Mostly Out

Mostly

Mostly In

In

Mostly

More

In

Out

Successful

Than
In
Chile

Fully In

Mostly

Fully In

In

Mostly

More

In

In

Successful

Than
Out

Successful Covert Action Events and Leader Survival
Most successful covert action events demonstrate a general adherence to the
factors of the model and indicate the validity of the model. The exceptions to this
observation indicate a potential relationship between the factors of the model,
combinations of factors, and a successful outcome. All of the successful cases, except for
Guatemala and the Republic of Vietnam, demonstrated a Fully In or Mostly In degree of
membership with the factor of Leadership Characteristics as predicted by the hypothesis.
In the successful cases that did not display a strong membership with this factor, they did
appear to display a strong adherence to global instability and internal conflict. In
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addition to indicating that successful cases do not necessarily adhere to all the principles
of the model, these cases point to a relationship between leader characteristics, global
instability, and internal conflict. Specifically, in cases where leadership characteristics
are not as strong, external influences creating global instability, as well as internal
conflict, resulted in a successful covert action event. The other general observation from
this initial review of the data is the importance of leadership characteristics and their
effects on regime type. This result indicates the reasonable assumption that a strong
leader personality profile is significant in predicting leader survival.
Among the successful programs, the cases that demonstrated the weakest
adherence to the factor of regime type, with six case studies of mostly out and more out
than in adherence, one of mostly in adherence, and one of more in adherence. It is
unclear if this factor is unimportant or in cases with strong adherence to leadership
characteristic, the leaders have strong ties to external governments or strong support from
the local populace. In addition, all of the cases demonstrated more in than out, mostly in,
and fully in adherence. This result confirmed that public dissent is an influential variable
in determining leader survival.
Failed Covert Action Events and Leader Survival
The failed case studies were not too remarkably different from the successful case
studies. Both failed case studies demonstrated a strong adherence to leader
characteristics, public dissent, global instability, and internal conflict. Additionally, they
showed a weak adherence to regime type. An interesting note with these case studies is
that they demonstrated different relationships to external forces. In the case of Indonesia,
Sukarno had a positive relationship with the United States and enjoyed support in his
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“Guided Democracy” vision. In the case of Cuba, Castro did not enjoy a positive
relationship with the United States and was aggressive in his support to building Cuba’s
communist regime.
As with the successful case studies, the lack of adherence to the factors of the
model does not imply causation. However, the failed case studies do suggest a
correlation between leader characteristics, relationships with the United States, and leader
survival.
It is important to note that this model is a preliminary proposal based on a
minimum list of critical conditions. These conditions can be mixed in a variety of
combinations. However, the main point to make in this research is that the conditions do
not work in isolation to create the result. To create this idea, the researcher was careful to
choose case studies that included the same silver-lined threading through them (USsanctioned covert action) but was unfamiliar with all of the case studies until the research
process began. This approach ensured that the research could capture all the details
during the discovery phase to discover case-specific configurations that explain how
leader survival is influenced by personality characteristics, public dissent, global
instability, internal conflict, and regime type. The discovery phase was enjoyable and
Rihoux and Ragin’s describe the process clearly when they assert, “Surprising results
then provide opportunities for further explorations to refine theory” (Rihoux and Ragin
2009).
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Leader Characteristics (LDR)
To measure charisma, neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience,
agreeableness, and conscientiousness, the researcher explored psychological profiles and
transcripts from declassified sources as well as open source biographies and articles. The
resulting scale has a sample range from 0.6 (very high leader characteristics) to 0.01
(very low leader characteristics).
Public Dissent (DISS)
Public dissent is measured by major episodes of political violence as documented
by the State Fragility and Warfare in the Global System Database. The 1953 ouster of
Iran’s Mossadegh government by the shah’s loyalists resulted in 800 deaths. Civil
violence experienced in Guatemala under the Arbenz regime resulted in 1,000 deaths.
The 1957–1961 Indonesia civil violence, attributed to dissident military members,
resulted in 30,000 deaths. There were no major episodes of political violence listed for
Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1960–1961. Chile’s civil violence in 1973 as a
result of the army’s ouster of army of Allende resulted in 5,000 deaths. No major
episodes of political violence listed for Dominican Republic from 1959–1961; no major
episodes of political violence were listed for Republic of Vietnam in 1963. Finally,
the1961–1962 Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba resulted in 700 deaths. The resulting scale
has a sample range from 0.6 (very high level of public dissent) to 0.01 (very low level of
public dissent).
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Global Instability (INS)
Global instability is captured by the major political violence events occurring
during the time of the event. The Governance Indicator developed by Kaufmann et al.
(2011) combine political independence, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, into an index for government effectiveness that ranges from -2.5 to +2.5.
Internal Conflict (CON)
Iran
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the abolition of the monarchy occurred at the
same time as the new Islamic Republic of Iran that combined elements of a parliamentary
democracy with a Shiite Islamic theocracy. Since 1946, Iran had been involved in both
interstate and intrastate conflicts.
Guatemala
Dominated by the conservative landholding class, aristocratic rule created an
unstable political climate with military coups and conflicts along social class lines.
Human rights abuses at the hands of government-affiliated death squads were the
trademark for the regime.
Indonesia
Political infighting, undisputed territory, and an Indonesian government that was
undecided between democracy and communism created a fertile environment for volatile
Islamic movements, leading to intrastate conflict over governmental control. A narcissist
leader with a leaning toward socialist doctrine prevented the country from achieving a
stable form of governance.
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Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic became a sovereign state in 1865. Governance in 20th
century vacillated between political upheavals and autocracy. The era of dictatorship was
dipped in a prolonged bloodbath that transcended three decades under Rafael Trujillo’s
rule.
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Tribal infighting, inexperienced political leaders, and a strong collective memory
of brutal colonial rule culminated in a string of presidents all elected under
unconstitutional means.
Cuba
Castro’s regime became increasingly anti-American as its economic reforms
collided with American interests in the country. The reforms also led to the exodus of
thousands of upper- and middle-class Cubans, primarily to the USA.
Republic of Vietnam
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north controlled by the communist
Viet min led by Ho Chi Minh and the and the Republic of Vietnam in the south led by a
US-supported Diem.
Chile
Allende’s narcissist leadership style ultimately resulted in a coup against his
democratically-elected Socialist party.
Regime Type (REG)
Iran=independents; Guatemala=military governments; Indonesia=nationalist
party; Democratic Republic of the Congo=Democratic Union for the Defense of African
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Interests; Chile=Salvador Allende=military government; Dominican Republic=Rafael L.
Trujillo; Republic of Vietnam=military governments; Cuba=Castro's government.
Through a review of the relevant doctrine in the literature, the researcher
predicted that Leader Characteristics would be the most influential factor in the model.
The argument for the importance of Leadership Characteristics is logical. Charismatic
leadership can overcome the most difficult situations, and this is the reason that Leader
Characteristic was determined to be the most important factor.
The connection between Leader Characteristic and Regime Type is logical.
Leaders are tied to the institution they lead which, in turn, drives internal and external
responses. Due to the secrecy and violent nature of covert action events and the necessity
to keep the information from public scrutiny, Global Instability turned out to be one of
the most influential factors in the case studies. American leaders assumed that
communism was the greatest threat and the United States would eliminate it at all cost.
The long-term consequences of these covert action events are seen today. Public dissent
and internal conflict were also important factors in leader survival.
Subset/Superset Analysis
To determine the coverage, consistency, and combined score of coverage and
consistency, the next step was to analyze the cases using the superset/subset function of
the fsQCA program. This procedure analyzes how well the outcome, or dependent
variable “success” rate, fits with the necessary conditions in this case the factors of the
model that produced that outcome, as specified in Table 15.
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Table 14 Superset Analysis
Factor

Consistency Coverage

Combined

Leader Characteristics (LDR)

0.961493

0.817518

0.703680

Public Dissent (DISS)

0.745314

0.717693

0.887707

Global Instability (INS)

0.920097

0.762431

0.920139

Internal Conflict (CON)

0.663362

0.615693

0.698630

Regime Type (REG)

0.617161

0.612377

0.653244

Analysis of Necessary Conditions
An analysis of necessary conditions allows researchers with another tool to
measure consistency and coverage. In this case, “consistency assesses the degree to
which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought to be
necessary, while coverage assesses the relevance of the necessary condition—the degree
to which instances of the condition are paired with instances of the outcome” (Ragin
2008, 44–45). This analysis provides insight into potential interactions among factors in
the model and the influence of adherence to one factor relative to adherence to others.
The analysis of necessary conditions among successful cases provided some
validation of the model and some differences. If the model is correct, leadership
characteristics, public dissent, and global instability should have the highest consistency
scores. Interestingly, regime type demonstrated the lowest coverage score, indicating that
it is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to produce a successful outcome on its own.
The necessary condition analysis also produced other interesting coverage results.
The ranking among the factors from most to least significant was leader characteristics,
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public dissent, internal conflict, global instability, and regime type. The high score for
public dissent is possibly because the factor is inherent to the political-social element and
social movements. It is also possible that this factor is dependent on the duration of the
leader’s tenure as well as divisions within the population based on ethnicity, economic
status, and literacy rate among others. All of the successful cases considered unfolded
during the Cold War context, so by necessity, all of the programs had to be designed to
be as self-sufficient as possible.
Table 15 Analysis of Necessary Conditions among Successful Cases
Factor

Consistency

Coverage

Leader Characteristics (LDR)

0.812030

0.962138

Public Dissent (DISS)

0.630150

0.626753

Global Instability (INS)

0.714286

0.957179

Internal Conflict (CON)

0.810150

0.962054

Regime Type (REG)

0.440226

0.467961

Leader characteristics and public dissent proved to be the most critical factors in
producing failure. The other finding of note was the lack of adherence to regime type.
This result again suggests that this factor is a necessary, but not sufficient condition.
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Table 16 Analysis of Necessary Conditions among Failed Cases
Factor

Consistency

Coverage

Leader Characteristics (LDR)

.173913

1

Public Dissent (DISS)

.086957

1

Global Instability (INS)

.086957

1

Internal Conflict (CON)

.086957

1

Regime Type (REG)

0

0

Fuzzy Set Calibration
As identified in the previous section, local accountability and sustainability scored
higher than predicted in consistency and coverage. As mentioned earlier, this could
possibly be caused by the influence of other factors in the model or other environmental
factors common to all the cases. FsQCA allows for this phenomenon through a process
of “calibration” (Ragin 2008, 16–17; 85–96). Informed by the available literature and
familiarity with the sample of cases, calibration allows for individual factors to be
weighted to account for their overall importance and influence on the other factors and to
mitigate overrepresented factors. In the calibration process, to structure the fuzzy set,
each factor is assigned three qualitative breakpoints: full membership, cross-over point,
and threshold for non-membership.
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Fuzzy Set Analysis
Using the calibrated values, a fuzzy set analysis of necessary conditions was
conducted. The results shown in Table 18 supported the model’s prediction that leader
characteristics and global instability are the two of the most necessary and sufficient
factors in determining a successful outcome. Interestingly, incorporation of public
dissent ranked the third highest in coverage. This could be because adherence to this
factor in the cases was usually an existing undercurrent of social unrest based on sociocultural factors. The results also indicate that leader characteristics and internal conflict
are influenced by the other factors and socio-cultural conditions common to all the cases.
Table 17 Fuzzy Set Analysis
Factor

Consistency

Coverage

Leader Characteristics (LDR)

0.761278

0.959716

Public Dissent (DISS)

0.868421

0.700585

Global Instability (INS)

0.855263

0.899210

Internal Conflict (CON)

1.000000

0.886667

Regime Type (REG)

0.435667

0.457578

Analysis and Comparison of Results
The hierarchy predicted by the model and the crisp and fuzzy set analyses were
consistent in the finding that leader characteristic is the most critical factor in determining
a successful outcome. This finding is intuitive, but also informative for policymakers in
determining whether to engage in covert action strategy. While less costly than executing
large forces, unconventional forces that execute covert action are inexpensive in
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manpower or material, comparatively speaking. The other critical factors identified by
the model, internal conflict and regime type did not fare as well in crisp set analysis.
Interestingly, after calibration the scores for internal conflict and regime type both
experienced lower scores as it became apparent that they were highly influenced by other
factors in the model.
Cross-Case Comparative Analysis
According to Stretton (1969, 158), “Cross-case analysis examines the
commonalities and difference in the events, activities, and processes of case studies.
Additionally, it is conducted in order to “extend the investigator's experience beyond the
single case by provoking her or his imagination, prompting new questions, seeking new
dimensions, measuring alternatives, creating models, and constructing ideal types and
utopias.” Ragin (1997) adds, “Another purpose of engaging in cross-case analysis is to
enhance researchers' capacity to understand "how" relationships may exist among
discrete cases, accumulate knowledge on the original case, refine or develop concepts.
Mossadegh was described as highly emotional, an aristocrat, and a gifted orator.
He shared similar characteristics to Indonesia’s Sukarno, Democratic Republic of the
Congo’s Lumumba, and Cuba’s Castro who exuded self-confidence and were wellknown as being gifted communicators. Mossadegh, Sukarno, and Castro were physical
communicators who tamed the crowd through visible demonstrations of emotions.
Lumumba, on the other hand, was more reserved but his speeches were deeply
intellectual in content. All of these leaders had the ability to relate to people on many
different levels. It is interesting to note that Lumumba and Sukarno had left their rural
homes for life in the big city. Both were greatly influenced by their cultural experiences.
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Guatemala’s Arbenz was known for having an unsteady personality and lack of personal
discipline and self-control. He attempted to commit suicide and had multiple bouts with
mental depression. Dominican Republic’s Allende was described as a chameleonic
person, vain, quick tempered, easily offended, socially ambitious, charming, and
womanizing. Trujillo came from a modest, barely literate rural family and was not
considered well-educated. He demonstrated the fascination with personal appearance,
clothing, and military decorations that suited him for a military career. Diem was often
described as cool and aloof by American advisors. He stood firmly by his Confucian
faith and displayed stoicism to the public, even while experiencing tremendous hardship,
believing that the traditional family and cultural ways of the Vietnamese should be
protected from new, modernized changes. Castro lived austerely, in almost Spartan
conditions: there is no need for luxury; his furniture is sober; his food is frugal, healthy,
and macrobiotic. His are the habits of a solder-monk. Described as having a thunderous
voice, he would often pause in mid-speech, raise his index finger, and point in an effort to
tame the crowd (2007, 13). He believed passionately that any change that would come to
Cuba would be determined and implemented from within the country. Despite
international pressure imposed by commercial, economic, and financial embargoes led by
the United States in the early 1960s, Castro remained stalwart in his vision for the
country.
Fuzzy Set Truth Table Analysis
The final analysis conducted was the fuzzy set truth table analysis. The function
of this analysis is to “determine the connections between combinations of causal
conditions and an outcome” (Ragin 2008, 109). The standard analysis provides three sets
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of solutions: complex, parsimonious, and intermediate. The complex case provides a
solution that avoids counterfactual cases. The parsimonious case provides the simplest
case with the fewest casual conditions through the use of counterfactual cases. The
intermediate case allows for inclusion of the most reasonable counterfactual cases. The
strength of this analytical method is it determines multiple pathways to a similar
outcome.
The parsimonious solution includes two causal pathways: leader characteristics
and internal conflict. The overall solution was calculated to have coverage of 0.998175
and a consistency of 0.868254. In this solution, each term is measured by their degree
membership in each possible solution for the outcome and the proportion each factor
contributes to the explanatory value in each potential solution. The importance of this
finding to policymakers is that understanding a leader’s personality profile is an
important consideration in designing a covert action strategy.
The intermediate solution provided to causal pathways leading to a successful
outcome. The first is leader survival, public dissent, and global instability. The second is
internal conflict and regime type. These pathways provide an overall consistency of
0.875614 and an overall coverage of 0.976277. These two pathways are instructive in
that they indicate two realistic sets of conditions that can produce a successful outcome.
In cases where leader characteristics are strong, regime type was not clearly defined, and
internal conflict is strong, the more advantageous the opportunity to execute a successful
covert action event. Public dissent is also another factor that influences the probability
for success in creating a permissive environment. This research contributes to the study
of covert action literature in three ways. First, it analyzes political and socio-cultural
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conditions that existed in the countries. Previous works have focused on these conditions
from a US perspective. Second, contrary to most Cold War era covert action studies, this
dissertation focuses on leader personality profiles within the context of the environment
at that time. Finally, this research focuses on factors influencing leader survival, whereas
previous research focused on the CIA’s use of covert action, foreign policy from US
presidents’ perspective, and, more often than not, the failures of these events and their
exploitation as depicted by popular culture and media at the time. Covert action will
continue to exist and US presidents will need to know how to execute it smartly. This
research also shows the limits of covert action, the nuances of the intelligence tradecraft,
the impact of US foreign policy on developing countries, and the long-lasting effects of
those decisions. Additional research may include a more in-depth look at the correlation
between leader characteristics and other covert action events in history. More detail will
be revealed once intelligence derived from these events become declassified.
Future Research
This study proposed a model for utilizing covert action options while remaining
cognizant of leader survival. The model correctly hypothesized that the most important
factor influencing the success of covert action was the relationship between the leader
and the entity executing the covert action event. The model also shows that a balanced
adherence to the factors of the model correlates to a successful outcome.
The limited nature of this dissertation research requires that additional
investigation be conducted, as three of the failed case studies were dropped because of a
lack of evidence or a failure to fit the case study selection criteria. More research needs
to be conducted on failed cases to confirm the findings of the two failed case studies
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examined in this study. Specifically, it is important to confirm that a general lack of
adherence to the factors of this model consistently produce failure. Additional research
could expand the data set or focus on a new set of cases as data from more covert action
events becomes available.
Covert action operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will provide fertile ground for
future research as records are declassified and the passage of time allows for a more
settled perspective on the cases. Additional research could also be conducted on leader
characteristics on predicting social movements, coup-proofing, violent uprisings, among
others. If the results continue to confirm the findings of this study, the US military and
civilian intelligence organizations may consider adopting the factors of this model as part
of their covert action planning process.
Another avenue for research lies in a more granular examination of the individual
cases examined in this research. Personality profiles such as Patrice Lumumba are rich in
detail and there is so much more to explore. The same can be said for the other seven
case studies. Each case study offered a glimpse into the personalities and personal lives
of the leaders who lived during that time. The most rewarding part of the research
process was having the opportunity to enter into each case in order to truly understand the
leader’s psychological, emotional, and physical conditions. This dissertation can be
expanded to include personality profiles on each leader, a comparative study of two
leaders with similar or dissimilar outcomes, the factors leading to leader assassination,
and the strategic perspective of the impact of leader assassination on a foreign policy.
Another aspect of this study was the fascinating correlation between leader
survival and US foreign policy. In many cases such as Indonesia, Chile, and the Republic
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of Vietnam, US senior leaders enjoyed close and personal relationships with the leaders.
The most important implication for this research is as a planning tool for planners and
military and political leaders faced with conducting covert action events with limited time
and resources. The decision to initiate a covert action event should be informed by the
presence or absence of the factors or conditions presented in this model. If they are not
present or cannot be created, the creation of a covert action program should be rejected.
If they are present, planners can use this model as a set of guiding principles when
deciding on the organization of a program and as a selection criterion to choose which
areas provide a more fertile ground to start and expand the program.
Finally, this study illustrates that political leaders must make the hard decision to
provide early support to understanding leader characteristics and cultivate relationships
based on these characteristics. Specifically, senior leaders in the civilian and military
spheres of influence may also benefit from the research conducted in this study. This
research has contributed to the understanding of an understudied element of covert action
research and results of this research confirm the assertion presented in the introduction
that the factors contained in this model should be included in covert action planning.
Policy Recommendation
Utilizing the model presented in this study, a leader may be able to make a more
educated decision about the use of covert action which may, in turn, save the lives of
many. Additionally, the President of the United States has the ultimate authority in the
approval of covert action. Having the option to choose between war and diplomacy, the
President as well as senior civilian and military leaders must understand how policy
shapes the choice between covert action and traditional military engagements. The
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traditional use of military force is actualized through large, conventional forces requiring
complex logistical planning and movement of troops and equipment, in addition to the
basing requirements for each operation. These types of conventional wars also serve as
symbols of US military power.
While covert action requires meticulous planning, it also offers a sophisticated
option that is as influential as large conventional force. Additionally, the 2018 National
Defense Strategy clearly states objectives on how to develop a lethal, agile force that is
prepared to fight wars in multiple domains. Moreover, it states that the US military
should be “strategically predictable” but also “operationally unpredictable” (National
Defense Strategy 2018, 5).
Finally, in regard to the intelligence tradecraft, the CIA should be the critical node
for the subtle and sophisticated implementation of covert influence operations while
unconventional military forces execute the tactical side. The 2017 National Security
Strategy supported the model stating, “To prevail, we must integrate all elements of
America’s national power—political, economic, and military….The United States must
develop new concepts and capabilities to protect our homeland, advance our prosperity,
and preserve peace.” It is also bolstered by the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which
clearly outlines the current and future state of warfare: “Deterring or defeating long-term
strategic competitors is a fundamentally different challenge….[O]operations must
introduce unpredictability to adversary decision makers….[W]e will challenge
competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts,
precluding their options while expanding their own, and forcing them to confront conflict
under adverse conditions.”
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The future of warfare requires a re-assessment of the traditional international
order. Long gone are the days of dual global superpowers and easily discernible friends
and foes. The next generation of wars will be fought in unconventional urban
environments by small, specialized teams of experts in the human and cyber domains.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies Russia and China as the “near peer”
competitors willing to exploit the vulnerabilities of their enemies through any means
possible. Moreover, this research presents a model for the effective utilization of covert
action with a focus on how the Department of Defense can leverage sensitive activities in
a complementary effort to execute the mission in any combat environment. More
importantly, this model places the emphasis on the importance of humans over hardware.
The focus on the human aspect of covert action holds endless possibilities: by
understanding the minds of the leaders, one is able to influence the individual’s decisionmaking processes, instill doubt in his/her leadership abilities, leverage and exploit
leaders’ strengths and weaknesses. A more in-depth look at the psychological, cognitive,
analytical, and critical thinking abilities of leaders may also be beneficial to the next
iteration of this research study. QCA has the potential to be an effective tool in policyoriented research. The option to assess combinations of factors offers much creativity
and flexibility to the researcher. There is still plenty of work to be done. This is only the
beginning. In sum, the future of warfare is based on the human terrain and success on the
battlefield comes from understanding the mind of the foe.
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